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 STARTERS
When in doubt, deregulate?
“As an advice-giving profession we are in way over our heads.”
Robert E. Lucas*
Regulatory reform, privatization, and competition policy have been embraced by policy makers in the Netherlands
during the 1990s. Competitive markets and the information contained in market prices have been accepted by
economists as important tools for coordination of individual actions in a decentralized economy for far longer.
Unfortunately, policy makers’ actions and their desired effects may not coincide with economists’ tools and their
expected outcomes derived under specific conditions. Unleashing competitive forces enhances efficiency, lowers
prices and speeds innovation, if certain assumptions hold. Privatization, removal of entry barriers, prohibition of
collusion, and reduction of governmental interventions boost economic growth, unless they don’t...
The mismatch between policy makers’ requirements for real-world advice in real-time
and economists’ predilection for circumscribed theoretical constructs made upon reflection is
not a new phenomenon. The abuse of Keynesian theories through the policy rule-of-thumb
“when in doubt, stimulate demand” led to stagflation and structural fiscal deficits. What may be
the economic outcome if modern regulation theories were abused through “when in doubt,
deregulate?”
Rather than wait for such a future, CPB conducts research on issues related to
competition and translates results into a form that may aid policy makers in making informed
choices. A selection of the research is included in this special theme issue of CPB Report. The
analyses attempt to find novel policy combinations to cope with market or government failure
and try to bring to the foreground the trade-offs inherent in political choices.
The research methodology at CPB in the area of competition is eclectic, as perusal of the
articles will reveal. Case studies can highlight the pros and cons of various policy measures that
strengthen market mechanisms. An analytical framework designed at CPB points researchers to
the industrial organization models appropriate for study of a particular market. The case studies
presented here not only provide sector-specific detail, but also are prototypes of research into
more generic questions. The retrospective analysis of liberalization of shop-opening hours is an example of a study
to monitor the effects of past policy changes. The empirical analysis of pricing in the coffee market displays a method
to flag noncompetitive pricing behavior. The study of the communication and information sector shows how
scenarios can be used to evaluate the future effects of  policy choices. The case study on health care applies
combinations of market and non-market mechanisms to improve the position on trade-offs. A summary of the
aggregate effects of intensified competition using two different macroeconomic models available at CPB uncovers the
need for special purpose models. A step towards meeting the need is provided in an article that reveals the effects of
a change in competition on industry structure and welfare by means of small theoretical model.
Overall, research at CPB shows that significant efficiency gains can be reaped by relying more on market
mechanisms in a wide variety of areas in the Dutch economy. Our responsibility to policy makers lies in
communicating the obstacles that need to be overcome and the trade-offs associated with policy choices. Policy
makers, for their part, have the responsibility to make the difficult choices.
Eric J. Bartelsman
* Robert E. Lucas, 1981, “Rules, discretion, and the role of the economic advisor,” p.259, in Studies in Business-Cycle
Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge.
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The cut-off date used in the compilation of the projec-
tions in ECONOMIC OUTLOOK was end November.
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  ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
*For more information, contact Wim Hulsman (tel: 31-70-3383309;
e-mail: whu@cpb.nl).
The world economy:
short-term developments*
Abstract
Recent short-term forecasts for the world economy
project a continuing strong growth of world output in
combination with low inflation. In fact, the views have
not changed much during the past three to six months.
The unchanged assessment for the world economy is
remarkable in view of the unexpected cyclical develop-
ments in major industrial countries and major shocks in
the Asian area.
Samenvatting
De jongste ramingen voor de wereldeconomie behelzen
een aanhoudend krachtige groei van de wereldproductie
gecombineerd met een lage inflatie. In de afgelopen drie
tot zes maanden zijn de inzichten omtrent de wereld als
geheel opvallend weinig veranderd, in het licht van het
onverwachte conjunctuurverloop in enkele grote
industrielanden en de aanzienlijke schokken in de
Aziatische regio.
Recent developments
International stock markets plummeted in October, and the
Asian area has been hit by a financial crisis. The US and the
UK economies showed unexpected strong growth, while
optimism about the Japanese recovery has dwindled. In
continental Europe the recovery is gathering momentum
as expected. Noteworthy developments concerning EMU
include the growing determination of EU governments to
start EMU in time with a widespread participation, and the
British decision not to join in the first wave.
Favorable prospects for the industrial world
Overall growth in the industrial world will remain favorable,
with real GDP expanding at 2¾% this year and 2½% next.
Inflation in the industrial countries will remain muted. Spare
capacity is large in much of the area, in particular in conti-
nental Europe and Japan. In continental Europe, consumer
price inflation rates have largely converged at slightly
above 1½%, and next year’s rates will not be much higher.
Japan’s inflation rate hovers around ½%. Both US and UK
economies face considerable uncertainty about how close
activity is to the point at which demand pressure would
ignite inflation. Inflation may pick up somewhat in the UK
and the US, but several indicators suggest a continuation
of noninflationary growth.
American economy still going strong
Although the American economy is ahead in the current
cycle, growth will be rather strong well into the coming
year. Production has continued to increase above the trend
rate, and survey evidence points to buoyant output also in
the period ahead. In the third quarter, domestic demand
grew strongly. High confidence reflected strong employ-
ment rises, with unemployment falling below the level
generally considered to be the natural rate. Net exports fell
further, reflecting dollar appreciation as well as stronger
domestic demand than abroad. Despite low unemploy-
ment, inflation has remained low, with consumer prices
rising by only 2¼% year on year, falling producer prices and
the lowest rise in unit labor costs for years. Cheap oil and
computer chips and the stronger dollar contributed to the
favorable inflation picture.
Japanese recovery delayed
Some strengthening of economic activity in Japan can be
expected, given the competitive yen, low interest costs and
less fiscal restraint. The current problems in the financial
sphere, however, may delay the rebound of activity. Indeed,
the recovery has been quite erratic ever since it began in
mid-1993. Last year’s strong growth was followed by a
good first quarter, but private consumption fell sharply in
the second quarter of this year due to the consumption tax
hike from 3 to 5% in April. Consumption has remained slug-
gish, although the impact of the tax increase is gradually
subsiding. Net exports and corporate investment, in con-
trast, have been supporting economic activity. Thus, in-
come and employment conditions have improved, which
favors an early recovery of consumers’ expenditure. Next
year may bring a gradual economic recovery, if private
consumption and exports cooperate. Net exports have
contributed much to the recovery of the past two years.
However, export prospects have become less bright due to
the Asian financial crisis.  As far as prices are concerned, the
depressing effect of cheaper imports has weakened. Do-
mestic wholesale prices, however, have remained under
downward pressure, reflecting stock adjustment and inno-
vation-induced cost reductions of electrical goods.
European upswing continues
In continental Europe, exports will remain supportive next
year, given strong expected market growth and improved
competitiveness. Nevertheless, the impulses will increas-
ingly come from domestic demand, in response to low in-
terest rates and strengthening confidence of households
and companies. In the UK, however, the top of the cycle
may have been reached now, due to the combination of
tight fiscal and monetary policies and a less competitive
sterling. Output has continued to grow at an annual rate of
about 4% in the third quarter. Some evidence suggests that
the pace of activity may be slowing, in particular in the
services sector. Net exports have fallen surprisingly little in
view of sterling’s appreciation of some 20% since August
last year. However, this is expected to adversely affect ex-
ports during the coming year, as profit margins of export-
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Table 1   International key data, 1996-1998
1996 1997 1998
annual percentage changes
GDP VOLUME
United States 2.8 3¾ 2½
Japan 3.5 ¾ 2
European Union 1.7 2½ 2¾
Industrial countries 2.5 2¾ 2½
WORLD TRADE VOLUME 6.0 8½ 8¼
WORLD TRADE PRICE   ($ terms) –1.5 –7 ¾
Manufactures –3.3 –7½ 1
Crude oil (fob) 20.3 –7 –2½
Raw materials, excl. energy –9.6 1½ 1¼
Crude oil price (Brent, level, $/barrel) 20.65 19¼ 18¾
Dmark/dollar exchange rate (level) 1.50 1.73 1.73
ers have fallen quite substantially. The monetary and fiscal
tightening earlier this year and the unwinding of the impact
of windfall spending on consumption, will substantially
reduce the rate of output growth next year. Still, domestic
demand is expected to remain relatively buoyant. The un-
derlying inflation has risen already to 2¼% at an annual
rate. Official interest rates have been increased twice in the
third quarter and most recently in November by a further
½%, to contain demand pressures. Lower import prices
were reflected in rising profit margins on domestic sales
rather than in a lower domestic price level. Up to now, earn-
ings growth has remained broadly flat, despite a consider-
able tightening of the labor market.
German output has grown during the first three quarters
of this year by about 2½ percent at an annual rate. Fluctua-
tions in the quarter-to-quarter rates were due mainly to
different numbers of working days. Export-oriented produc-
tion sectors are doing quite well since summer last year,
reflecting improved competitiveness on account of a
weaker Deutschemark and falling unit labor costs. Sectors
producing for the home market, however, suffer from near-
stagnating domestic demand. Modest income growth de-
presses consumer expenditure; private consumption
stabilized in the third quarter. Building activity has been de-
clining continuously for 2½ years, reflecting oversupply as
well as public consolidation efforts. Demand for investment
goods rose only slightly, although capacity utilization has
become rather high. Unemployment is stabilizing. In these
circumstances, consumption will contribute only little to
output growth in the near future. The recovery will thus
remain export-led for the time being.
The economic strengthening in France shows a similar
profile as in Germany, with a respectable 2½% annual
growth rate during 1997. The external sector remained the
main source of economic recovery in the first half of this
year, benefiting from strong market growth and a favorable
exchange rate. Foreign demand is likely to remain dynamic,
although the contribution to growth will weaken. Domes-
tic demand, however, is beginning to pick up — first
stockbuilding, and in the second half of the year also private
consumption. Pessimism has diminished appreciably in
recent months. Investors are still hesitant, but some
strengthening of investment can be expected, provided that
demand prospects remain favorable. Employment growth
accelerated since early this year, but labor supply is rather
strong; the reduction in unemployment will thus be slow.
Inflation is expected to remain subdued, as in the rest of
continental Europe.
The upturn in Italy is relatively slow, reflecting weaker
competitiveness as well as substantial fiscal consolidation
efforts. Still the situation has improved. Year-on-year
growth may have been close to 2% in the second and third
quarters of 1997. Investment in equipment started to re-
cover early in 1997, in particular in the car sector and related
industries. Apart from a buoyant demand for cars, con-
sumption remained weak. However, also this component
is expected to strengthen next year. Inflation has shown a
remarkable slowdown to less than 2%. Just as remarkable
is the reduction of the government deficit from 6¾ of GDP
in 1996 to a projected 3% this year, even considering the
one-off character of a number of the measures taken.
Asian crisis
South East Asian equity markets fell sharply in the third
quarter of this year, first in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thai-
land, while Korea followed in November. At the same time,
a number of currencies fell sharply (20 to 40%) against the
dollar. The origin of the financial turbulence lies in a pro-
longed period of excessive bank credit growth, the weak
financial system and the overvaluation of national curren-
cies. Loss of confidence led to a rush of capital to safe
havens abroad and substantial currency depreciations.
This will depress growth and import demand of the af-
fected countries, but exports may surge thanks to a
dramatic improvement of competitiveness. The outside
world will experience slower market growth as well as a
loss of market shares. This applies in particular to Japan,
as 40% of its exports remain within the region. The US and
the EU are less exposed. If the turmoil does not spread over
the entire region — at present the main victims are the four
tigers and Korea — the impact on other countries than Ja-
pan will be rather modest, probably a loss of some tenths
of percentage points of economic growth. Japan, being al-
ready in a weak position, may have to boost domestic
demand to sustain growth, while also supplying capital to
the countries under attack. If contagion goes much further,
spreading to China and Hong Kong, and perhaps to non-
Asian countries like Brazil and Russia, the ultimate effect
could be a retreat to safe assets such as bonds and shares
of the large industrial countries. This scenario can be
avoided by support operations, fiscal and external adjust-
ment and longer-term reform. The first steps to restore
confidence have been taken by the IMF, together with the
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the govern-
ments of the US and Japan.
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The Dutch economy:
short-term developments*
*For more information, contact John van der Lem (tel: 31-70-3383401;
email:jtnvdl@cpb.nl).
Abstract
The Dutch economy performs well. Strong domestic de-
mand boosted GDP-growth in 1997 to 3¼%. Next year,
Dutch GDP will increase by almost 4%, due to accelerat-
ing exports. The CPI accelerated in the course of 1997,
partly caused by incidental factors, i.e. higher prices of
harvest products. Furthermore, higher import prices
were reflected in the CPI, but with a lag. However, next
year inflation is expected to decelerate slightly. Profit
margins on consumption are not expected to narrow
further. Labor costs are expected to increase moderately
and, as a consequence, business profitability can im-
prove slightly. Under these circumstances, employment
growth in the Netherlands remains substantial (over 2%).
The number of unemployed should thus fall from 7½%
of the labor force in 1996 to under 6% next year.
Samenvatting
De Nederlandse economie presteert goed. Dankzij een
krachtige binnenlandse vraag steeg het BBP-volume in
1997 met 3¼%. Omdat volgend jaar de uitvoergroei zal
versnellen, kan het BBP dan toenemen met bijna 4%. Het
inflatietempo steeg weliswaar in de loop van 1997, maar
dat is deels veroorzaakt door incidenteel hogere prijzen
voor oogstproducten. Daarnaast zijn, met enige vertraging,
de gestegen invoerprijzen zichtbaar geworden in de CPI.
Voor volgend jaar wordt op een afnemend inflatietempo
gerekend, waarbij de winstmarges op consumptie niet
verder verslechteren. Omdat ook de loonkosten zich
gematigd blijven ontwikkelen, kan de winstgevendheid
volgend jaar iets verbeteren. De werkgelegenheid groeit
onder deze omstandigheden uitbundig met ruim 2% per
jaar. Hierdoor kan de werkloosheid verder afnemen van
7½% in 1996 tot onder de 6% van de beroepsbevolking
volgend jaar.
has encouraged households to borrow appreciably more
in the first three quarters. This is true for consumer credit
as well as mortgage loans. The latter include both
remortgaging at lower rates of interest and taking out new
second mortgages on the basis of steeply appreciated eq-
uity. Given the indicator of consumer willingness-to-buy,
households should continue to spend freely in the coming
months. This indicator for expenditure on durable goods in
particular now stands at a higher level than during the 1989-
1990 boom years.
Investment growth rates exceed those of household
consumption. Both private residential investment and busi-
ness investment in plant and machinery were strong in the
first half of 1997, according to recent figures published by
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). It is true that construction-re-
lated investment growth is distorted upwards by the cold
spell early last year, but even allowing for this, investment
activity is very vibrant indeed. Leading indicators, such as
building permits granted and commissions for architects,
point to a sustained growth in investment in residential, in-
dustrial and commercial buildings during the second half
of this year and the early part of next year. Also the increase
in investments in machinery— Statistics Netherlands has
reported more than 10% growth for the first half year— is
distorted upwards, in this case by the completion of a major
project in the energy sector. But here the underlying trend
is strong as well. Not only foreign suppliers of capital goods
benefit from dynamic Dutch demand; the engineering
industry’s domestic sales are also up, by 8% in value terms
over the first three quarters. Leading indicators, such as
orders received by the domestic capital-goods industry,
point to vigorous growth for the coming months.
Strong domestic demand generates considerable addi-
tional imports. Short-term data on foreign trade for the first
half of 1997 show that import growth easily outstrips export
growth (by around 1½ percentage points). Dutch non-en-
ergy goods exports, which increased by over 4% last year,
accelerated only fractionally over the first half of this year.
Against the background of improving demand, particularly
in Europe, and a substantially improved competitive posi-
tion due to the stronger dollar and pound, exports could
have been expected to perform better, even taking account
of factors such as the swine-fever epidemic and the Fokker
aircraft industry collapse. The recovery of demand in conti-
nental Europe is evident from the most cyclically sensitive
export category, namely chemical products. The latter cat-
egory is doing particularly well, and on top of that the terms
of trade are improving in this sector. Last year, the prices
of energy, the feedstock for the chemical industry, rocketed.
At that time, the industry was not able to pass these higher
costs on in its output prices because of cyclical weakness.
In the meantime, the cyclical situation has improved mark-
edly, and now the industry can pass on these costs. Be-
Recent developments1
In contrast to most other European countries, economic
growth in the Netherlands is currently driven by domestic
expenditure. Household consumption as well as invest-
ment contribute to this growth.
In the first half of 1997, private consumption recorded
similar growth as last year, namely 3¼%. Consumption fig-
ures for the third quarter suggest that this trend is continu-
ing. Durable consumer goods, such as domestic appliances
and clothing, as well as financial and telecommunications
services are much in demand. Real disposable household
income has risen above all on the back of forceful jobs
growth. The favorable labor market conditions have pro-
vided a strong underpinning for consumer confidence. This
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cause of an improvement in the terms of trade (see box:
“Terms of trade barely affected by exchange-rate fluctua-
tions”), the external trade balance remains unchanged.
The upshot of these demand trends was that Dutch GDP
expanded by more than 3% over the first half year. Output
figures for the third quarter are already available for some
branches. Industrial output increased by 4% over the first
three quarters, with both the chemical and engineering
industries thriving. Construction output for the first three
quarters was up by more than 6%, and also the services
sector posted significant growth. Retail trade volume was
more than 3½% up over the first three quarters. Commer-
cial services such as temporary-employment agencies,
banks and insurance companies performed even better.
Against this, however, output contracted sharply by around
10% over the first half year in the agricultural sector and
natural-gas production: the former owing to the swine-fe-
ver epidemic, the latter owing to the milder winter weather
in early 1997 compared with early 1996. Also the produc-
tion of the medical services sector rose, but by less than
GDP.
As in 1996, vigorous economic growth led to the creation
of a considerable number of new jobs in the first half of this
year. In mid 1997, there were nearly 150,000 more jobs than
a year earlier. Expressed in full-time equivalents, this
amounts to an increase of around 100,000 labor-years. As
in previous years, most of the new jobs have been created
in the services sector. Judging from the available labor-
market indicators, the outlook for the labor market is favor-
able (see figure 1). The number of vacancies was sharply
up in the second quarter, and temporary employment de-
mand is still rising by around 15%. At the same time, the
number of applications for layoffs, a requirement under
Dutch law, is falling steadily, and the number of bankrupt-
cies has been reasonably stable for some time now. These
indicators suggest that employment will continue to ex-
pand at, at least, the current rate for some time to come.
This is confirmed by the recent trend in the number of reg-
istered unemployed. After a hiccup in the midyear, unem-
ployment has fallen appreciably further since the summer.
Over the first three quarters, the jobless total fell by nearly
60,000 persons. Accordingly, also the number of unemploy-
ment benefit payments has fallen sharply.
Despite strong employment growth, no clear signs of
tension on the labor market can be observed. Only for some
specific technical functions, there are indications for short-
ages of skilled staff looming. Signs of a tightening labor
market in the form of wage pressures are also lacking; pay
increases have been moderate this year. For 80% of em-
ployees collective wage increases averaged 2% in 1997.
This is fractionally down on earlier projections, because
some recent settlements provided for relatively modest pay
increases. However, collective labor agreements covering
30% of employees in the market sector show slightly higher
contractual pay increases for 1998 (see box: “Trends in
recent collective labor agreements”).
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
92
100
108
116
124
132
effective exchange rate
terms of trade
1980=100
Terms of trade barely affected
by exchange-rate fluctuations
The Dutch external terms of trade in non-energy goods is
expected to improve this year. At first glance this is surpris-
ing because a country with a depreciating currency will
typically suffer terms-of-trade losses in the short run. This
is because a weakening currency quickly pushes up import
prices, while exporters exploit the improved short-term
competitive position on foreign markets to capture addi-
tional market share by not raising export prices in line.
Moreover, it takes some time before higher import prices
are absorbed in output prices.
The terms of trade improves this year above all because
Dutch exporters differ from their rivals in rapidly matching
price changes by foreign competitors. In the past, Dutch
exporters over the short run followed half of the changes
in competitors’ prices and followed half of the hikes in do-
mestic costs. Labor costs and the costs of imported raw
materials and semi-manufactured goods for industry ac-
count for the lion’s share of these domestic costs.
Exporters’ rapid response to price changes can be attrib-
uted to a large extent to the structure of Dutch production.
The Netherlands is specialized in agricultural products and
semi-manufactured goods which are precisely the markets
where price competition dominates. Moreover, a quarter of
Dutch exports consists of reexports. In this sector, relatively
little value is added per unit of trade, so that the import price
largely determines the export price.
These factors imply that exchange-rate fluctuations
generate few terms-of-trade effects. The figure below
illustrates this: cumulatively the guilder has gained 30% in
value since 1980, but the terms of trade have remained
virtually stable over this period.
Terms of trade and effective exchange rate, 1981-1996
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Trends in recent collective labor agreements
Figure 1 Cyclical indicators
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To what extent are pay settlements tending upwards?
The average annualized pay increase of the concluded
collective labor agreements, cited in the section ‘recent
developments’, does not provide the full picture. This is
because the pay increases for 1997 are determined to a
large extent by contracts concluded in 1996 or earlier,
while many agreements negotiated in 1997 will apply
over several years. Negotiations are likely to reflect the
latest actual outcomes and/or forecasts of the relevant
factors. Hence, one way of uncovering the trend in pay
settlements is to look at collective labor agreements
sorted by the date when the agreement was signed.
To determine the trend in pay settlements from collec-
tive labor agreements with different lengths and/or start-
ing dates, a calculation has been made for every
agreement of the effective rise in contractual pay within
the contract period. In this way an adjustment is made to
allow for carry over effects from the period before the
collective labor agreement’s starting date and for the
period after its expiration date. The increase has been
rescaled on a one-year period in order to compare the
outcomes for agreements with different lengths. The fig-
ure below shows the changes in pay rates for all contracts
concluded since January 1996, sorted by closing date.
Also, the weighted moving three-months averages are
shown.
The figure reveals that until roughly September 1996
the effective average contractual pay increase stayed
within 2% per year. Subsequently, this figure has risen
to around 2½% per year, during the fourth quarter of 1996
and the first half of 1997. Since the third quarter of this
year, the effective average contractual pay increase has
gone up slightly, in line with a forecast of 3% for the cal-
endar year of 1998.
Effective rise in contractual wages
10
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The consumer price index (CPI) has risen by 2½% in the
third quarter. Inflation has thus nudged up on the first half
year. The acceleration was evident above all in foodstuffs,
among them harvest products. Although import prices rose
early this year, on the back of the dollar appreciation, this
was reflected in selling prices only in the course of this year.
The CPI increase will come out at 2¼% for this year.
Prospects
The CPB leading indicator of economic activity2 shows that
the cyclical upswing will continue over the coming months.
Figure 1 shows that this favorable development is broadly
based. In particular, international indicators and the con-
sumer willingness-to-buy bolster economic activity. Over
the somewhat longer term (to end 1998), the long-leading
indicator shows that the growth rate may decelerate some-
what. The key factor in this context is the trend change in
the stock markets. The surge in share prices up to the end
Table 2    Key data for the Dutch economy on a half-yearly basis (volume), 1996-1998
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
I II I II I II
annual percentage changesa
Private consumption 3 3¼ 2¾ 3 3 3¼ 3¼ 2¾ 2 ¾
Private residential investment ¼ 6 2½ –6 6½ 12½ ¼ 1¾ 3
Private nonresidential investment 9¼ 7¾ 5¼ 5 13½ 11 4½ 4¾ 5¾
Exports of goods, excluding energy 4½ 6¾ 8¾ 3 6 6¼ 7¼ 9 8½
Imports of goods 5¾ 7¾ 7¼ 3 8½ 9 6½ 7¼ 7
GDP 3¼ 3¼ 3¾ 2¾ 3¾ 3¼ 3¼ 4 3¾
Employment (persons) 2 2¼ 2¼ 2 2 2¼ 2¼ 2¼ 2¼
Consumer price index 2 2¼ 2¼ 2 2¼ 2 2½ 2¼ 2
a Percentage changes from the corresponding period of the previous year.
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Figure 2 CPB leading indicators of economic activity
of July was followed by a correction in early August, which
was accentuated in late October. Since then, share prices
have been at a lower level. Long-term interest rates have
been relatively stable for some time now, hovering around
5½%, while the expansion of the real money supply has
slowed somewhat in the course of 1997. Given the average
lead of over a year, these financial figures point to a possible
deceleration of growth in the second half of 1998. Whether
this will happen and to what extent remains to be seen of
course. After all, a similar situation occurred in late 1987
when the long leading indicator pointing to a turnaround
in 1988; but in the event this did not come about until much
later. The same could happen this time.
Next year employment is expected to expand at broadly
the same rate as this year (see table 2). This once again puts
a solid floor under the development of real disposable
household income (which is projected to rise by more than
2%). The consumer’s willingness-to-buy makes a sharp
downswing in consumption unlikely. Given the size of capi-
tal gains3 over the nearly completed year and the usual time
lag of wealth effects in consumption growth, wealth effects
are likely to further underpin consumption. Hence, the fore-
cast assumes a 2¾% increase in the volume of private con-
sumption. Such a development implies a fall in the
noncontractual savings rate of half a percentage point,
which will bring it down to virtually nil.
Business fixed investment will increase by slightly over
5% in 1998, after rising by nearly 8% in 1997. This decelera-
tion of growth is due entirely to falling investments in large
energy projects. The growth of cyclically sensitive invest-
ments4 will be high in both years, namely more than 8%.
There are ample indications that current and projected
business gross fixed investment will substantially expand
production capacity. Industrial production will thus rise by
around 4½% this year, while the capacity utilization rate is
only fractionally up. According to investment surveys,
around 34% of all investments made in manufacturing in
1997 were expanding capacity. Also the high level of invest-
ment in industrial buildings is traditionally an indication of
capacity expansion. The recent increase in the number of
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Table 3 Main economic indicators of the Netherlands, 1995-1998
1995 1996 1997 1998
annual percentage changes
International
Relevant world trade volume 8.5 4.8 6¾ 7½
Relevant world trade price (guilders) – 1.9 1.4 6½ 1½
Guilder/dollar exchange rate (level) 1.61 1.69 1.95 1.95
Demand and output (volume)
Private consumption 1.8 3.0 3¼ 2¾
Private residential investment 0.9 0.1 6 2½
Private nonresidential investment 7.6 9.3 7¾ 5¼
Exports of goods, excluding energy 8.3 4.4 6¾ 8¾
Imports of goods 7.6 5.8 7¾ 7¼
GDP 2.3 3.3 3¼ 3¾
Labor market
Employment (persons) 1.6 2.0 2¼ 2¼
Unemployment rate (%, level) 8.3 7.6 6¾ 5¾
Dependency ratio (%, level) 82.4 80.3 78¼ 75¾
Wages and prices
Contractual wages market sector 1.4 1.7 2¼ 3
Compensation per employee market sector 1.6 1.9 3 3
Unit labor costs manufacturing – 2.0 0.7 –½ –½
Household disposable income (real) 1.8 2.5 2¾ 2¼
Consumer price index 2.0 2.1 2¼ 2¼
Price competitiveness – 3.5 1.9 2¾ –½
levels
Public sector
General government financial balance (% GDPa) – 4.0 – 2.3 – 1¾ – 1½
Gross debt general government (% GDPa) 79.1 77.2 72¼ 69¾
Taxes and social security contributions (% GDP) 43.6 44.0 43¾ 42¾
Miscellaneous
Current balance (% GDP) 6.2 6.3 6¾ 7¼
Labor share in enterprise income (%) 82.7 83.1 81¾ 80¾
Long-term interest rate (%) 6.9 6.2 5¾ 5¾
aHarmonized GDP
building permits granted shows that
many construction investments are
still in the pipeline for next year. Fi-
nally, the sustained moderate trends
in labor costs give no reason to expect
a higher proportion of efficiency in-
vestments.
Exports will join the club of eco-
nomic growth engines next year, to-
gether with domestic expenditure
(see table 3). This is due mainly to
strong growth in world trade volume
(up by 7½%). The international lead-
ing indicators leave little doubt about
this. Dutch manufacturing exports will
exceed this figure, increasing by 8¾%,
because exporters have improved
their price competitiveness consider-
ably over the last two years, not least
owing to the appreciations of the dol-
lar and pound. Export growth could
be even stronger were it not for the
fact that during this phase of the eco-
nomic cycle the Dutch export product
mix, with its predominance of food-
stuffs and semi-manufactured goods,
is at a disadvantage.
Unlike in 1997, import growth will
lag behind export growth next year.
Owing to some easing of demand for
durable consumer goods and invest-
ments in machinery, final imports will expand relatively
moderately. Since imports of raw materials and semi-
manufactured goods for industry will remain strong, total
import volume growth will come out at 7¼%, which is less
than export volume growth. Since the terms of trade will
remain broadly unchanged, the surplus on the current ac-
count of the balance of payments will widen further from
6¾% to 7¼% of GDP.
GDP growth is projected at 3¾% next year. This seems
to be a significant acceleration compared to the growth rate
of 3¼% of 1997. However, this year’s growth rate will be dis-
torted downwards by a number of one-off factors, of which
the swine-fever epidemic is the most important. Adjusted
for these factors, growth would have been ½% higher in
1997, which implies that growth is roughly stable in 1998.
The growth forecasts for next year will only marginally ben-
efit from the presumed ending of the swine-fever epidemic
towards the end of this year, because a restructuring of this
sector will exert an almost comparable negative impact on
the level of output.
As mentioned above, employment will increase next
year by roughly the same amount as this year. The num-
ber of persons in work will rise by 2¼%. This corresponds
to an increase in labor-years of 2½% in the market sector.
Labor productivity in the market sector will rise by 1¾%.
Labor supply will expand by far less than the jobs total.
Hence, the number of unemployed should fall, for the fourth
year running, to 5¾% of the labor force.
Also in the nominal sphere the trends continue to be en-
couraging. Next year prices will rise broadly in line with this
year’s figure of 2¼%. Import prices will contribute less to
inflation and labor costs a bit more. This reflects a slight
acceleration in contractual wage increases to around 3%.
The settlements concluded thus far for next year point to
a 2¾% increase. Since the labor market is showing some
signs of tightening, this figure is likely to nudge upwards in
the settlements still to be concluded. The forecast for infla-
tion reflects also some recovery in profit margins. This year,
margins narrowed substantially by historical standards.
Analysts attribute this to the fiercer competition promoted
by the more open international markets. If this continues to
depress profit margins, there may be some downward risk
in the inflation forecast. Moreover, the introduction of a new
Competition Law may reduce inflation.
Public finances fare better than forecasted in September
(see CPB Report 1997/3). Tax receipts will exceed the 1997
estimate by 2 to 3 billion guilders (about 0.3% of GDP).
Especially tax revenues on business profits over recent
years are higher than expected earlier. Moreover, taxes on
disbursed profits are considerably higher than expected in
12
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September. Central government expenditure in 1997 is
slightly behind the scheme presented in September. The
government deficit and, hence, the public debt to GDP ra-
tio decrease faster than projected in September. Therefore,
the Netherlands will easily meet the EMU criteria with re-
spect to public finances (see table 3).
Risks and uncertainties
As usual, there are many risks and uncertainties attached
to the outlook for the Dutch economy. Most of these origi-
nate abroad, such as the uncertainty regarding the dollar
exchange rate and possible interest rate hikes. Others stem
from domestic sources, such as the risk of larger-than-an-
ticipated wealth effects on consumption growth and, partly
connected to that, the risk of overheating.
A major uncertainty at present is the Asian crisis. In the
economic outlook for the world economy it has been ar-
gued that, as long as the situation does not deteriorate fur-
ther, the impact of this crisis on regions like Western Europe
will be rather modest, probably a loss of some tenths of per-
centage points of economic growth. For two reasons the
impact of the crisis on the Netherlands is probably even
smaller than that.
The first one refers to the trade pattern and product mix
of the Netherlands. Relative to other European countries,
Dutch exports to the South East Asian region are small.
Only 3½% of Dutch exports went to that part of the world
in 1996. Centrally located in Europe and being a small
economy, external trade of the Netherlands is very much
focussed on surrounding countries. Also the so-called com-
petitor weights of South East Asia for Dutch exporters are
relatively small compared to other European exporters.
This implies that Dutch exporters do not often meet their
Far Eastern counterparts on third markets, once again com-
pared to the competition other Europeans face from South
East Asia. This can be attributed, at least partly, to
the product mix of Dutch exports vis-à-vis Far Eastern ex-
ports. The Netherlands is specialized in foodstuffs and
semi-manufactured goods while South East Asia supplies
predominantly engineering products, like electronics.
Therefore, dramatically improved competitiveness of
South East Asian countries probably hurts Dutch exporters
less than it does other Europeans. The same product-mix
differential implies that also on the domestic market the
impact of stiffer Far Eastern competition is felt less in the
Netherlands than elsewhere in Europe, particularly in Ger-
many, which is also specialized in engineering products.
The second reason for a relatively smaller impact of the
Asian crisis on the Netherlands involves the strong direct
investment position of the Dutch in South East Asia, com-
pared to other European countries. Slightly over 5% of the
total 1994 stock of outward direct investments is located in
South East Asia (see table 4). Only the United Kingdom
features more prominently in the Far East (7.2% of total UK
investments abroad). This reflects to a large extent the
former role of the UK as a colonial power in the region.
Subsidiaries of non-Asian multinationals, that are located
in South East Asia and exporting to the rest of the world, can
profit fully from improved competitiveness. However, de-
pressed Asian growth will cut into their sales to domestic
markets, such as the Thai and Korean markets. On balance,
the first effect probably dominates. It should be kept in mind
that the crisis in Asia means that GDP of the region will no
longer grow by, say, 8%, but that growth is still expected to
exceed that of most Western economies.
Notes
1Unless otherwise indicated, growth figures indicate changes compared to
the corresponding period of the previous year.
2This indicator measures the ratio between actual and trend-based output in
the enterprise sector. An ascending line in the figure indicates that growth
exceeds the average achieved during the previous business cycle. The peaks
and troughs indicate turning points in the business cycle.
3Including around 70 billion guilders from increased home equity and around
100 billion guilders from household shareholdings (based on the AEX index
at end November).
4These are investments in fixed assets by enterprises, excluding investment
by the energy sector, dwellings, ships, aircraft and railway rolling stock.
Table 4 Stock of outward direct investments,
1994
Total Stock South East Asiaa
% GDP %b
The Netherlands 43 5.1
Germany 10 4.8
France 12 2.0
United Kingdom 26 7.2
Switzerland 41 3.8
a Including South Asia (India, Pakistan, etc.)
b Direct investments located in South East Asia as a percentage of total out-
ward investments by the country of origin.
Source: OECD Foreign Direct Investment Statistics.
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The world economy:
medium-term prospects*
ment rate is heavily debated because unemployment has
come down to 5% without igniting inflation. The favorable
scenario assumes an equilibrium unemployment rate of
4½%, while the cautious scenario sticks to a more tradi-
tional level of 6%.
Can Japan recover?
The most important question regarding Japan is to what
growth rate it will be able to recover. Although a  return to
the high growth rates of the eighties is rather unlikely, a
recovery from the current situation is  not inconceivable.
Although demographic changes will reduce the working
age population, labor supply might still grow as a result of
increasing labor force participation, especially of women.
A recovery of productivity requires continuing reform of the
manufacturing sector by means of outsourcing of low-
value added parts to other South-East Asian countries.
Moreover steps have to be taken to upgrade low-produc-
tive parts of the sheltered service sectors and to restructure
the financial sector. An assessment of the growth potential
still results in a growth rate of about 3% per year in the fa-
vorable scenario. However, given the gloomy starting po-
sition, the actual growth rates of employment and
productivity might  be much lower.
How much has the structural situation
in Europe improved?
The structural situation in Europe has improved consider-
ably in many respects. In particular, profitability of the busi-
ness sector has improved. Interest rates and inflation rates
have converged to low levels. The internal market has been
completed further, and government budgets have been
restructured. Although the growth of the working-age
population in the period up to 2002 is expected to decline
to less than a ½% per year, employment growth of 1% per
year is still conceivable as a result of higher labor force par-
ticipation and lower unemployment.  In line with produc-
tivity growth of 2% per year during the 1986-1990 period,
structural productivity growth of Europe is estimated at 2%
per year.
The advent of EMU and long-term trends with respect
to demography, technology and internationalization re-
quire increased flexibility of labor markets. The labor mar-
ket will increasingly have to bear adjustment to external
shocks. During the last decades, however, European labor
markets have not been able to adequately deal with cycli-
cal and structural changes.  During economic recoveries,
insufficient jobs were created to offset the increase in un-
employment during periods of economic distress. Indeed,
the persistence of unemployment is the most serious eco-
nomic problem facing Europe.
Consensus exists about the need to pursue broad-based
reforms, simultaneously improving a great number of in-
stitutions. Social security institutions need to be reformed
Abstract
The United States economy faces uncertainty about the
structural growth rate and the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate. The main uncertainty for Japan concerns its
ability to restructure its sheltered service sectors and its
financial sector. For Europe, the main uncertainties in-
volve EMU and labor market policies. In view of these
uncertainties, economic growth in the industrial econo-
mies range from 2¾% per year in the favorable scenario
to 1¾% per year in the cautious scenario. For Europe
these growth rates are 3% and 1¾% respectively.
Samenvatting
Onzekerheden ten aanzien van de economie van de
Verenigde Staten hebben betrekking op de structurele
groeivoet en het evenwichtige werkloosheidsniveau.
De belangrijkste onzekerheid voor Japan betreft het
vermogen om de afgeschermde dienstensectoren en de
financiële sector te herstructureren. Onzekerheden voor
Europa hangen samen met de EMU en het arbeids-
marktbeleid. In het licht van deze onzekerheden varieert
de economische groei in de geïndustrialiseerde landen
van 2¾% per jaar in het gunstige scenario tot 1¾% per
jaar in het behoedzame scenario. Voor Europa zijn deze
groeivoeten respectievelijk 3% en 1¾%.
Introduction
Economic prospects for an open economy like the Nether-
lands are to a large extent determined abroad. An assess-
ment of the medium-term prospect for the world economy
is therefore a logical first step in exploring the medium-term
prospects for the Dutch economy.1 Forecasting the world
economy over a medium-term horizon, however, is ex-
tremely difficult. CPB therefore presents its medium-term
prospects for the world economy in the form of two
scenario’s: a favorable and a cautious scenario.
What is the structural growth rate in the US?
After growing above trend for about six years the US
economy faces uncertainty about its  structural growth rate.
This growth rate is determined by the sum of labor supply
growth and structural productivity growth. With an ex-
pected growth rate of labor supply of just above 1% per year
up to 2002 the US outpace the other industrialized coun-
tries. Growth of labor productivity during the 1991-1996
period of about 1.4% per year has been substantially higher
than the 1975-1991 average of ¾%. Whether this is the re-
sult of an increase of the structural  growth rate is still un-
certain. The favorable scenario assumes that the structural
productivity growth rate has increased to 1¼%  per year.
The cautious scenario sticks to the traditional estimate of
¾% per year.  Also the level of the equilibrium unemploy-
* for more information, contact Ben Geurts (tel: 31-70-3383324; e-mail:
bmeg@cpb.nl)
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The Dutch economy:
medium-term prospects*
Abstract
In the cautious scenario for the period 1999-2002, growth
of Dutch GDP will slow to 2% per year. Yet unemployment
will not rise because growth of labor supply will moder-
ate as a result of demographic factors. In the favorable
scenario,  the economy will continue to show vigorous
growth of 3¼% per year and unemployment will fall fur-
ther. In both scenarios, price rises will remain in bounds,
not least owing to fierce international competition.
Samenvatting
De groei van het Nederlandse BBP vertraagt in het behoed-
zame scenario voor de periode 1999-2002 tot 2% per jaar.
Toch loopt de werkloosheid niet op omdat de groei van het
arbeidsaanbod in samenhang met de demografische
veranderingen vermindert. In het gunstige scenario blijft de
economie krachtig groeien met 3¼% per jaar en daalt de
werkloosheid. Prijsstijgingen blijven in beide scenario’s
binnen de perken, onder meer als gevolg van de scherpe
internationale concurrentie.
Introduction
The prospects for the Dutch economy for the period 1999-
2002 are outlined on the basis of two scenarios, namely the
cautious and the favorable scenario. The scenarios indicate
the margins within which the Dutch economy is likely to
develop during this period under broadly stable conditions
(i.e. excluding extreme windfalls or setbacks). The scenario
approach has been adopted because of the many uncer-
tainties surrounding medium-term forecasts. The key
uncertainties originate in international economic develop-
ments. Hence, the differences between the scenarios can
be traced primarily to developments in this area. While it
makes sense to use the cautious scenario for setting fiscal
policy, the favorable scenario can be useful in preparing
other policies. This latter scenario reveals the problems and
policy tasks that are likely to emerge in case of favorable
economic developments. Both scenarios incorporate only
known and approved policy measures. Accordingly, no
new policies have been provided for.
Two scenarios
The cautious scenario foresees a cyclical downswing. GDP
will expand by only 2% per year between 1999 and 2002,
which is appreciably lower than during the period 1995-
1998 (see Table 5 on page 16). The slowing of economic
growth is due mainly to unfavorable international develop-
ments. Whereas the volume of relevant world trade is ex-
pected to expand by 6½% per year during the period
1995-1998, the cautious scenario projects a figure of only
to (re-)activate the unemployed, thereby preventing a long-
lasting lockout of these groups from the labor market. In
addition, rigidities in product and capital markets should be
removed, and human capital accumulation be stimulated.
How will the EMU function?
EMU is without doubt the most important institutional
change in the years to come. In May 1998, the European
counsel of ministers of finance (ECOFIN) will decide which
countries will participate in the third stage of EMU. Most
European countries seem to be able to pass the EMU exam.
Since the UK and Denmark have stipulated an opt-out,
however, a large EMU  of 12 countries is rather likely. Many
uncertainties surround the actual operation of EMU. How
independent will the new European central bank be? Will
individual countries  be able to respond adequately to coun-
try-specific shocks? What are the effects of the euro becom-
ing a major international currency? The potential benefits
of EMU are large: the elimination of exchange rates will re-
duce costs and prices and intensify competition. EMU will
firmly root the internal market in the EMU area.
Taking into account the analysis above, two scenarios
pose a reasonable lower and upper bound for global eco-
nomic development.
Cautious scenario: lack of confidence in ECB
Cyclical tensions and rising inflation and interest rates harm
economic growth in the US. The Japanese economy suf-
fers from weakening global economic growth, weak inter-
nal demand, and a failure with respect to the upgrading of
the sheltered service sectors. European economic growth
does not persevere. Lack of confidence of financial markets
in the euro raises European interest rates and inflationary
pressures through downward pressures on the euro-dol-
lar exchange rate. Although unemployment remains high,
also wage inflation rises again, indicating that persistence
of unemployment remains the dominant feature of Euro-
pean labor markets.
Favorable scenario:
successful reform of European labor markets
In the favorable scenario, the US and the UK continue to
grow along their structural growth path. In Japan, deregu-
lation of the service sectors boosts productivity growth,
while unemployment remains low. Economic performance
in Europe enhances the confidence of financial markets in
the euro. This raises the euro-dollar exchange rate and al-
lows the ECB to cut European interest rates. High profitabil-
ity and low interest rates spur business investment, thereby
boosting growth of capacity and employment. The eco-
nomic recovery is not restrained by the labor market, be-
cause a more flexible labor market stimulates labor supply.
Nevertheless, unemployment in Europe is still 1%-point
higher in 2002 than in 1990.
Note
1 See CPB Report 1996/1 for the last report on the medium-term prospects for
the Dutch economy.
*For more information, contact Jan Donders (tel: 31-70-3383300;
e-mail: jhmd@cpb.nl).
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4% per year for the coming period. In the favorable scenario
for 1999-2002 in contrast, relevant world trade growth will
not fall back compared to the previous four-year period, but
will even edge upwards to 6¾% per year. This forceful ex-
pansion of relevant world trade should push Dutch GDP
growth to an average of 3¼% per year.
Domestic expenditure
Private consumption is increasing by 2½% per year during
the period 1995-1998. This rather impressive rise can be
attributed not only to strong employment growth and posi-
tive purchasing power trends, but also to the boost to
household wealth provided by higher house prices and
share values. In the cautious scenario, private consumption
growth will ease to an average of 1¾% per year, owing to
lower increases in both employment and purchasing
power. In the favorable scenario, more jobs will be created
than in the cautious scenario. Also purchasing power will
show stronger growth, largely because the tightening of the
labor market will accelerate wage growth. In this scenario,
private consumption should increase by 2¾% per year.
In the cautious scenario, private residential investment
will fall by 1% per year between 1999-2002, compared to an
annual rise of 2% during the previous four-year period. The
trend change in this type of investment originates mainly
in less new households being set up. In the favorable
scenario, the trend will not be reversed, but private residen-
tial investment will rise by only 1% per year. The greater
buoyancy of these investments is due to a steeper rise in
household incomes. This will boost the number of new
households and stimulate the shift from rented to owner-
occupied housing. Higher incomes will boost spending also
on home improvements.
Private nonresidential investment is soaring during the
period 1995-1998 owing to strong output growth and im-
proved profitability. In the cautious scenario, growth of this
type of investment will decline to an average of 2¼% per
year, largely because of a decline in output growth. The
capacity utilization rate, which will reach high levels in 1998,
will nudge downwards in this scenario. In the favorable
scenario, investment levels will fall back somewhat com-
pared to the previous four-year period, mainly because
profitability will not improve further. Capacity utilization
rate will remain broadly unchanged.
International trade
Non-energy goods exports substantially contribute to eco-
nomic growth during the period 1995-1998. While world
trade is thriving, Dutch exporters are able to capture some
additional market shares. Whereas export growth during
boom years is tempered somewhat by the Dutch specializa-
tion pattern (towards commodities that are not sensitive to
the business cycle), Dutch exports have become more com-
petitive on price. In the cautious scenario, export growth will
moderate to 4% per year, which coincides with the projected
expansion of relevant world trade. Exports of agricultural
goods will lag behind average export growth. This is due to
several factors, including environmental policies (which are
having a significant adverse impact on especially the live-
stock industry) and fierce competition faced by the Dutch
horticultural industry. On the positive side, chemicals exports
are performing well because this industry has been able to
upgrade its export mix in recent years. In the favorable sce-
nario, export growth will remain the same as it was in the
period 1995-1998. Indeed, exports will be the main engine of
economic growth. Although price competitiveness will not
change, exporters still capture some additional market
shares. The chemicals sector will perform particularly well
also in this scenario. Also re-exports will show strong growth.
Goods imports are increasing rapidly during the period
1995-1998. This holds true for imports of raw materials, of
consumer and capital goods, and of goods destined for
reexporting. In the cautious scenario, import growth will
decline to 3½% per year. Each of the named import com-
ponents will slowdown. Also in the favorable scenario,
import growth will moderate somewhat, but much less
than in the cautious scenario.
The external current-account should record a surplus of
7¾% of GDP in 1998. In both the cautious and the favorable
scenarios, this surplus will widen to 8½% of GDP in 2002.
This will further expand net foreign assets.
Prices
Inflation is low during the period 1995-1998, not least ow-
ing to the modest rise in import prices. Import prices are
held in check in part because of fierce international compe-
tition, which is squeezing margins. Margins are under pres-
sure also at home. The liberalization of international trade
and the deregulation of domestic markets play a key role
here. In the cautious scenario, the rise in import prices will
remain modest. This will hold true also for inflation in the
Netherlands. The consumer price index will rise by 1¾% per
year in this scenario. In the favorable scenario, prices will
rise somewhat faster. The tightening of the labor market in
this scenario will contribute to a faster rise in labor costs,
which will in turn fuel price rises. However, the moderating
influences of fierce international competition and deregu-
lation measures will mitigate price pressures. Under these
circumstances, the rise in consumer prices should stay
within 2% per year.
Over the short and medium term, the prices of Dutch
non-energy goods exports will closely follow those of the
competitors. Indeed, the acceleration of export prices in
1997 and 1998 coincides with a similar hike in competitors’
prices. In both the cautious and the favorable scenarios,
Dutch export prices will continue to rise in line with those
of the competitors.
Profitability
Profitability is improving sharply during the period 1995-
1998. Over the whole period, the capital share in enterprise
income (the complement to the labor share) will rise by 2½
16
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percentage points. In the cautious scenario, this surge in
business profits will come to an end as the capital share in
enterprise income will remain constant in this scenario. The
market sector’s profit ratio will decline somewhat owing to
higher net interest payments by enterprises. In the favor-
able scenario, the economy will continue to expand apace.
Yet the capital share in enterprise income will not develop
differently from that in the cautious scenario. This indica-
tor will be the same in 2002 as in 1998. Net interest pay-
ments by enterprises will not change in this scenario, so
that also profit levels will remain constant at the 1998 level.
Wages and purchasing power
Contractual wages will rise by 2¼% per year in the cautious
scenario, which is the same growth as during the period
1995-1998. On the assumption that earnings drift will
amount to ½% per year and that employers’ social insur-
ance contributions will remain unchanged, compensation
per employee in the market sector will increase by 2¾% per
year. In the favorable scenario, contractual wages growth
will accelerate to 3½% per year and earnings drift to 1% per
year. This is due mainly to the tightening of the labor mar-
ket, which in turn is the outcome of large numbers of jobs
being created together with fewer people entering the la-
bor market.
The average earner’s purchasing power is rising by ¾%
per year during the period 1995-1998. Purchasing power
will increase in the cautious scenario by slightly less,
namely by ½% per year. Purchasing power in the favorable
scenario will be more buoyant, increasing by 1½% per year.
Contractual wages will rise faster in this scenario while
social insurance contributions will weigh less heavily as un-
employment falls.
Labor market
Jobs are being created at a very rapid rate between 1995
and 1998. Over the whole period, around 465,000 people
will find work. This figure excludes part-time jobs of less
than 12 hours per week. In the cautious scenario, employ-
ment growth will slow together with overall economic
growth. Since demographic changes will depress growth
of labor supply during the scenario period, the unemploy-
ment rate will fall fractionally from 6% in 1998 to 5¾% in
2002. In the favorable scenario, sustained strong employ-
Table 5 Main economic indicators of the Netherlands, 1991-2002
1991-1994 1995-1998* 1999-2002
cautious favorable
annual percentage changes scenario scenario
INTERNATIONAL
Volume relevant world trade 3.6 6½ 4 6¾
Price relevant world trade – 1.3 1¾ 1¼ 1
Guilder/dollar exchange rate (level in end year) 1.82 1.95 2.05 1.85
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (VOLUME)
Private consumption 2.2 2½ 1¾ 2¾
Private residential investment 1.6 2 –1 1
Private non-residential investment – 0.9 6¾ 2¼ 5
Exports of goods. excluding energy 4.2 7 4 7
Imports of goods 2.7 6¾ 3½ 6¼
GDP 2.1 3¼ 2 3¼
LABOR MARKET
Employment (persons)  0.9 2 1 1½
Unemployment rate (%, level in end year) 8.7 6 5¾ 4¾
Dependency ratio (%, level in end year) 83.2 76 76¼ 73¼
WAGES AND PRICES
Contractual wages market sector 3.2 2¼ 2¼ 3½
Compensation per employee market sector 3.4 2½  2¾ 4¼
Unit labor cost manufacturing 0.9 –1 0 ¼
Household disposable income (real) 0.2 ¾ ½ 1½
Consumer price index 2.9 2¼ 1¾ 2
Price competitiveness 0.2 ¼ 0 0
levels in end-year
PUBLIC SECTOR
General government financial balance (% GDP)     4.2 1.9 1½ –¼
Gross debt general government (% GDP) 77.9 70 68½ 60¾
Taxes and social security contributions (% GDP) 44.7 42½ 42 41¾
MISCELLANEOUS
External current balance ( % GDP) 5.4 7¾ 8½ 8½
Labor share in enterprise income (% GDP) 82.7 80¼ 80½ 80¼
Long-term interest rate (%) 6.9 5¾  6 5½
*Medium-term projections are based on the 1997-1998 forecasts of last September (see CPB Report 1997/3).
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ment growth coupled with the projected trend-based reduc-
tion in  growth of labor supply will cause a definite tighten-
ing of the labor market. This tightening accelerates growth
of contractual wages, which will in turn restrict employment
growth. The tighter labor market will also produce addi-
tional growth of labor supply arising from the encouraged
worker effect. The labor market supply and demand projec-
tions in this scenario yield a reduction in the unemployment
rate to 4¾% in 2002.
Public finances
The general government deficit is projected to come out at
1.9% of GDP in 1998. The Netherlands thus easily meets the
Maastricht Treaty’s fiscal-deficit criterion. During the period
1995-1998, the tax and premium burden falls by 2¼ percent-
age points to 42½% of GDP. In the cautious scenario, the
fiscal deficit will fall slightly further, to 1½% of GDP in 2002.
Also the tax and premium burden will shrink fractionally to
42% of GDP in 2002 under the assumption that no new
policy initiatives and/or tax cuts will be implemented. In the
favorable scenario, the fiscal deficit will fall more sharply
than in the cautious scenario. Under these circumstances,
a budget surplus of ¼% of GDP will emerge in 2002. Also
the tax and premium burden will shrink more sharply in this
scenario to 41¾% of GDP in 2002 because the reduction in
the unemployment rate will further ease social-security
contributions.
Concluding remarks
In preparing policies for the next cabinet period, policy-
makers will have to bear in mind the major uncertainties
that inevitably surround medium-term economic forecasts.
The two scenarios outlined here aim to make a number of
uncertainties more manageable. It is typically difficult to
quickly adapt policy choices to new developments. Accord-
ingly, it is advisable to use, for each particular policy area,
the scenario in which the policy task is most pronounced.
In particular, if budgetary planning is based on the cautious
scenario, the need for interim austerity measures is re-
duced. At the same time, policymakers will have to prepare
for the policy tasks posed by the favorable scenario. In that
scenario, potential problems in the labor market, in infra-
structure, and in attaining environmental targets will be-
come more serious.
Sectoral developments in
the Dutch economy:
medium-term prospects*
Abstract
The commercial services sector and manufacturing in-
dustry feature relatively strong growth of production in
the coming years. Contrary to the past, growth of the
manufacturing industry is only slightly lower than that
of commercial services. This is caused, among other
things, by high profitability and investment levels in
manufacturing in 1998. Specialization in higher value-
added and in more knowledge-intensive market seg-
ments is observed in agriculture, chemical industry, steel
industry and transport.
Samenvatting
De commerciële dienstverlening en de industrie ver-
tonen in beide scenario’s een relatief sterke produktie-
groei. De groei in de industrie wijkt minder af van die in
de tertiaire dienstverlening dan in het verleden. De qua
winstgevendheid en investeringsniveau gunstige uit-
gangspositie van de industrie in 1998 is hieraan mede
debet. Upgrading vindt plaats in de landbouw, de
chemische industrie, de staalindustrie en de transport-
sector.
Commercial services maintain strong growth
The main sectoral development is the continued increasing
importance of commercial services. The share of commer-
cial services in not only overall employment but also the
volume of GDP is growing. The rapid growth of commer-
cial services in the last decade is due to a number of factors.
First, many new services, often related to information tech-
nology, emerged, both for personal and business use.
Second, many enterprises concentrated on their core activi-
ties because of strong competition, and contracted out
support services. Furthermore, the branch of temporary
employment agencies boomed in recent years, not only for
cyclical reasons but also because of greater demand for a
flexible deployment of labor. Finally, intensifying interna-
tional specialization of manufacturing output raised inter-
national trade. This boosted the wholesale trade and
transport sector.
For the same reasons, the commercial services sector will
be the most dynamic sector also during the period 1999-2002
(see table 6). In the cautious scenario, the volume of produc-
tion will expand by 2½% per year. Because of the vigorous
international economic development, commercial services
will grow by 4½% per year in the favorable scenario.
Manufacturing industry will also perform well
In both scenarios, the increase of industrial production will
be only slightly less than that in commercial services. To a
large extent this is due to high profitability and investment
*For more information, contact Frans Suijker (tel: 31-70-3383390;e-mail:
fws@cpb.nl).
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levels in manufacturing industry in 1998. The capital share
in enterprise income indicates a remarkable jump in profit-
ability of manufacturing industry during the period 1993-
1998 (see table 7). Dutch manufactures benefited from
expanding exports and from wider margins as a result of the
appreciation of the dollar and pound. In 1998, profitability will
almost reach the high level of the sixties. The upswing in
profits strongly impacted investments. However, as a per-
centage of gross value added, Dutch investments in 1998 are
not yet back on the high level of 1989, because industrial
enterprises invest heavily abroad as well, for instance to
secure a stronger position in attractive growth markets. Fur-
thermore, as many enterprises are already concentrating on
their core activities, outsourcing support services will be less
important than in the past. This will hamper the growth of
business services.
In manufacturing industry, the chemical industry will show
the strongest growth. Export sales will soar. Moreover, the
chemical industry has been very successful in upgrading
processes, not only of basic products but also of special
products. Many new products are introduced. Especially
the pharmaceutical industry is flourishing. The upgrading
processes in the chemical industry is expected to be con-
tinued in the scenarios.
The capacity utilization rate of manufacturing is on a
high level in 1998. Accordingly, industrial investments need
to expand to allow strong growth of production. The sound
financial position will allow for this.
Growth in energy, construction and
agrosector below average
Strong growth of industrial production will boost energy
demand. However, improved energy efficiency will ham-
per energy consumption. Furthermore, the exports of natu-
ral gas will decline. As a result, the production of the energy
sector will not expand in the cautious scenario and will
grow only slowly in the favorable scenario.
The construction sector will benefit from the recovery of
the office market. The malaise in the office market has
lasted several years. Combined with expanding invest-
ments in manufacturing, this will produce an increase of in-
vestments in nonresidential buildings. Also increasing
investments in infrastructure will boost the production of
the construction industry.
Growth of value added of the agrosector, i.e. agriculture
and the food and beverage industry together, is limited by
historical standards in both scenarios, owing to production
restrictions and environmental measures in several
branches. Examples are quotas for fish, milk and sugar. As
a result of the outbreak of swine fever this year, a large
restructuring program for the pig-rearing branch is planned
to start next year. According to this program, the number
of pigs should be 23½% lower in 2000 than in 1995 or 1996.
Although horticulture is not constrained, this sector will
realize only modest growth because of the small rise of
Table 6  Volume gross value added (factor
costs) by branches of industry, 1995-2002
1995-1998 1999-2002
cautious favorable
annual percentage change
Agrosectora 1¾ 1¾ 3½
Industryb 3¾ 2¼ 4¼
Energy 1¾ 0 1½
Construction industry 1¾ ¾ 2
Commercial servicesc 4½ 2½ 4½
Medical services 1 1¼ 1¼
Enterprises 3¼ 2 3½
Market sectord 3¾ 2¼ 4
a Agriculture and food and beverage industry.
b Metal industry, chemical industry, textile, furniture and building materials
industry and paper industry.
c Excluding operation of real estate.
d Enterprises excluding mining and quarrying, operation of real estate and
medical services.
demand in the European market. In addition to some ex-
pansion of the volume of production, the projected growth
of value added is the result of a reduction of inputs.
Profitability will remain at a high level
The profitability of the market sector will remain at the high
level of 1998 in both scenarios. However, there are some
differences between sectors. Profits in manufacturing will
increase somewhat, while profits in commercials services
will decrease slightly. The relatively small Dutch manufac-
turing industry, which is highly competitive, will realize
large productivity gains combined with strong growth of
production. Consequently, profits will improve. The in-
crease in profits will be smaller in the favorable scenario
than in the cautious scenario because of higher labor costs
in the favorable scenario due to a tight labor market.
Profitability in the commercial services sector will de-
crease slightly. Fierce competition, partly due to deregula-
tion in some sectors, will keep profit margins of the services
sector under pressure. Moreover, compared to other sec-
tors, productivity growth in the services sector is only
Table 7  Profitabilitya and gross fixed
investmentsb, 1989-2002
1989 1993 1998 2002
cautious favorable
%
Profitability
Market sector 18.5 13.6 19¾ 19½ 19¾
of which
- manufacturing 27.3 15.5 31¼ 33¼ 32
- commercial services 24.5 22.8 24¾ 24 24
Gross fixed investments
Enterprisesc 18.6 16.8 18¼ 18½ 19
of which
- manufacturing 18.0 14.2 16½ 17 18½
- commercial services 18.9 16.4 18¼ 18½ 19
a Capital share in enterprise income.
b In % of gross value added.
c Excluding operation of real estate.
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modest, while increases in contractual wages are almost
the same in all the sectors.
Although the profitability trend in the commercial ser-
vices sector is not so encouraging as in manufacturing,
investments will increase during the period 1999-2002. This
is caused, among other things, by deregulation that makes
it easier to build superstores. The recovery of the office
market, mentioned above, is another important reason.
Labor productivity in commercial services sector
During the past decades, labor productivity growth slowed
down in all sectors of the economy. Productivity growth in
commercial services is traditionally below average because
the scope for technological progress is smaller. However,
low productivity growth may be caused partly by underes-
timating the effect of innovation and higher quality on the
volume of production. During the period 1995-1998, pro-
ductivity in the services sector increases by only 1% a year,
a very low pace by historical and international standards.
Accordingly, an improved productivity performance of the
commercial services sector is of vital importance for the
long-run growth potential of the Dutch economy.
There are good reasons to expect that productivity
growth in the services sector will be higher in the future.
Hence, growth accelerates in the favorable scenario. A first
reason is a further liberalization of sheltered markets, such
as public transport, telecommunication and retail sales. The
resulting stronger competition diminishes X-inefficiencies.
Second, there will be more specialization within the ser-
vices sector itself. Moreover, capital-intensity will rise as a
result of increasing application of information and commu-
nication technology. Finally, the application of modern
management techniques, already used in manufacturing,
may help to improve productivity.1
Upgrading in the Dutch economy
CPB argued in 1992 that the Dutch economy should trans-
form its specialization in low value-added processing indus-
tries, energy and the agro-industrial complex towards
higher value-added knowledge-intensive market seg-
ments.2 Such an upgrading process is still desirable for
several reasons. First, demand for medium- and high-tech
goods and services is stronger.  At the same time, countries
in Eastern Europe and Asia with lower labor costs special-
ize in low-tech products. Furthermore, the production of
more knowledge-intensive goods and services fits the
higher educational level of the Dutch labor force. Finally, up-
grading protects the natural environment.
 The extent of upgrading in the period 1992-1995 is as-
sessed, using indicators like prices per weight, value added
per unit inputs and educational level of employees. Upgrad-
ing may take place in different ways and on different lev-
els. It can be caused by relatively strong growth of branches
with high value added per unit inputs, the introduction of
goods or services with high value added, or the improve-
Unemployment definitions*
Unemployment can be defined in various ways. The OECD
publishes standardized unemployment figures according
to ILO definitions. This yields a figure of 6.9% for the Neth-
erlands in 1995. In monitoring the Dutch labor market, how-
ever, CPB employs a different unemployment concept,
resulting in an unemployment rate of 8.3% in 1995.
The main explanation behind the difference between the
two figures is that Dutch national sources limit the labor
force to jobs of at least 12 hours a week.1 This reduces the
size of the labor force, but has only a small impact on the
number of unemployed. On the one hand, people looking
for a job of less than 12 hours are excluded from the unem-
ployment figure. On the other hand, people occupying a job
of less than 12 hours who are looking for a job of 12 hours
or more are included in the unemployment figure. More-
over, the national definition is less strict in defining avail-
ability for the labor market, in part because those who
already occupy a job (of less than 12 hours) often cannot
quit on short notice. Whereas the international definition
includes only those people who are prepared to begin
working within the next two weeks, the national definition
considers some of those who are prepared to start work
within the next three months to be available for work.
*For more information, contact Hans Roodenburg (tel. 31-70-3383304;
e-mail: hjr @cpb.nl).
1 Another, less important, difference is that CPB uses employment data from
the National Accounts, while the OECD relies upon survey data.
 NOTE
ment of the efficiency of production processes.The assess-
ment3 shows that substantial upgrading has occurred in
branches in which the Dutch economy is already special-
ized, i.e. agriculture, chemical industry, steel industry and
transport.  For instance, the branch in agriculture with the
highest value added per unit inputs, i.e. horticulture, fea-
tures the best track record in terms of growth of production.
Furthermore, every branch in agriculture strongly reduced
inputs.  The observed upgrading process is expected to
continue in both scenarios.
Notes
1 See Biema, M. van and B. Greenwald, Managing our way to higher service-
sector productivity, Harvard Business Review, July-August 1997, pp. 87-95.
2 CPB, 1992, The Netherlands in Triplo; A scenario study of the Dutch Economy
1990 - 2015 (only in Dutch: Nederland in Drievoud; een scenariostudie van de
Nederlandse economie ), Sdu Publishers, The Hague.
3 Detailed results are presented in CPB, 1997, Economic prospects for the next
cabinet period (only in Dutch: Economische Verkenning voor de volgende
Kabinetsperiode), Sdu Publishers, The Hague.
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Detecting relevant policy
issues on competition
and regulation
Harold Creusen*
CPB designed an analytical framework to guide investiga-
tors in analyzing markets, detecting market distortions and
formulate policy issues (see Creusen, 1997). The framework
explores the complex interactions between competitors,
suppliers and customers, exploring firm behavior that de-
termines the (technological) supply conditions of firms and
the terms of competition in final markets. It can therefore
serve as a guide for selecting the appropriate theories to in-
vestigate market distortions caused by inappropriate firm
behavior. The comprehensive framework, furthermore,
helps to integrate the fragmented nature of industrial orga-
nization models that focus only on specific aspects.
This article demonstrates how policy analysts can use
the analytical framework to design a policy-relevant re-
search project. In fact, we will follow the steps taken by a
policy analyst who employs the framework to investigate
the residential building industry. The article is structured ac-
cording to the three successive steps the analysts need to
take in order to formulate a research project. First, the in-
dustry structure, including agents and markets, needs to be
identified. Subsequently, the scope for firm behavior needs
to be assessed. Finally, a list of relevant issues for compe-
tition policy, industrial policy and specific regulation needs
to be formulated. The article then describes how these pre-
liminary steps can be used to define a research project that
will assess whether conditions in the market require policy
action and, if so, what the policy options are. It considers
the residential building industry as an example to highlight
the use of the analytical framework for defining policy-rel-
evant research.
Analyzing the industry structure:
the case of residential building
In the first step, the policy analyst has to identify the relevant
agents and markets in the industry. He can, for example,
describe the industry structure from the vantage point of a
typical firm facing suppliers on input markets and competi-
tors and customers on output markets. The typical firm in
the residential building industry would be a construction
company or contractor involved in residential construction.
The analyst will find out that the typical firm faces different
groups on various types of markets. He can thus define the
industry as a group of firms containing the typical firms and
their competitors, suppliers and customers, as represented
in figure 1 for the residential building industry.
Figure 1 shows that several types of markets in the in-
dustry may be relevant for policy research. The type of such
a market depends on the type of the typical firms’ competi-
tors. The size of a relevant  market is defined in such a way
that the products related to this market are not easily sub-
stitutable with products outside the market.
If the policy analyst wants to map the relevant output
markets, he may find several relevant types of customers.
Some private consumers contract a constructing firm to
Introduction
The Dutch government has recently taken steps to change
the regulatory environment in order to enhance economic
efficiency. Grounded in the modern view on the benefits of
competition, the government considers free entry and
unimpeded competition to be the main source of efficient
production and optimal pricing. Therefore, the renewed
regulatory framework aims to strengthen competitive
forces by removing entry barriers and market distortions.
In fact, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has started a cam-
paign to rationalize regulation1 and to enhance competition
in erstwhile state monopolies. Furthermore, in accordance
with EU-policy, a new government agency will enforce the
new competition law that explicitly prohibits collusion and
other anti-competitive business practices.
When policy analysts and policymakers design and
implement a new regulatory framework, they may arrive at
several questions. For example, how do they detect mar-
ket distortions that harm economic welfare? What eco-
nomic issues are at play and which of them are relevant for
competition policy, industrial policy or specific regulation?
In-depth analytical research of specific markets may pro-
vide answers to these typical questions.
Abstract
CPB recently developed an analytical framework of in-
dustrial organization to guide policy analysis. The frame-
work, addressed mainly to policy analysts entrusted
with competition policy, industrial and technology policy
and regulatory reform in particular markets, aims to
detect firm behavior that gives rise to market imperfec-
tions. Further, it can point to the potential role for policy
in removing these market distortions and improving
dynamic welfare. This article applies the framework to
the residential building industry.
Samenvatting
Onlangs heeft het CPB een analytisch kader voor
industriële organisatie en een leidraad voor beleids-
analyse ontwikkeld. Het kader is vooral bedoeld voor
beleidsmakers op het gebied van mededingingsbeleid,
industrie- en technologiebeleid en (de)regulering van
specifieke markten. Dit kader dient als hulpmiddel bij
het opsporen van ondernemingsgedrag dat marktver-
storingen teweeg brengt. Bovendien kan het kader
aangeven hoe het beleid deze marktverstoringen kan
wegnemen en de dynamische welvaart verhogen. Dit
artikel past het kader toe op de woningnieuwbouw.
*tel. 31-70-3383393; e-mail: hpwac@cpb.nl.
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build their own private residences. Most private consum-
ers, however, buy a new house as a part of collective and/
or social house-building program. Finally, business inves-
tors and housing societies may contract a (main-) construc-
tor to build houses or apartments for rent.
Focusing on the relevant input markets, the analyst may
come up with a range of suppliers of material inputs and la-
bor. In fact, the inputs for constructors range from building
materials and arable land, via specific services (civil engi-
neers, architects and project designers) to specific types of
labor (such as bricklayers, carpenters etc.). The availability
and acquisition of land may require special attention be-
cause arable land is a scarce commodity.
When considering the internal organization of construc-
tors, the analyst will find firms with diverse technologies
and levels of incorporation. Smaller firms focus on specific
orders, or act as specialized subcontractors. Large-scale en-
terprises often incorporate several stages such as design,
construction and completion of houses, and therefore act
as the main contractor in large projects.
Detecting market distortions
The next step for the analyst is to consider the constructors’
behavior on the input- and output markets, and find out
whether such behavior may result in market distortions.
The checklist as outlined in figures 2a (part I) and 2b (part
II)  (next page) may be helpful in analyzing (the effects of)
firm conduct. The indicator boxes re-
fer to several types of questions. If the
answers to these questions corre-
spond to the answers in the checklist,
firms improve their supply conditions
or act on output markets similar to the
types of conduct described in the re-
spective behavior boxes.
The subsections below show
how the analyst can use this checklist
to detect firm conduct in the residen-
tial construction industry that may
possibly result in market distortions.
In particular, many of the questions in
these subsections are similar to the in-
dicator boxes in figures 2a and 2b.
Supply conditions
The conditions under which construc-
tion companies can build and deliver
new houses depend on the firm’s
technology, internal organization and
relations with intermediate suppliers.
The analyst has to answer the follow-
ing questions to determine which ac-
tions constructors may take to
improve their supply conditions.
For example, do constructing
firms conduct technological research
and develop new techniques (e.g. industrialization, prefab
construction and advanced scheduling)? Are they able to
cooperate with other firms to capture spillover effects from
research? By answering these questions, our analyst will
find out whether constructors engage in process innova-
tions given current technology, or whether they adopt a
new and better technology. Firms that replace their technol-
ogy can develop their own new techniques. Alternatively,
they can cooperate with other firms to create more drastic
inventions, or imitate those new techniques that proved to
be successful. In fact, they can benefit from cooperation if
this allows them to capture spillover effects and avoid du-
plication. Policymakers may then stimulate reproduction of
high-standing techniques and cooperation in research and
development, but should take care that cooperation will not
result in cartels that force up prices in output markets.
Second, are employers able to adequately monitor the
superintendents and construction workers? Do they use
specific wage systems2 to provide incentives to their em-
ployees? If constructors cannot monitor employees but can
design appropriate wage systems, they can induce con-
struction workers to provide sufficient effort and to use
other inputs efficiently.
A similar principal-agent problem occurs in controlling
the cost and timing of intermediate delivery. For example,
main contractors may use special procurement systems to
stimulate subcontractors to deliver their products without
Figure 1:  Structure of residential building industry
Suppliers of building
materials, arable
land and services
Superintendents
and construction
workers
Suppliers of arable
land, e.g. local
governments
Subcontractor
(Potential)
competitors General contractor
(Potential)
competitors
Investors in
large building-
programs
Private consumers for standard
houses
Private consumers building own
private residences
strategic behavior goods and services
Input markets
Output markets
Technology
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exceeding planned cost or time. Fur-
thermore, employees may capture
some of the firm profits through wage
bargaining. The analyst should thus
consider the bargaining process and
find whether potentials for unreason-
able rent capturing by employees
may exist. Finally, do constructers use
scarce intermediate inputs offered by
dominant suppliers, or do they find
sufficient supply on competitive input
markets? Constructors may use indis-
pensable materials  or services (such
as large scale project-design or civil
engineering) that are scarce. In that
case, they may try to integrate with a
supplier to ensure sufficient supply at
moderate prices. If the constructors
take no actions, they may pay higher
intermediate prices. Construction
companies may similarly attempt to
build up stocks of scarce arable land.
The next section explores the conse-
quences of building up stocks for a
firm’s competitive position.
Firm behavior related to the supply
conditions thus concerns the cost structure of production
— i.e. either changing the technology, improving labor ef-
ficiency or reducing intermediate input prices. Changes in
the cost structure can affect the competitive structure of the
output markets. For example, increasing returns to scale or
scope of the technology used by the constructors may re-
strict the “market room” for new competitors.
Market interactions
In addition to enhancing supply conditions, constructors
can also strengthen their competitive position through
other means. They can, for example, employ specific strat-
egies to act or deal with competitors and customers. These
market interactions may affect product quality, prices and/
or marketing, or result in alliances between constructors.
The policy researcher has thus to analyze the competitive
strategies of each constructor in order to depict the market
structure in residential building. For that purpose, he can
consider the following questions.
First, do constructors use real estate agents as interme-
diates to obtain orders or sell houses? The analyst will find
out that constructers make little use of intermediaries. In
fact, they have direct contact with their principals, i.e. pri-
vate consumers, business investors and housing societies.
Second, do constructors have any potential to differen-
tiate their products and focus on specific orders? Do they
use any advertising or marketing to obtain new orders? If
constructors focus on building specific types of residences,
they can improve customers’ valuation. At the same time,
however, they will divide the market in firm-specific seg-
ments or niches, which may weaken effective competition
and increase market prices.
Moreover, (private) customers may have difficulty in
observing the quality of delivered work. Constructors may
then attempt to build up a good reputation and a high-qual-
ity image by using advertising and promotional campaigns.
However, excessive advertising can raise barriers for new
firms to enter, thereby reducing competition and increas-
ing prices.
Finally, if construction companies cannot differentiate
and thus operate in homogeneous segments, they can still
use other strategies to raise their profits. For example, do
they invest in (sunk) assets such as material inputs and/or
do they make alliances to reduce competition? Construc-
tors may strengthen their competitive position and protect
themselves against entrants if they can build up capital
stocks, (e.g. of arable land). Later entrants then have to pay
higher prices for such specific capital. Constructors can also
conclude specific agreements to reduce total costs of
constructing houses, such as subcontracting. However,
such agreements may simultaneously give firms the oppor-
tunity to raise market prices of new homes.
Formulating issues for further research
In the third and final step, our analyst has to formulate the
relevant policy issues that need further research.
The results from this extended research may possibly lead
to policy intervention.
Figure 2a  Checklist part I:  Supply Conditions
ye s
ye s
ye s
ye s
no
no
Supply Conditions
technological
research ?
spillover of
R&D results ?
coordination and
pooling R&D results
imitation or own
invention of
new technology
labor market
have owners
difficulty in observing
productivity ?
enhancing efficient
input use by proper
wage contracts
upstream
intermediates
scarce capacity of
suppliers or elastic
demand ?
integration with
supplier
being squeezed
by supplier
market type indicator firm behavior
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When formulating relevant issues, the analyst has to dis-
tinguish three categories of policy issues focusing on, re-
spectively, competition policy, industrial policy and specific
regulation. The first category involves market distortions
that reduce competition, increase market prices and thus
harm customers’ welfare. These issues may possibly point
to market distortions that reduce effective competition or
raise entry barriers for new firms. They may therefore be
relevant for competition policy.
In the case of residential building, the analyst may pro-
pose additional research on mutual agreements between
constructors, such as subcontracting. For example, he may
suggest comparing the prices and production costs of sub-
contracting consortiums with those of competitive con-
structors in order to examine whether subcontracting saves
building costs or raises market prices. With respect to en-
try barriers, the analyst may propose further investigation
of the assignment of arable land. In particular, to which
constructors and under what conditions do local municipals
or landowners distribute scarce arable land?
The second category involves issues that induce dy-
namic growth of total welfare, such as stimulating techno-
logical research. In this respect, our analyst would suggest
further analysis of ways to stimulate the development and
diffusion of new construction techniques and the coopera-
tion in research projects. Supplementary analysis of tech-
nical research may explore what extent firms can benefit
from technological research and spillover effects. Can con-
Figure 2b  Checklist part II:   Market Interactions
structors reduce building costs if they
implement their own innovations or
new techniques developed by other
firms or noncommercial organiza-
tions? If not, can they still benefit from
changes in organizational structure?
The relevant issues on product
innovation and differentiation are of
interest to both competition policy
and industrial policy. In fact, increased
diversification may improve con-
sumer valuation, but simultaneously
reduce competition and raise market
prices due to powerful segmentation.
Further investigation of product diver-
sification should investigate to what
extent constructors build customer-
specific houses but at higher prices.
However, general competition
policy and/or industrial policy may not
be sufficient to handle the policy is-
sues mentioned above. Policy ana-
lysts and policy makers have to
determine whether the resulting mar-
ket distortions require additional
regulation. If the policy analyst finds
that mutual subcontracting and asym-
metric information on quality raise market distortions, he
might suggest further analysis of the need for specific regu-
lation on procurement systems and quality control. Such
regulation may, for example, focus on the delivery terms
and payment conditions of subcontracting agreements and
contracts with final customers, or on quality standards that
aim to remove information asymmetries on quality.
Conclusion
This article outlined a three-step procedure to analyze in-
dustries. This analytical framework helps to detect market
distortions that can be relevant for policymakers but need
further investigation. The first step of the framework is to
identify the agents and markets in the industry. The next
step is to examine the behavior of the typical firm in the
industry. During this step, policy analysts have to consider
firms’ conduct that determines their supply conditions and
cost structure and their interactions with competitors and
customers. The final step is to formulate relevant issues for
competition policy, industrial policy and regulatory policy.
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Economic effects of
liberalizing shop opening
hours in the Netherlands
Yvonne Bernardt*
Introduction
The Dutch law on shop opening hours was relaxed in June
1996. This deregulation was one of the first results of Dutch
policy aimed at stimulating competition and reducing su-
perfluous regulation. The Dutch rules for opening hours
were among the most restrictive in the world, so that the
law was an obvious candidate for revision. From Monday
through Saturday shops are now allowed to stay open from
6 am. to 10 pm., while Sunday openings remained relatively
restricted.1 Economic arguments played an important role
in the discussion about liberalizing shop opening hours.
This article discusses the main economic effects of liberal-
izing the law on shop opening hours. It is based on an ear-
lier CPB study (see CPB, 1995).
The article is structured as follows. First, the structure of
the model and the main short-run outcomes are presented.
Second, the differences with the medium-term results, as
described in CPB (1995), are described. Third, the first out-
comes of liberalization are evaluated. Finally, conclusions
are presented.
Model, assumptions and outcomes
A partial equilibrium model was developed to evaluate the
economic effects of liberalized shop opening hours. The
model uses a detailed description of the retail market in the
base year. We distinguished small, medium and large re-
tail companies, three location types (city centers, other
urban areas and peripheral areas) and food and nonfood
shops (making 18 shop types). For all types, statistics about
the average sales volume, costs structure and employment
were given or approximated. The assumptions in CPB
(1995) were oriented at evaluating medium-term effects
(five to ten years after liberalization). To compare the results
of the model with the present situation, one and a half years
after liberalization, this section presents the assumptions
and outcomes that are appropriate for evaluating the short-
run effects (i.e. the first five years after liberalization).
The most important exogenous variable of the model is
the change in opening hours by retailers. In the short run,
average shops were assumed to  open two and a half hours
per week longer than before liberalization (see Table 1).
These assumptions are based on comparing opening hours
in other European countries.
After increasing the opening hours per shop type, the
model calculates the changes in employment, costs, sales
and profits. We now turn to the description of the most
important relationships in the model.
Employment
The change in opening hours generates direct employment
effects because of the existence of threshold labor  — the
minimum labor capacity a shop needs to be open (see
Nooteboom, 1983). The minimum is one person for small
shops. For large-scale food shops, where not only a check-
out point but also several service counters have to be open,
this minimum can be as high as five persons. Threshold
labor implies that longer shopping hours reduce labor pro-
ductivity. Some substitution can occur, especially in the
large shops, when longer opening hours reduce sales dur-
ing peak-hours, so that the minimum labor requirement can
be lower (less service counters open). Small shops do not
have this flexibility to reduce threshold labor.
In addition to these effects, changes in sales volume will
affect employment. Since large shops tend to feature higher
labor productivity than small ones do, and large shops in-
*tel. 31-70-3383402; e-mail: ybn@cpb.nl.
Abstract
This article describes the economic effects of liberalizing
shop opening hours. CPB analyzed the economic effects
in 1995 to contribute to the discussion about liberalizing
the restrictive law on shop opening hours in the Nether-
lands. Shop opening hours were indeed liberalized in
1996. According to the model CPB developed, liberaliza-
tion would raise employment in the retail sector, while
sales volume and prices would change only marginally.
The effects for large-scale shops were expected to be
more positive than for small shops. This article focuses
on the short-run effects and evaluates some of the first
experiences from retailers and consumers.
Samenvatting
Dit artikel beschrijft de economische effecten van een
liberalisering van de winkelsluitingswet. Het CPB
analyseerde deze effecten in 1995, als bijdrage aan de
toen gevoerde discussie over het liberaliseren van deze
restrictieve wetgeving. In 1996 is de winkelsluitingswet
geliberaliseerd. Uit het model dat door het CPB is
ontwikkeld volgde dat de werkgelegenheidseffecten in
de detailhandel positief zouden zijn, terwijl in omzet-
volume en prijzen slechts marginale veranderingen te
verwachten waren. Voor grootschalige winkels waren de
uitkomsten positiever dan voor kleine winkels. Dit artikel
richt zich vooral op de uitkomsten voor de korte termijn
en beschrijft de eerste ervaringen van  detailhandel en
consumenten.
Table 1 Assumptions about short-term increase
in opening hours, by shop size
Small Medium Large All
extra hours per week
food 3 4 5½ 3½
nonfood 2 4 5 2½
total 2 4 5 2½
Source: CPB, 1995
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crease their opening hours (and sales) more, this effect
increases labor productivity.
Costs of labor and capital
The model distinguishes three costs categories. The first is
related only to sales volume, such as costs of purchases
and part of the labor costs. The second cost category is
linked to sales volume per hour. These are capacity costs,
such as costs of housing, machinery and equipment. The
third category are the costs directly related to opening
hours, such as threshold labor and a small portion of energy
costs.2
After an increase in opening hours, the costs that are re-
lated to opening hours (predominantly threshold labor) in-
crease. Wages are higher on late hours and Sundays. Labor
costs were assumed to increase by less than could be ex-
pected given the characteristics of the employees in the
base year, because new hours were supposed to often be
worked by part-time employees or young people, who earn
lower wages. Capacity costs were assumed to be fixed in
the short run, while they were related to sales volume per
opening hour in the medium run. Furthermore, the distri-
bution of consumers over time is expected to be more
uniform after some adjustment period, which reduces ca-
pacity utilization and the need for peak capacity. However,
since most costs are related to sales volume, opening hours
influence only a small part of costs.
Sales volume, prices and profits
Price and sales changes resulting from shifts in costs de-
pend on substitution elasticities between shops and sub-
stitution elasticities between retail goods and other
consumer goods and services. Based on estimates for sub-
stitution between shop types in Bode, Koerts and Thurik
(1990), we adopted substitution elasticities of -9 in the food
sector and -3 in the nonfood sector. Estimated substitution
elasticities of retail demand with other sectors are -0.5 for
food and -1 for nonfood (CPB, 1990).
Depending on the market structure, changes in costs can
not always be passed on to consumers. Since the retail
market is competitive in some segments and less so in
others, we assumed a gradual increase in the extent to
which costs changes are passed on to consumers. Further-
more, a small autonomous growth of retail sales was as-
sumed because of the larger availability of retail services.
Autonomous growth is largest in the food sector, which com-
petes with snack bars and other fast food suppliers. On
average, in the short run, the autonomous increase is
assumed to be 1% of retail sales (at the expense of other
sectors).
Short-run outcomes
The model calculates all effects simultaneously, which re-
sulted in the outcomes presented in Table 2. Total sales
volume and prices increase marginally, while profits as a
percentage of sales show little change. Employment in
retail trade increases 1.8%, which amounts to about 8,000
full time jobs above the base year of the model (1991). Large
retailers clearly benefit most. The volume of sales of me-
dium- and large scale retail companies increases but de-
creases for the small retailers. Employment increases most
for large retailers and least for small retailers.
Economic effects in the medium run
CPB (1995) presents outcomes for the medium term, after
complete liberalization of shop opening legislation, includ-
ing Sunday opening. Assumptions differ from the short-
term analysis in three respects. Most importantly, opening
hours are supposed to increase more. In particular, the in-
Table 2  Liberalized shop opening hours:
results in the short run, by shop size
Small Medium Large Total
Changes in %-points in the short run
Sales
value -0.6 1.4 2.4 0.9
volume -1.3 0.7 1.7 0.2
price 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Profit share 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Employment 0.6 2.1 3.1 1.8
Source: CPB, 1995
crease in opening hours is twice that in the short run; on
average shops are open five hours longer every week.
Second, the autonomous sales increase can be expected
to be somewhat lower than in the short run. In the short run,
the longer opening hours are new. People might thus buy
more than they would otherwise. Indeed, consumption
shifts not only between sectors but also intertemporally so
that the consumption quote increases temporarily (because
of bringing forward purchases of durable goods, such as
furniture). In the medium run, the autonomous increase
was assumed to be only 0.5% of sales.
Third, in the medium run capital costs are no longer
fixed, but vary with sales volume per opening hour. Also
threshold labor is more flexible in the medium run. It takes
some time to find the most efficient number of employees
for the new opening hours and to adjust the number and
type of employees to the new situation. This enhanced flex-
ibility reduces costs.
These modifications yield larger disparities between
small and large shops than in the short run. Large shops
benefit relatively more. The increase in employment is
stronger because of the negative effect of the additional
opening hours on labor productivity. The labor productivity’s
decreasing effect of more threshold labor dominates the la-
bor productivity increase as a consequence of the shift of
sales towards large-scale shops. Employment increases by
0.6%-points more than in the short run. Retail employment
growth then corresponds to almost 11,000 full time jobs in
26
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the base year. The medium-run price effect is relatively
smaller, reflecting the costs-decreasing effect of labor and
capital flexibility and the growing market share of (more
efficient) large scale shops (for more details on the out-
comes, see CPB, 1995).
First experiences after deregulation
Enough time has passed since deregulation to carefully
evaluate some of the first experiences. There have been
several inquiries among retailers and consumers, with
questions about the actual opening hours and the effects
on consumer behavior.
One of the inquiries among retailers (MKB, 1997) shows
that supermarkets are now open 70 hours per week on av-
erage, 15 hours more than in 1995. The average increase
in hours for the total retail sector is much lower.
Table 3 surveys the outcomes of inquiries about the ex-
tension of opening hours and consumers’ reactions. Large
shops responded more strongly than small shops did, es-
pecially in the food sector. In the nonfood sector, large-scale
stores in sectors such as building materials, garden centers
and house-furnishing responded strongly. In the IMK/REA
study, 24% of the shops increased their opening time, but
this corresponded to 52% of the overall floor space of
shops. Opportunities for Sunday opening are not exten-
sively used, except in the centers of a few large cities and
some out-of-town locations with large nonfood stores.
Whereas large-scale retailers were projected to gain
most, CPB (1995) expected also that new kinds of small-
scale shops (e.g. convenience stores) would enter the
market. This restructuring has in fact already started. The
longer opening hours for shops in gas stations (which are
allowed to sell a wider range of products) are extensively
used. Moreover, CBS (1997) reveals that newly established
shops are exploiting longer opening hours on a relatively
large scale.
Consumers clearly appreciate the longer opening hours.
Broader availability of retail services is especially advanta-
geous for people combining work and a household. How-
ever, also many older people without children at home use
the new opening hours. Fewer rush hours in shops and
shorter lines for checkout points also benefit consumers.
Indeed, the positive effects on consumer welfare are prob-
ably the most important benefits of the deregulation.
Conclusions
This article discusses the economic effects of liberalizing
shop opening hours. We adopt a partial equilibrium model
aimed at investigating the short-term effects for the retail
sector. By making some modified assumptions, the model
provides insight also in the medium-term effects presented
in CPB (1995). For the short run, we find that with an aver-
age increase in opening hours of about two and a half hours
per shop per week, prices and sales volume increase mar-
ginally. The effects for large-scale retailers in the food sector
are largest. Employment increases by 1.8% in the short run
because of the negative impact of longer opening hours on
labor productivity. In the medium run, with an increase in
opening hours of five hours per week, employment rises by
2.4%. From the available information about the use of
longer opening hours by retailers, it appears that the large-
scale food shops are indeed changing their opening hours
most. Given the relatively broad use of longer shopping
hours, the new legislation appears to be successful already
after a year and a half. The longer opening hours put into
effect by retailers reflect the demand by a broad group of
consumers who clearly appreciate the greater availability
of retail services.
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Notes
1 In principle, shops are not allowed to open on Sundays and holidays, but the
local government can grant permission for 12 Sundays (or holidays) per year.
Table 3  Responses of retailers and consumers to the new shop opening legislation
SHOPS CONSUMERS
MKB (1997) 32% of food shops open occasionally in the evenings.
20% of non-food shops open occasionally in the evenings.
15% of all shops open regularly in the evenings.
5% of all shops open on Sundays.
IMK/REA (1997) 24% of all shops increased opening hours, 56% of consumers shop in the evenings; relatively more men and
7% open more than 65 hours per week. young people than women and elder people, but even 20% of those
4% of shops open more than 4 Sundays per year. older than 65  use  the evening opening hours.
the effects are strongest in the food sector (supermarkets).
CBS (1997) 42% of large retailers increased opening hours and half of all consumers shop in the evenings, and nearly ¼ more than
78% of the top-100 companies. once a week.
13% of small and medium enterprises open longer and 2/3 of consumers value the fact that shops are open during the
39% of entrants. evenings as ‘good’ or ‘very good’.
about 28% of consumers shop on Sundays, most of them  more than
three  times a year.
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How competitive is the
Dutch coffee market?
Leon Bettendorf and Frank Verboven*
Abstract
World coffee bean prices have shown large fluctuations
during the past years. Consumer prices for roasted cof-
fee, in contrast, have varied considerably less. This ar-
ticle investigates whether the weak relationship between
coffee bean and consumer prices can be explained by a
lack of competition on the Dutch coffee market.
Samenvatting
Terwijl wereldmarktprijzen voor koffiebonen de laatste
jaren sterke fluctuaties vertonen, blijven de wijzigingen
in de consumentenprijzen voor koffie beperkt. Dit artikel
poogt een verklaring te geven voor deze zwakke relatie
tussen koffieboon- en consumentenprijzen. Met name
wordt onderzocht of dit te maken heeft met een mogelijk
gebrek aan competitie op de Nederlandse koffiemarkt.
Introduction
World coffee bean prices have shown large fluctuations
during the past years. Consumer prices for roasted coffee,
in contrast, have varied considerably less. Figure 1 illus-
trates the relationship between coffee bean and consumer
prices in the Netherlands. Bean prices dropped at the end
of 1992, but consumer prices hardly responded at all. When
bean prices more than doubled in the middle of 1994 (due
to a frost in Brazil), consumer prices increased by only 50%.
Industry observers have offered two alternative explana-
tions for the observed weak relationship between coffee
bean and consumer prices (NRC, 29 March 1997). First, cof-
fee beans constitute only a part of the production costs for
roasted coffee. Labor costs and packaging costs are other
potentially important determinants. Second, coffee roast-
ers may feel constrained to raise their prices by too much
due to negative demand responses by consumers. If this is
the case, firms may absorb bean price increases by reduc-
ing their markups.
This article seeks to carefully evaluate both the cost and
the markup explanations for the observed relationship be-
tween coffee bean prices and final consumer prices. For
that purpose, we estimate a structural model of coffee sup-
ply and demand, following recent advances in the growing
field of the “New Empirical Industrial Organization”
(Bresnahan, 1989). The theoretical framework reveals that
the cost explanation may be relevant to the extent that la-
*For more information, please contact Leon Bettendorf ( tel. 31-70-3383317;
email: ljhb@cpb.nl).Frank Verboven works at the Universiteit Antwerpen
(UFSIA) and Tilburg University.
bor and packaging influence the marginal cost of produc-
ing coffee. The markup explanation may be relevant to the
extent that firms recognize their oligopolistic interdepen-
dence and behave closer to a cartel rather than the competi-
tive outcome. Our structural parameter estimates enable us
to assess the relative importance of both explanations.
Within our structural framework, the strong volatility in
bean prices, mainly caused by exogenous weather condi-
tions such as a late frost or enduring drought, provides a
unique natural experiment to analyze the coffee roasters’
oligopolistic behavior. An analysis of this behavior is rel-
evant because of the widespread suspicion that market
power is significant in the food-processing industries.
Sutton (1991) provides ample evidence that a small num-
ber of firms dominates many foodstuff markets. Further-
more, OECD (1996) reports that the agri-food sector, after
the labor market, is the second most exempted, or favor-
ably treated area under competition laws. It therefore ar-
gues in favor of enhancing competition in the production
and sale of agricultural goods.
Our study employs publicly available monthly data. The
Dutch coffee market features one dominating firm, namely
Douwe Egberts. This firm roughly accounts for between
60% and 70% of total sales. Many small firms compete in
the remaining segment. Imports are relatively small, al-
though increasing.
This article is structured as follows. The next section pre-
sents the econometric model based on our prior knowledge
of the coffee sector. Next, the empirical results are pre-
sented. An extended discussion of the data and results can
be found in Bettendorf and Verboven (1997).
The Model
Supply
Coffee supply is determined by the condition that perceived
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of production.
Following the New Empirical Industrial Organization
(Bresnahan, 1989), this condition can be written in aggre-
gate form in the following flexible way:
t
t
t
p
1+
1 -   =  mc
τ
θ
ε



 (1)
where mct denotes marginal cost in period t. The left-hand
side is the firms’ perceived marginal revenue and is now
explained intuitively. The parameter τ reflects factors that
drive a wedge between the consumer price, pt, and the
wholesale price of coffee, tp / (1+ )τ , e.g. due to value- added
taxes. Note that all prices are expressed in real terms.
Marginal revenue depends also on the price elasticity of
market demand t t t t t= ( Q / p )(p / Q )ε − ∂ ∂ , where Qt repre-
sents total coffee demand.
The parameter θ captures the degree of oligopolistic in-
terdependence in the industry. If θ equals zero, perceived
marginal revenue is equal to the (wholesale) market price,
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and coffee supply is perfectly competitive. If θ equals 1,
perceived marginal revenue is equal to the marginal rev-
enue of a monopolist, so that the coffee industry behaves,
effectively,  like a cartel. In between these two extremes are
various models of oligopolistic interdependence. If an es-
timate of θ between zero and one is found, it is useful to
stick to one clear interpretation of θ . In the discussion of the
parameter estimates below, we follow the interpretation of
1/ θ as the “Cournot-equivalent number of firms.” This is
the number of firms that is consistent with the data if one
believes that the industry behaves according to the sym-
metric Cournot oligopoly model. For example, an estimate
of θ of 0.25 implies that the industry behaves as if there are
four identical Cournot-competing firms in the industry.
From (1) one can easily compute the Lerner-index, L.
This index measures market power, and is defined as the
percentage markup of producer price over marginal cost:
L =  
p  / (1+ ) -  mc
p  / (1+ )
 =  t t
t t
τ
τ
θ
ε
(2)
According to the Lerner index, market power is strong if
there is strong oligopolistic interdependence or if consum-
ers feature inelastic demand.1
Expression (1) reveals that bean prices influence con-
sumer prices both directly through their impact on marginal
cost, and indirectly through their impact on the price elas-
ticity of demand. Given our research question, we need to
specify functional forms for both marginal cost and de-
mand in the coffee market.
Demand
We choose a simple linear form for the demand equation:
t 0 1 tQ  =   +  pα α (3)
with t 1 t t= p / Qε α− . The specification is extended with three
quarterly season effects.2 An increase in the coffee price
may reduce demand for several reasons. First, consumers
may drink less coffee and switch to substitutes. Second,
they may use a lower dosage of coffee. Finally, consumers
may become more careful (preventing spilling).
Marginal costs
We use prior knowledge of the coffee roasting production
process to impose restrictions on the cost function. As dis-
cussed, for example, in Sutton (1991), the production pro-
cess is quite simple. It involves roasting and grinding the
coffee beans into the final coffee substance, which is then
packaged for consumer use. Coffee beans, packaging and
labor are essentially used in fixed proportions. Further-
more, economies of scale in production are extremely lim-
ited, making average variable and marginal cost
independent of output. These facts yield the following
specification for marginal cost:
t o 1 t
bmc  =   +  wβ β (4)
where tbw  is the price of coffee beans. The constant 0β cap-
tures other factor costs, in particular labor and packaging
costs. Detailed data on these costs are not available, but
they presumably did not vary much over the sample period,
as compared to bean costs.3 A rough rule of thumb in the
industry states that — on average—about 60% of total costs
are bean costs (Financieel Dagblad, 3 May 1997). Given the
importance of fixed costs (e.g. advertising), the share of
beans in the marginal costs may be even somewhat higher.
To gain precision of parameter estimates, we fix 0β  by
imposing the restriction that other costs have on average
been 40% of marginal costs.4
The coefficient 1β can be interpreted as the transforma-
tion rate of beans into roasted coffee. According to experts,
the production of one kilogram (kg) of roasted coffee re-
quires 1.19 kg of beans. About 20 percent of the raw coffee
beans consists of water and evaporates during the roast-
ing process. This number is roughly confirmed by our data:
during our complete sample period, the total input volume
of coffee beans was 1.2 times the total output of roasted
coffee.
The supply side is now completed, after substituting the
demand elasticity from (3) and marginal cost given by (4)
into the first-order condition (1). The system consisting of
this supply equation and  demand equation (3) is estimated
simultaneously using the generalized method of moments.
Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 1 (see next
page). First, the mean value of the implied price elasticity
of demand equals 0.2. This is consistent with estimates ob-
tained for the United States and Germany.5 We can draw
a first inference about industry conduct from this robust re-
sult. Since marginal costs cannot be negative, condition (1)
implies that the conduct parameter cannot exceed the price
elasticity, i.e. θ ε≤ t . This result holds generally, irrespective
of functional forms. It implies that a profit-maximizing cartel
( θ=1 ) always operates on the elastic part of its demand
function. Given our estimated elasticity of 0.2, cartel behav-
ior can thus be rejected. The δ -coefficients reflect seasonal
effects: demand is lowest in the first quarter and highest in
the final quarter of a year.
Figure 1 Evolution of coffee prices (1990=100)
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The estimate of 1β looks quite high compared to the value
of 1.2 for the physical rate of transformation of beans into
roasted coffee. One explanation is a systematic distribution
and transportation margin. The coefficient implies a mar-
gin of about 40% of the value of output.
The conduct parameter θ is estimated to be rather small,
implying a rejection of the hypothesis of monopoly ( θ =1).
The hypothesis of perfect competition ( θ =0) is rejected as
well in favor of oligopolistic interdependence. The indus-
try roughly behaves as if there were around 30 symmetric
Cournot-competing firms. Due to the low price elasticity, the
Lerner index is relatively high (e.g. compared to the esti-
mate of 0.06 obtained by Roberts (1984) for the US).
These results are used to analyze the price changes ob-
served in 1994. Decomposing the effects of the large in-
crease in bean prices (104%, in real terms) shows why the
increase in consumer prices ends up much smaller (45%).
First, the rise in bean prices results in a limited increase in
marginal costs (57%), due to the assumed average 60% cost
share of beans. A second dampening effect on consumer
prices stems from a reduction in  the markup (-8%), follow-
ing an increase in the price elasticity. Markup absorption
thus occurs, but remains unimportant since θ is not large.
Finally, the model is simulated for alternative firm behav-
ior, different from what is actually observed. In the case of
a symmetric duopoly ( θ =0.5), the mean simulated price
would be 145% higher than the observed price, whereas the
growth rate in 1994 would be much smaller (12%) because
markup absorption would become more important. Under
a cartel (or monopoly) outcome ( θ =1), these figures are
227% and 7%, respectively.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the observed weak relationship
between coffee bean prices and consumer prices in the
Netherlands. Using a structural model of oligopolistic inter-
action, we show that the relatively large share of costs other
than bean costs is responsible for a substantial part of the
observed weak relationship. The remaining part follows
from markup absorption, but this is less important since
coffee producers behave in a  relatively competitive man-
ner. Simulations of the model show that consumer prices
would have been much higher and fluctuated even less in
response to bean price fluctuations if the industry had be-
haved according to a Cournot duopoly or a cartel.
We employed publicly available data on the Dutch cof-
fee market. Given the moderate data requirements, we
hope that the analysis will stimulate further research to
investigate firm behavior and market power in other sec-
tors of the economy.
At the same time, there is room for additional in-depth
analysis of firm behavior in the coffee industry, provided
that additional data can be obtained. With firm-level data,
it would be possible to analyze firm-specific oligopoly be-
havior. The present analysis reveals interdependent,
although rather competitive conduct at the aggregate
level, but firms may still exert strong individual market
power. Furthermore, more detailed data would allow us to
consider dynamic aspects in the industry. For example, in-
ventory costs, adjustment costs or consumer loyalty may
to some extent influence the relationship between coffee
bean prices and consumer prices.
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Notes
1 
An alternative approach to estimate market power is proposed by Hall and
refined by Roeger (see Oliviera Martins et al., 1996 and van Dijk et al., 1996).
This analysis is based on the definition of the Solow residual and applied at
a sectoral level, for which (annual) data on growth rates of inputs and out-
puts are available. This technique estimates the Lerner index  directly, assum-
ing it is a constant. Our industry-level approach, in contrast,  focuses on the
two components of a time-varying markup, i.e. a conduct parameter of
oligopolistic interdependence and the price elasticity of demand.
2 
Adding the tea price and total expenditures as additional variables yielded
insignificant estimates and were dropped.
3 
We did include the wage rate in the food sector, but this variable was insig-
nificant since it did not show much variation in real terms.
4 
Our more detailed working paper shows that this restriction on the constant
could not be rejected.
5 
For the U.S., Roberts (1984) reported a price elasticity of 0.25. Feuerstein
(1996) estimated a value of 0.18 for Germany.
Table 1 Coefficient estimates & standard errors
intercept in demand 0α 0.788 (0.046)
price effect on demand 1α -0.011 (0.003)
second quarter effect 2δ 0.033 (0.016)
third quarter effect 3δ 0.040 (0.019)
fourth quarter effect 4δ 0.098 (0.018)
effect of bean price on marginal cost 1β 1.679 (0.057)
conduct parameter θ 0.031 (0.008)
price elasticity of demand ε 0.211 (0.060)
Lerner-index L 0.147 (0.028)
Note: ε and L are evaluated at sample mean values
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Competition in
communication and
information services
Marcel Canoy*
come prohibitively expensive if the dominant player is free
to determine the price for accessing that network. Second,
also in other aspects than network ownership, the former
monopolist often dominates the liberalized market and can
thus abuse this position to obstruct competition. After the
decision to liberalize, the government has to make sure
these two obstacles are handled adequately. Adequate
handling involves deciding in each circumstance if regula-
tion is called for, and, if so, how to conduct and organize
regulation.
The first part of our research aims at providing some
tools to the government to handle the problems mentioned
above. The description and analysis of the markets of C&I
services gives rise to a number of policy questions. We
identify the most important of these questions, discuss
policy options and assess their economic consequences.
The second part of our study looks further ahead (a
dozen years) and further beyond the C&I submarkets. The
principal objective is to investigate the effects of liberaliza-
tion on the economy as a whole. Since everybody watches
TV and uses the telephone, competition in C&I services
exerts a strong impact on the economy, but where, how
and to what extent? In evaluating the effects, we take the
level of competition as given. The question therefore is not
how to reach competition, but rather what happens to the
economy given a particular institutional setting for compe-
tition. To give an example, in a favorable economic environ-
ment with a competitive C&I market, how does C&I
competition affect transaction costs in credit markets? We
then vary the settings by considering various scenarios and
see what we can learn from this variation in regulations and
the environment.
Economic theory does not state unambiguously that
deregulation, liberalization and competition enhances
welfare under all circumstances for everyone. We describe
the general effects that are expected to occur in the optimal
situation of competitive C&I markets with a minimum of
market failure. Apart from discussing the benefits of com-
petition, we point also at the dangers if liberalization fails.
We discuss three channels through which enhanced C&I
competition benefits the economy. The first channel in-
volves the C&I markets themselves: how does more intense
competition affect the price/quality mix of products and
services? The second channel involves the use of C&I ser-
vices by downstream industries. Input costs in downstream
industries can be reduced by C&I use. In this connection, the
C&I sector is rather special because improvements in the
price/quality mix of C&I products can reduce transaction
costs in many markets. Lower transactions costs may not
only allow for substitution away from other inputs, such as
inventories, but also improve the functioning of other
markets or create markets that otherwise would not exist.
The third channel involves another dimension of down-
stream industries. Improved competition in C&I markets
*tel:  31-70-3383379; e-mail canoy@cpb.nl.
Abstract
The Dutch markets for communication and information
services have recently been liberalized. The introduction
of competition is accompanied by potential market fail-
ures that need to be tackled by the government. This
article discusses some general principles of regulation
during the transition from a tightly regulated market
towards a more liberal regime. It also analyzes some of
the economy-wide effects of liberalization.
Samenvatting
De Nederlandse markten voor communicatie en informatie-
diensten zijn recentelijk geliberaliseerd. De introductie
van mededinging gaat gepaard met potentieel
marktfalen, waar de overheid een oplossing voor dient
te vinden. Dit artikel behandelt enige algemene
principes van regelgeving voor de transitie naar een
meer liberaal regime. Het analyseert ook een aantal
effekten van liberalisering op de economie.
Introduction
This article discusses the main results of a recent study on
competition in the Dutch communication and information
(C&I) services market (see Bernardt and Canoy, 1997b). The
underlying study consists of two parts. First, it overviews
the current situation and explores some problems that the
government faces when it introduces competition. Second,
it seeks to find out why competition in the market for C&I
services is important for the economy as a whole. The first
part aims to fill a gap in the Dutch literature on competition
and regulation in the C&I sector. The second part is more
in line with CPB’s traditional fields of expertise. Much of
CPB’s research focuses on how certain policies or develop-
ments affect the economy as a whole. The research dis-
cussed in this article therefore combines elements of “new
markets” for CPB (institutions and competition) with CPB’s
“old specialties” (economy-wide effects).
This article concentrates on main lessons of the study.
For the underpinning of the lessons the reader is referred
to the underlying study.
Objectives and tools
Liberalization aims at increasing competition. The mar-
kets of C&I services feature two potential obstacles on the
path towards more competition. First, market failures,
mostly associated with network features, threaten to thwart
competition. For instance, if one player owns the most
important network, access to that network is likely to be-
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may alter also the dynamic structure of the economy. Con-
sumer tastes can be affected by information flows. Produc-
tion technology may improve more rapidly under the
influence of lower costs of innovation brought about by
increased accessibility to stocks of knowledge. To become
more specific about these general effects, we elaborated on
a number of representative case studies.
This study compelled us to make a large number of
choices; choices on policy options, on case studies, on ways
to fill in the scenarios and on many other things. More of-
ten than not, these choices were founded neither on empiri-
cal work, nor on modelling outcomes, nor on a clear
consensus in the literature. We therefore had to pool to-
gether information from various sources. Apart from tak-
ing advantage of the literature and experiences from
abroad, we gathered information from about 20 interviews
with market players and experts. The interviews were valu-
able, in particular considering the rapidly changing nature
of the market, which quickly renders information obsolete.
Given the time-span and purpose of our study, an eclectic
approach was necessary.
Lessons on competition and regulation
The underlying research discusses a number of specific
policy questions, policy options and their pros and cons.
This article pools the information together and draws some
general lessons on competition and regulation.
Lesson 1:  Regulation plays a vital role during the transi-
tion period towards a competitive market.
There is fairly broad consensus on the lesson in the
Netherlands nowadays. Both market parties and the Parlia-
ment support this approach (see Bernardt and Canoy,
1997a). Less consensus exists on the level, organization and
time-span of regulation.
The most telling example of Lesson 1 is the regulation
of interconnection charges, i.e. the prices of the service that
is required to establish the link between different networks
in order to guarantee interoperability.1 PTT-Telecom still
occupies a dominant position in the market for fixed-wire
telephony, because it is the only operator with a final link
to the customers (the so-called local loop). This implies that
all other operators depend on PTT’s network to serve their
customers. Not only the level of the charges, but also its
cost base and the long-term credibility of regulation deter-
mines whether or not competition in both services and
infrastructure will take place. Long-term credibility of inter-
connection regulation determines, to a certain extent,
whether or not investments in infrastructure will be made.
Potential investors are not prepared to take risks if they do
not have confidence in future regulation. The level and cost
base of interconnection charges determine whether com-
petitors have sufficient manoeuvering space to effectively
compete in services. In particular in the short and medium
term, when there is no alternative local loop available,
operators have to pay interconnection charges to the PTT
both for outgoing and incoming phone calls, which puts
more weight on the appropriateness of the level and cost
base of the charges. If local loop competition has materi-
alized (either by a wireless local loop, by TV cables or both),
access charges for outgoing calls (so-called originating
access) becomes a competitive service, so that the regula-
tor needs to monitor only the charges for incoming calls,
which remains a bottleneck facility even in the presence of
competing local loops. The interconnection example shows
that regulation is essential to boost competition during the
transition period, after which regulators can back off if com-
petition has reached more mature stages.
Consider the introduction of various forms of conditional
access television. Conditional access can improve the
match between supply and demand of TV programs by
explicitly linking consumer preferences to supply through
subscriptions, instead of implicitly through advertisements.
Leaving the coordination of decoder standards to the mar-
ket suffers from the real risk of coordination failure, which
is likely to result in incompatible standards and a delay in
the introduction of decoders. Another market failure in-
volves a discontinuity in the penetration rates of decoders.
Consumers do not want decoders if that implies that they
cannot look at all the channels they like, whereas popular
channels do not want to disappear behind a decoder if there
is no full penetration of decoders. The potential benefits of
conditional access television might be reaped only if the
government tackles this coordination problem. Once de-
coder penetration has been established, the government
can step back and monitor the TV market from a distance.
Lesson 2:  Regulatory watchdogs should make themselves
redundant as quickly as possible.
It seems paradoxical to first plea for additional efforts by the
regulator and then to conclude that the regulator should
aim for self-liquidation. The logic of the second lesson lies
in the ultimate objective of transition regulation, which is
deregulation. Regulation should assist the market on its
way to a competitive environment. Accordingly, success-
ful regulation implies that markets become competitive as
soon as possible, which then removes the need for watch-
dogs. Think of a football analogy: an optimal referee in a
football match has such a good reputation that he does not
need to blow his whistle at all. The regulatory watchdog in
the U.K., Oftel, has in fact announced that it aims for self-
liquidation in 2002.
Regulators should move towards self-liquidation be-
cause they can become anti-productive and can obstruct
innovation in a dynamic market. In the quickly moving C&I
markets, infrastructure tends to converge (i.e. both informa-
tion and communication services can be transported
through various types of infrastructure), new models are
quickly outdated and replaced by even newer ones, and
services emerge that are hybrid in nature (i.e. combine el-
ements of communication and information). Clearly, such
a world does not need regulatory straitjackets. Neverthe-
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less, rules and referees are vital during the stage in which
market failures can obstruct developments more than regu-
lation does.
Lesson 3:  Social and political goals should not be attained
through C&I markets. Socially adverse effects created by
liberalizing of C&I markets can best be cured directly, rather
than by distorting C&I markets.
Social and political goals in C&I markets should be placed
in historical context. C&I monopolists used to have a util-
ity role. Nowadays, the utility role is minimal. Liberalizing
the C&I market implies that market distorting constraints
with a utility flavor should be placed in the museum next
to the monopolists. This does not mean that the govern-
ment should be passive if liberalization creates socially
adverse effects. As the following examples illustrate, these
effects can better be handled separately.
The utility-flavored constraints occur in fixed-wire tele-
phony, mail and possibly also in the TV market in the future.
Society has strong feelings about universal service for te-
lephony, mail and TV. Everybody must be able to watch TV,
receive mail and access telephony for a reasonable price.
In telephony, low-frequency callers put a burden on other
callers by being unprofitable customers. This can become
a problem in a competitive market by distorting the market,
as prices do not reflect costs. The suggestion to rebalance
the tariffs has lead to political objections. However, specific
measures aimed at disadvantaged groups seems a supe-
rior way of dealing with this problem. In the TV market, a
similar story applies to the price of public TV, which does
not reflect the underlying costs.
Lessons on economy-wide effects of competition
In analyzing the economy-wide effects, we concentrate on
both the opportunities for competition and the dangers of
liberalization. Apart from identifying the location and the
scale of economy-wide effects, we discuss also the relative
importance of policy and the economic environment.
Lesson 4:  In the assessment of the impact of C&I compe-
tition on the economy, the government’s ability to handle
market failures in the transition period is often more impor-
tant than the economic environment.
Normally one would not expect regulation to be more im-
portant than the economic environment in a market such
as this, because technological developments are typically
perceived as a pervasive trend. The key is that regulation
has reached a crossroad. Between now and the coming,
say, five years, a number of vital choices must be made. If
the regulators take a wrong turn, a competitive chaos is
looming. The environment always plays a role. No matter
how effective one regulates, low growth rates discourage
investments and consumer spending. If the regulator takes
the right path, the economic environment determines how
easy the path will be and how fast one arrives at the com-
petitive goal. The lesson does not say that a lot of regula-
tion is called for. Successful regulation is vital, but success
is not necessarily associated with heavy government
interference.
If, hypothetically, the regulator sets interconnection
charges at such a high level that no new entrant can effec-
tively compete in services, and if the long-term credibility
of the regulatory watchdog is so doubtful that no entrant
dares to invest, the economic environment becomes irrel-
evant to the question of whether or not competition will take
place. The matter is highly complex and so the question is
not solved easily. Even well-equipped Oftel did not succeed
in realizing effective competition in the U.K. during the first
ten years after liberalization.
Lesson 4 can be further illustrated by the case studies
included in the second part of the CPB study, notably tele-
shopping and conditional access TV. Even the ‘bad environ-
ment’ scenario allows substantial scope for teleshopping.
The bottleneck for the development of teleshopping lies in
C&I policy. Unsuccessful policy creates bottlenecks in the
interface and C&I investments that are required, while
prices for C&I services are high as well. Although techno-
logical developments can be pervasive, diffusion of tech-
nology is not.
Lesson 5:  Benefits from competition in C&I can be most
effectively reaped (and sometimes only be reaped) if com-
petition is complemented by other developments, notably
in the organization and production process of firms.
Kremer (1993) demonstrates that production processes
often require complementary actions and conditions for
these processes to be successful. In a number of articles,
Brynjolfsson (http://ccs.mit.edu/erik) showed that this holds
in particular for ICT related developments. Our study con-
firms these insights. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is a
protocol of data communication that permits businesses to
replace paper documents with their electronic equivalent.
EDI consists of data transport in standard formats, often in
conjunction with up- and downstream trading partners and
banks and typically squeezes unnecessary (product) inven-
tory from the supply chain, from manufacturer to end-user.
EDI can be a costly failure if employees do not know how
to operate the associated machines or management does
not want to bear the full consequences of the technology.
We used the example of DAF trucks to illustrate the
point. It clearly demonstrated that a full implementation of
EDI at all levels, using all complementarities, can yield sub-
stantial gains: before the reorganization and implementa-
tion of built-to-order production and EDI, DAF was virtually
bankrupt. Currently, DAF trucks is a successful company.
The benefits do not originate in EDI per se, but rather in the
combination of EDI and the modified production process,
the organization, and the relationships with the suppliers
and customers.
Another example of complementarity involves
teleshopping. Some retailer can create the most beautiful
virtual shop in the world (in fact, some pretty nice ones al-
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ready exist), but lack of support from transport, willing
consumers, C&I firms (for the interface), banks (safe and
user-friendly payment systems), or user equipment can
obstruct the development of teleshopping. The failure to
successfully deal with the complementary elements ob-
structs the development of teleshopping.
A final example of a failure to recognize comple-
mentarities was the attempt to introduce a conditional ac-
cess sports channel in the Netherlands (Sport 7). The
required complementarities were the cooperation of the
cable operators, the government and the consumers. A
new attempt (sports and movies, Canal+) has learned this
lesson from the Sport 7 failure and appears to be doing
comparatively well.
Lesson 6:  The consumer benefits of C&I competition are
often not evenly distributed and are manifested in in-
creased leisure, improved quality, widened product range,
or better service.
Improved competition in C&I services implies that the ser-
vices become cheaper, faster, more accessible and more
diverse. Liberalization implies also a repositioning of C&I
suppliers. In the ‘utility times’ of the C&I markets, the pub-
lic good aspects effectively implied that heavy users were
sponsored by infrequent users. This applied to both TV and
telephony. With C&I goods and services, marginal costs are
frequently quite low, while fixed costs are high. Pricing
schemes that charge high fixed subscription fees and low
usage charges (for example for telephony) enhance eco-
nomic efficiency, but place a financial burden on custom-
ers with low usage. In the television market, where the
marginal cost of having an additional viewer watch is zero,
conditional access (decoders) can distribute costs more
evenly over viewers who pay only for usage. Lesson 3
implies that adverse social effects should be solved
separately.
C&I products and services are consumed disproportion-
ately by the wealthy, at least initially. However, prices of
improved goods often start out high because producers
attempt to price discriminate, i.e. to extract surplus from
those with a high willingness to pay. Eventually, prices of
goods in a competitive market drop to levels that make the
purchase affordable for broader classes of consumers.
Concluding remarks
From the lessons above, the following picture emerges.
Regulation plays a crucial role during the transition phase
to achieve a competitive market as soon as possible. Regu-
lation can manifest itself in various forms. The most inter-
ventionist regulation determines prices (interconnection).
Less interfering regulation levels the playing field (mobile
telephony) and puts market parties together to push them
in the right direction (decoders). The lightest degree of regu-
lation concerns various forms of monitoring, such as moni-
toring quality of service. The regulatory watchdogs should
aim at the lightest possible form of regulation that still
manages to achieve the goal, so that the market is only
minimally distorted. Nevertheless, in some cases heavy
regulation is called for.
Another general aim of regulation is to be time consis-
tent and credible in the long run. Time consistency is im-
portant, because the market is dynamic, so that static
notions should be avoided or be easily adaptable whenever
appropriate. Credibility in the long run is essential to reduce
risks for the investors. The regulator thus faces a trade-off
between commitment and flexibility.
The future trends point at improvements in quality, wid-
ening of product choice, reduction of transaction costs and
increased flexibility of producers (which leads to more tai-
lor-made products and services for consumers). On the one
hand, markets become more transparent. On the other
hand, products become more differentiated so that in gen-
eral the effect on competitiveness is ambiguous.
In the “bad” world, where regulators have taken wrong
turns and the economic environment is unfavorable, high-
income groups profit from C&I innovations and low-income
groups live similar (but more expensive) lives as in 1997.
The biggest danger in such a scenario is that C&I widens
the gaps between the two groups. In this world, the C&I
markets are chaotic while inefficient entry and exit occurs.
The “good” world, where regulators have taken the right
path and the economic environment is helpful as well, pro-
duces a more balanced picture. Increased competition in
C&I services leads to prices that are affordable for most
people so that there is a high penetration of new user equip-
ment, such as decoders, mobile phones and so forth. Effec-
tive policy backs this up with education for lower income
groups.
There are other tasks for the government apart from
regulation. First, the Competition Authority (NMa) should
gradually take over tasks from the regulatory watchdogs.
The sooner they can do this, the better regulation has
worked. The second governmental task involves stimula-
tion. Mass acceptance of new technology is eased if the
government gives a good example (e.g. information about
all governmental bodies available on Internet) and if edu-
cation is attuned to the new needs of the information soci-
ety. The third and final government action involves social
goals. In particular, the government might want to protect
lower income groups to prevent a further widening of the
gap between income groups. Other social goals involve spe-
cific measures, e.g. for universal service (see Lesson 3).
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Competition in health care:
A Dutch experiment1
Eric Bartelsman and Philip ten Cate*
lects much of the needed revenue through sickness fund
contributions levied on the payroll.2 Owing to fiscal pres-
sures, the government attempts to reduce costs and in-
crease non-tax revenue. Cost control has occurred through
central budgeting and price control of hospitals and special-
ists, through direct capacity management, and, to a lesser
extent, through reductions in coverage. Non-tax revenue
has increased by requiring patient co-insurance. Some ef-
fort has been put into improving efficiency by using mar-
ket mechanisms, but mostly for insurance administration,
and less for health care delivery itself. Improving the effi-
ciency of health care delivery may or may not reduce ag-
gregate health expenditures, but, as will be argued, should
diminish political concern about escalating costs.
Effects of market failures
The health care market deviates in important ways from a
stylized perfectly competitive market. To start, consumer
preferences for health care are unlike those for traditional
goods. The need for health care is subject to a special form
of risk, with infrequent but unpredictable and very costly
events. Consumers are unable to use savings to cover the
risk because of the uncertain timing of the event, while they
are unable to borrow because their state of health makes
them bad credit risks. In general, these conditions give rise
to a market for pooled savings, or insurance, to ensure
accessibility.
Insurance markets, however, will not function efficiently
because they are subject to adverse selection or moral
hazard. If uniform rates are charged to different risk groups
because the insurer cannot observe health risks, individu-
als who know that they are high risks will choose insurance,
while low-risk individuals will not. Rates will thus rise to
reflect the higher risk of the insurees, which causes further
selection. Adverse selection thus can cause a death-spiral
of smaller risk-pools until insurance no longer is offered
(see Schut, 1995).
Another problem, risk-selection by insurers, occurs be-
cause health care demand is highly skewed across consum-
ers: To illustrate, in one study, only 1 percent of patients
accounted for as much as 28 percent of total costs (see
Newhouse, 1996). Although only a small portion of the
probability of health care needs can be predicted using
readily available indicators such as age and gender, screen-
ing high-risk individuals can be profitable for competing
insurers.
Insurance also suffers from moral hazard on the demand
side of the market because insured consumers no longer
face a budget constraint when purchasing health care. With
complete insurance, consumers will desire any care with
positive marginal benefits, regardless of cost. Finally, asym-
metric information permeates health markets. Consumers
lack information about the need for health care services and
thus defer judgment to those with medical training. Accord-
ingly suppliers have the market power to create their own
*Bartelsman (tel: 31-70-3383349; e-mail: ejb@cpb.nl); ten Cate (tel: 31-70-
3383371; e-mail patc@cpb.nl)
Abstract
This article briefly summarizes the trade-offs in choos-
ing managed competition as a system for mitigating
market failures in health care and for simulating the fea-
tures of a perfectly competitive market. Not much em-
pirical evidence exists at the systems level, however, to
evaluate the trade-offs. This article describes why the
Netherlands represents an ideal location for a controlled
experiment with managed competition, and how such
an experiment can be implemented.
Samenvatting
De afwegingen die spelen bij het kiezen voor gereguleerde
mededinging als systeem voor het oplossen van
marktfalen in de zorg en voor het nabootsen van
aspecten van volledige mededinging worden kort
weergegeven. Er bestaat echter weinig inzicht in de
empirisch betekenis van deze afruilen. In dit artikel wordt
beschreven waarom Nederland een geschikte plek is om
te experimenteren met gereguleerde mededinging, en
hoe zo’n experiment er uit zou kunnen zien.
Introduction
Health care expenditures have ballooned during the previ-
ous decade in most industrialized countries, both in per
capita terms, and as a percentage of GDP. A growing expen-
diture share for health care does not necessarily indicate
any underlying economic problem. Increased expenditure
shares on software or restaurant meals, for example, do not
provide a cause for policy action. There are several indica-
tions, however, that current health care outlays do not rep-
resent consumer preferences, so that the system may not
meet patient needs in the most efficient manner.
In a perfectly competitive market the worries about the
growth of health care spending would be unfounded. The
market outcomes would be efficient, both statically and
dynamically, and production would not suffer from X-inef-
ficiency. However, the conditions necessary for a perfectly
competitive market are not met in the health care sector. In
a free market, market failures associated with imperfect
information would produce inefficient outcomes. Indeed,
the health care market in the Netherlands operates with
strong government involvement, as it does in most indus-
trialized countries.
More than 80 percent of health care expenditures in the
Netherlands are disbursed by the government, which col-
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demand, and thus face incentives to provide excessive (or
inefficient) care.
Figure 1 shows the market supply and demand curves,
Qs and Qd, under the assumptions of perfect competition.
The supply curve reflects marginal costs, while the demand
curve depends, among other factors, on income, age struc-
ture, and the health conditions of consumers. At the equi-
librium outcomes p* and Q*, social benefits equal social
costs, thus producing static efficiency.
In a hypothetical free health care market, however, this
equilibrium will not be achieved. Moral hazard on the de-
mand side will shift the demand curve and allow private
and social returns to differ. Depending on the type and
amount of co-insurance, the demand curve will rotate up-
wards, and become vertical in the absence of co-insurance,
as denoted by effect 1 in figure 1.
The supply curve reflects costs of production. In a free
health care market, X-inefficiency shifts the supply curve
upwards because more resources are needed to produce
output (effect 3). X-inefficiency can exist in health care
markets because inefficient providers are not driven out by
market forces. This occurs because consumers have diffi-
culty determining the quality of service and only have lim-
ited incentives to care about cost. Stronger competition
between providers (for example, if the market becomes
more transparent because consumers receive comparisons
of provider quality) lowers prices and strengthens the in-
centives for providers to tackle X-inefficiency.
Information asymmetry allows providers to influence
the perceived benefits of care. Supplier-induced demand
shifts the demand curve, as denoted by effect 2. In essence,
supply creates its own demand, and can determine the level
of output and the price. Equilibrium output and prices will
occur where the demand and supply curves meet. If provid-
ers further enjoy market power, or can coordinate their
actions, they can choose a price that lies above marginal
costs.
A free health care market with insurance also has impli-
cations for dynamic efficiency. Because consumers are will-
ing to pay any price for care (they are reimbursed), they will
demand use of technology with the highest benefits. Hence,
introduction of a technological advance can be profitable,
regardless of the cost-benefit ratio of such technology. The
net present value of social returns to innovation will thus
be lower than the net present value of private returns.
Managed competition
Under managed competition, as developed by Enthoven
(1988), economic agents have incentives to behave as if
they were in a perfectly competitive environment. Price
signals and competitive pressures are designed to bring
cost-conscious consumers and capable profit-seeking pro-
viders together in an efficient manner. Informational asym-
metries, adverse selection and moral hazard are dealt with
by imposing some ground rules and creating particular
institutions.
A new market party is necessary for managed compe-
tition to function properly, the so-called sponsor. The spon-
sor acts as a purchasing agent for a pool of consumers (for
example, all inhabitants of a region), lays the ground rules
for competition among insurers and health care providers,
supplies consumers with information, and helps prevent
risk-selection by insurers.
Health care providers offer potential customers a con-
tract for a specific period with coverage at or above a mini-
mum standard, at a price based on the risk characteristics
of the entire risk pool. The providers, called health plans,
can exist in different organizational forms. A health plan
could resemble a traditional fee-for-service insurance firm,
which reimburses customers for purchased services. Alter-
natively, providers and insurers can integrate and offer pre-
paid access to care. In such plans, payment to physicians
could take various forms, such as salary, capitation (i.e.
fixed amount per subscriber per period), or profit sharing.
Health plans are free to select or exclude providers. This
feature creates incentives for plans to carefully monitor
health care delivery, and for providers to adopt efficient care
patterns.
Consumers are free to switch between plans periodi-
cally. The sponsor collects the premiums and redistributes
revenue among plans according to the risk profile of cus-
tomers choosing that plan. Risk adjustment ensures that
plans compete on price, quality, and coverage, rather than
through risk-selection. The sponsor provides consumers
with information on price, quality and level of coverage of
the competing plans. Consumers also need to consider
differences in co-insurance schemes when choosing plans.
Such co-insurance aids in alleviating moral hazard.
Managed competition, in theory, circumvents the prob-
lems described above. X-inefficiency is reduced because
health plans will lose market share if their unit costs are
high. Even if providers are salaried, the ability of the plan
to select and exclude providers increases pressure on pro-
viders to provide proper effort.
Figure 1 provides some guidance in evaluating static ef-
ficiency under managed competition. The supply curve will
be near Qs, owing to the reduction of X-inefficiency. The
demand curve may be rotated owing to moral hazard, but
P
Q s
Q d
Q
P *
Q *
2
3 1
1. Moral hazard
2. Supplier-induced demand
3. X-inefficiency
Figure 1
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proper co-insurance reduces this problem. However, the
problem of supplier-induced demand may now result in a
leftward shift of the demand curve. Underprovision can be
combated by the sponsor mandating minimum care stan-
dards, and by consumers voting with their feet after receiv-
ing quality information from the sponsor. Overall, the static
supply and demand curve can be brought close to what
would prevail under perfect competition.
Health plans also face incentives that move market out-
comes towards dynamic efficiency. The plans must make
investment and innovation decisions to remain attractive
to customers in the future. Failures will be punished by the
market. Adoption of new medical technology will be evalu-
ated by the plan not only on benefits, but also on costs.
Furthermore, plans have an incentive to invest in maintain-
ing healthy customers.
Trade-offs and pitfalls
Managed care may seem to be a free lunch, but certain
trade-offs exist and uncertainties remain. The sponsor faces
tasks that may be difficult to implement successfully, in
practice; only experience will tell. The sponsor may incur
high costs and be only partly effective in ex-ante risk adjust-
ment, which is needed to combat risk-selection by plans.
Health plans will attempt to make themselves look unattrac-
tive to customers who are costly within the categories used
for risk-adjustment, and attractive to relatively good risks.
The sponsor may have a difficult time providing the neces-
sary price/quality information to the consumer. The
sponsor must work with indicators that are medically mean-
ingful yet easy to interpret. Health plans face incentives to
score well on the selected indicators. Care must be taken
that the incentives derived from the indicators line up with
appropriate medical practice.
Another empirical issue involves the effect of various
types of co-insurance on the elasticity of demand. A higher
percentage co-payment is expected to provide stronger in-
centives for customers. In addition to the uncertainty re-
garding the responsiveness of demand to co-insurance, a
trade-off may exist between incentives for cost control and
access to care, especially for low-income households.
In addition, different types of provider payments influ-
ence the net direction of supplier-induced demand. In man-
aged competition, a large portion of the revenue for each
health plan is a fixed premium per patient, the remainder
coming from co-insurance payments. In general, the the
plan is motivated to conserve on treatment in order to lower
costs. Of course, quality indicators provided to patients will
put some restrictions on this abuse. The method with which
providers in a plan get remunerated also plays a role. Pri-
mary care physicians receiving capitation payments may
attempt to pass patients on to secondary care specialists,
physicians paid per item will try to increase provisions,
while physicians sharing in plan profits may attempt to
reduce the overall cost of care provided. It is also important
Empirical findings
Supplier-induced demand
Wennberg, et al. (1982) describe the difficulty in inferring
the importance of supplier-induced demand from ob-
served variation in treatment. In particular, physician
uncertainty about diagnosis and about treatment out-
comes rather than ‘rational economic’ response to
incentives may explain variation in treatment. Managed
care may reduce physician uncertainty, by pooling and
sharing best-practice information, but may increase pres-
sure on physicians to respond to financial incentives (see
Newhouse, 1996). Recently, the legal system in the US
has responded to consumer complaints regarding
underprovision by capitated managed care plans (see
Latham, 1996).
Effects of co-insurance on Moral Hazard
The magnus opus on the effects of co-insurance is the
RAND Study (Newhouse, 1993). The main finding is that
co-payments are an important tool in reducing moral haz-
ard, but that high deductibles may not be needed. Quality
of care for the very poor may be adversely affected. Van
Vliet and Van de Ven (1983) report how demand in the
Netherlands is affected by co-payments.
X-inefficiency
The RAND study also provides data on a small experiment
with patients randomly assigned to different types of in-
surers/providers. Health maintainance organizations
(HMOs), a specific form of managed care plan, were able
to use significantly fewer resources for comparable health
outcomes. Since that study, many differences have been
observed among plans by type of ownership and pay-
ment schemes. It is difficult to ascertain efficiency with
which resources are used (X-inefficiency), as opposed to
whether too many resources produce too much output
(supplier-induced demand). McKinsey (1996) provides a
cross-country comparison of efficiency in care, but a simi-
lar study has not been done across providers, by type.
Dynamic efficiency
Although technology is thought to be a major cause of
escalation in health care expenditures (see Cutler, 1996),
little effort has been spent on the interplay between incen-
tives in health markets and R&D in medical technology.
In a review of the topic, Weisbrod (1991) provides some
examples of adopting non-cost effective treatment. One
example is given of an R&D project (for cochlear implants)
that was scrapped after diagnosis-related-group (DRG)
pricing was introduced in Medicare. For the Netherlands,
a more relevant empirical question is how adoption of
technology may vary by plan type.
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to understand the role of administrative interventions, such
as utilization review, on physician behavior and quality of
care. Does such a review lead to an efficient diffusion of best
practice, or do the implied restrictions reduce the ability of
physicians to act appropriately given the specific circum-
stances of their patients?
Little empirical evidence exists on the link between types
of providers and the rate at which innovations are adopted.
Also, changes in the distribution of (variation in) clinical
practice following introduction of managed competition
have not been studied adequately. Box 1 summarizes what
is known empirically about moral hazard, supplier-induced
demand, and dynamic inefficiency.
Why in the Netherlands?
Experimentation with the health care system creates the
risk that outcomes may worsen for some customers or
providers. Such risk must be minimized in order to imple-
ment a socially acceptable experiment. The proposal we
make places a limit on the downside risk to any consumer.
We propose to put in place a system of managed compe-
tition for the segment of the Dutch population currently
covered by private insurance (see Box 2). Such customers
consist of families of wage earners whose earnings exceed
the income threshold for inclusion in the sickness fund
system. These customers currently can select fee-for-
service insurers, who must accept them at or below a maxi-
mum premium. Under the proposed experiment, the insur-
ers and other forms of health plans may choose to offer
contracts to the customers via the sponsor. Unlike in the
present system, the premiums may no longer be risk-rated.
Sickness funds will be required to submit an offer as well,
which ensures that customers of the experiment have the
option to receive the same quality care that is given the
majority of the population insured under the sickness
funds. Furthermore, sickness funds will receive a market-
based benchmark of their ability to provide a competitive
price-quality mix.
Such an experiment is relatively easy to implement in
the Netherlands, because many of the features required for
managed competition are already in place or can be created
by transforming existing institutions.Competition among
private insurers, and recently also among sickness funds,
already exists. The insurers and sickness funds, however,
do not have much scope to influence the costs of provision;
instead, they mostly compete on administrative efficiency.
Recently, sickness funds obtained the right to select or
exclude independent practitioners, but in practice all re-
gional providers are included. Integration between insur-
ers and providers is currently prohibited. For the
experiment, such alliances will be allowed, and are likely to
be formed in various configurations.
The sponsor could be spun-off from the sickness fund
council, the oversight organization for sickness fund insur-
ers. This organization has experience not only in regulat-
ing insurers, and collecting data on care trajectories, but
also in distributing centrally collected sickness fund contri-
butions to the funds based on their customers’ health pro-
files. In addition to implementing ex-ante risk adjustment,
the sponsor will have to monitor the plans’ risk-selection
behavior. In the Netherlands, risk-selection incentives are
reduced substantially by  a rather extensive mandatory
national system (AWBZ) that covers difficult-to-insure items
such as dialysis and long-term care.
In the Netherlands, experience already exists with deter-
mination of  minimum coverage standards, which are a
necessary condition for managed competition. Presently,
minimum standards are set both for sickness-fund insur-
ance, and for contracts offered by private insurance. After
introduction of managed competition, the role of the gov-
ernment can be limited to adjusting the minimum standard
to political and economic circumstances.
Finally, two circumstances may ease acceptance of the
proposed experiment in the Netherlands at the present
time. First, political consensus is relatively easy to reach in
the Netherlands because a forum for discussion among
interested parties in health care already exists. The budget-
ary pressures have ensured that all parties already agree
that some form of action is required. Second, medical spe-
cialists, traditionally the party most opposed to managed
competition, are quite unhappy with the current system.
Hence, they may be willing to move to a different system.
Under the current system, physicians get paid a fixed fee
per provision, determined by dividing a global budget with
the total number of provisions. As budgets get tighter,
physicians are induced to supply more provisions. This, in
turn, reduces the price per provision, further reducing in-
come. This system has resulted in the feeling among phy-
sicians that they are running faster and faster merely to stay
Policy Experiment
- Mandatory insurance with guaranteed acceptance for all
customers not eligible for insurance by sickness funds.
- Health plans vie for customers annually with an offer of
coverage at or above a minimum level of coverage for a
community rated premium.
- Health plans may select or exclude providers.
- Sponsor provides price/quality information to
customers.
- Sponsor distributes ex-ante risk adjustment to plans
based on actual customer-mix.
- The sickness funds submit a contract offer for their
standard coverage.
- Competition Authority (NMa) oversees competition
among insurers and providers.
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in place. Also, the link between income and performance
under managed competition is likely to be regarded as an
improvement by physicians.
Conclusions
This article argued for an experiment with managed com-
petition in health care in the Netherlands.
At present, certain facets of managed competition exist
in different countries, but a system that  meets all require-
ments does not exist anywhere. In the US, the market share
of HMOs and other forms of managed care providers have
increased dramatically in recent years. Yet, the US experi-
ence does not provide the right setting to evaluate the sys-
tem of managed competition. First, adverse selection
remains a problem because insurance is not mandatory,
nor are insurers required to accept customers. Further-
more, problems related to asymmetric information are not
addressed by a sponsor who implements ex-ante risk
adjustment and provides customers with price/quality
information.
The proposed experiment would provide experience
about the pros and cons of managed competition. Partici-
pation would be mandatory for those not covered by the
sickness funds. At the same time, the risk for the popula-
tion under the experiment would be limited because stan-
dard coverage would remain available. Furthermore, the
experiment does not affect socially vulnerable segments of
society. Structured monitoring and evaluation of the experi-
ment may lead to well-defined options for restructuring the
entire health care system.
First, information on the effects of co-insurance will be
obtained. The market will likely provide a wide variety of
options: The customer must choose between the level of
the premium, on the one hand, and deductibles, co-pay-
ments, and out-of-pocket maxima, on the other. Variation
in health care usage among customers with different types
and levels of co-insurance can aid in evaluating the best
way to combat moral hazard.3
The market will likely introduce various types of plans,
ranging from traditional insurance, to managed care
groups, insurance with utilization review, preferred pro-
vider schemes and others.4 The information on price and
quality of care collected by the sponsor can be made avail-
able to analysts to assess which types of care work well for
which types of patients. The experiment also will provide
a useful benchmark for the performance and competitive-
ness of sickness funds.
Finally, information will be generated about health care
delivery trajectories for each of the plans. This information
can be used to see which organizational forms are able to
develop the most efficient methods of care, and which
forms are best able to quickly adopt better methods. Al-
ready, the Netherlands performs well internationally in
research on clinical methods, and hopefully the health
plans will stimulate further research in this direction. Be-
cause the Netherlands covers such a small area, the reduc-
tion in incentives of health plans to use advanced but non-
cost effective technology is unlikely to influence the
direction of technological change. Unfortunately, the mere
existence of such technology still will result in requests
from patients for its use, placing continued upward pres-
sure on aggregate health care expenditures in years to
come.
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Abstract
This paper discusses the use of macroeconomic
models for assessing the economy-wide effects of
deregulation. Two of CPB’s models, ATHENA and
MIMIC, account endogenously for a reduction of the
rents accruing to labor following an exogenous
negative price shock because the modelling of wages
implies rent sharing. ATHENA accounts for a reduction
of X-inefficiency as well. With either model, the usual
practice of exogenously shifting both prices, wages and
productivity would involve some double-counting.
Samenvatting
Dit artikel bespreekt het gebruik van macromodellen
voor de analyse van de macroeconomische gevolgen
van deregulering. De twee CPB-modellen ATHENA en
MIMIC houden zelf al rekening met een loondaling na
een negatieve prijsschok, omdat bij de loonvorming
sprake is van rent sharing. ATHENA houdt daarnaast
ook rekening met verminderde X-inefficiency. De
gebruikelijke methode om tegelijkertijd aan prijzen,
lonen en productiviteit een exogene schok toe te dienen
zou dus bij beide modellen tot dubbeltellingen leiden.
Introduction
How should the economy-wide effects of regulatory reform
be assessed? Clearly, aggregating the results of a number
of partial studies (as, for example, in McKinsey & Company,
1997) will not do because such an approach neglects feed-
backs at the macro level. Current macroeconomic models,
however, were not built for a structural analysis of compe-
tition policy and are in fact ill-suited for this purpose. The
usual approach has been to administer plausible exog-
enous shocks, derived from case studies, to a number of
endogenous variables of the macroeconomic model, which
serves as an instrument to account for the inter-
dependencies between these and other variables. By dis-
cussing an experiment in two of CPB’s macroeconomic
models, this paper points out that this approach may in-
volve some serious pitfalls.
The effects of deregulation
Theoretical and empirical research1
Predictions of the effects of regulatory reform (or deregu-
lation for short) have been based mainly on theoretical and
empirical research into the effects of regulation. The tradi-
tional justification for regulation is that it serves the public
interest by correcting for some form of market failure; natu-
ral monopoly is the classical example. Empirical research,
however, suggests that regulation often creates rather than
eliminates inefficiencies (for example, by limiting compe-
tition in situations in which markets could work). The fail-
ure of the public interest theory of regulation led to the
development of the economic theory of regulation by the
Chicago economists Stigler, Peltzman and Becker. Accord-
ing to this latter theory, compact, well-organized groups
(producers, labor), who tend to benefit from regulation at
the expense of broad, diffuse groups (consumers), capture
the regulatory process. Moreover, self-interested politicians
and regulators use their power over regulated industries to
win reelection or to hold on to lucrative jobs.
How will the lack of competition affect firm behavior in
regulated industries? First of all, firms may maintain higher
prices. Furthermore, the resulting high profit rates may
cause managerial slack and blunt the incentives for cost
reductions, productivity improvements and innovation.
This yields both X-inefficiency and dynamic inefficiency.
Moreover, restrictions on the firms’ operations may ham-
per static efficiency. High profit rates may also boost wage
claims by workers who want to secure part of the rents (rent
sharing). Deregulation2 is likely to alleviate these unfavor-
able effects by strengthening competitive forces.
Most empirical research involves case studies that em-
ploy microeconomic partial-equilibrium models to assess
the consequences of specific measures in a particular in-
dustry. According to Winston (1993, p. 1268), who provides
an overview of research relating to deregulation in the US,
empirical studies have focused on comparative static ef-
fects rather than dynamic issues because of analytical trac-
tability and data availability; below, these dynamic issues
will be neglected as well. These studies typically find that
deregulation reduces prices and wages and boosts produc-
tivity. The effects on profits and employment differ from
case to case as a result of opposing influences.
Economy-wide effects
For several broad packages of deregulation measures, the
economy-wide effects have been assessed. Examples are
‘Europe ‘92’ (Emerson et al., 1988; CPB, 1989) and the
‘Hilmer Reforms’ in Australia (Industry Commission, 1995).
Furthermore, OECD (1996) explores the macroeconomic
effects of regulatory reform in key sectors for a number of
countries. However, as noted in the introduction, most
existing economy-wide models — whether traditional mac-
roeconomic models or applied general-equilibrium mod-
els — are ill-suited for this purpose. Their theoretical base
(perfect competition, constant returns to scale, no X-inef-
ficiency) directly conflicts with the assumptions underlying
(partial) analyses of (de)regulation; moreover, they typically
lack the necessary institutional detail. The usual approach
has been to administer exogenous shocks to a number of
40
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Coefficient matrices:
pl  py h  pc  e  mu  pm UR
(1) pl  a  1 1-a -b
(2.j) py  1 -dAj -dMj  1
(3.j) h  f -f 1-f dMj.f
(4) pc  g 1-g
Semi-reduced-form equations for UR:
(5.j) UR = [{1 - (1 - a) . (1 - g) / (1 - dAj . f)} / b] . mu ...
Note: j = A(THENA), M(IMIC); dAM = dMA = 0, dAA = dMM = 1; UR: un-
employment rate; mu := ln(1 + MU), MU: mark-up; lower case sym-
bols refer to the logarithm of the variable concerned; pc: consumer
price; pl: wage rate; pm: import price; py; product price; h: labor
productivity; e: labor efficiency index.
endogenous variables of the macroeconomic model on the
basis of case studies and use the model merely as an instru-
ment to account for the interdependencies between these
and other variables at the macro level. For example, the
OECD subjects its model(s) to the following simultaneous
shocks: a) a boost to labor efficiency, b) a reduction of ag-
gregate employment, c) a lowering of prices, and d) a cut-
back on wages (OECD, 1996, p. 52).
Although this approach for assessing the economy-wide
effects of deregulation is superior to simply aggregating the
results of a number of partial studies, it cannot be applied
mechanically. For a shock that is administered to just one
variable — for example, solely to prices — will affect the
other variables as well; moreover, different models may re-
spond differently to such a shock, depending on the speci-
fication of the behavioral equations. Hence, a thorough
knowledge of the model at hand is a prerequisite for judi-
ciously selecting the additional exogenous shocks that
must be administered to each of these variables in order to
arrive at a correct estimate of the economy-wide effects of
deregulation. An experiment with two of CPB’s macro-
economic models illustrates this point.
An experiment with ATHENA and MIMIC
Both ATHENA and MIMIC describe the Dutch economy at
the macro level, but they do so with a different focus and
degree of detail. ATHENA is an empirical multisectoral
model distinguishing some fifteen sectors of industry; see
CPB (1990); the detailed description of the enterprise sec-
tor enables the analysis of measures affecting particular
industries. MIMIC is an applied general-equilibrium model
focusing on how the tax and social-security system impacts
the labor market (see Gelauff and Graafland, 1994); the
model involves a fairly disaggregated description of the
household sector (some fifteen household types are distin-
guished) but far less sectoral disaggregation.
In broad outline, the two models have much in common.
Many equations are based on the neoclassical theory of
profit-maximizing firms and utility-maximizing households.
MIMIC deviates from perfect competition on product mar-
kets by assuming Bertrand competition; hence, prices fol-
low from marking-up marginal cost. ATHENA is less explicit
about market structure, but the way of specifying the price
equations is similar (but not identical) to that of MIMIC.
Wage formation is similar, too. Both models incorporate a
wage curve derived from a bargaining model. Wages ex-
ceed the market-clearing level, so that unemployment ex-
ists in equilibrium. Importantly, the wage curve accounts
for rent sharing, which establishes a link between product
market competition and the labor market: Higher markups,
due to a lack of competition, raise equilibrium unemploy-
ment by increasing wage pressure.
The two models differ in a number of ways. Whereas
MIMIC closely adheres to the specifications implied by
theory, ATHENA is more empirically orientated and some-
times deviates from standard neoclassical theory. In par-
ticular, the specification of the factor-demand equations
and price equations differs across the two models. Al-
though these differences seem minor, they appear to be
crucial for understanding the differences in the simulation
results reported below.
Box 1 presents the coefficient matrices of simplified
equations for wages, prices and labor productivity —
written in the general linear form y = B. y + C . x    — and the
implied (semi-) reduced-form relationships between the
markup and the rate of equilibrium unemployment.
Equation (1) is the wage curve, the equilibrium relation-
ship between the wage rate p
l  and the unemployment rate
UR at given levels of the product price py, the consumer
price pc, and labor productivity h. A positive elasticity of
wages with respect to py implies rent sharing: High mark-
ups feed into wages through high product prices.
According to (2), the product price py follows from mark-
ing-up marginal cost, here represented by unit wage cost.
With labor-augmenting technological chance, the wage
rate must be corrected for autonomous labor efficiency e,
as in MIMIC. ATHENA, however, corrects the wage rate for
labor productivity h, which includes the effects of factor
substitution.
Equation (3), a rewritten labor-demand equation, de-
scribes labor productivity h. Cost minimization implies the
MIMIC equation (3.M), which features the wage rate rela-
tive to marginal cost (i.e. the product price corrected for the
markup factor mu). ATHENA omits this correction for the
markup factor, as in (3.A). With competitive product mar-
kets, the product price equals marginal cost in equilibrium;
in that case, the labor-demand equations in both models
coincide. As long as the markup is constant, the difference
in the specification of labor demand across the two mod-
els is not important. In the experiment below, however, the
markup is lowered. According to ATHENA, a lower
markup raises (labor) productivity through a higher real
product wage. We interpret this effect as a reduction of
X-inefficiency.
The consumer price pc is a weighted average of the prod-
uct price py and the import price pm; see (4).
The semi-reduced-form equations (5.A) and (5.M) for the
equilibrium unemployment rate reveal an important
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difference between MIMIC and ATHENA. In MIMIC, lower
markups unambiguously imply lower equilibrium unem-
ployment. In ATHENA, the reduction of unemployment will
be smaller (because f > 0) and may even turn into an in-
crease (if f is high).
Simulation results
The simulation results are consistent with the analysis above;
see Table 1. A negative price shock of one percent is applied
to some sheltered industries in which the scope for deregu-
lation is considerable.3 One direct effect, through the rent-
sharing mechanism, is a reduction of wages. This spills over
to other industries and feeds back into prices, thus multiply-
ing the exogenous shock. Another direct effect is a boost to
demand for the output of the affected industries. For produc-
tion to meet this demand, resources must be shifted from the
rest of the economy, the exposed sector for short, towards
the sheltered industries. At a given amount of employed re-
sources, the sheltered sector can expand only if the exposed
sector contracts. In MIMIC, however, the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate falls by 0.4%.4 The employment of additional
resources creates room for the whole economy to expand,
reversing the negative impact on the exposed sector and
reinforcing the positive impact on the sheltered sector. In
ATHENA, however, equilibrium unemployment remains
constant. Nevertheless, the exposed sector expands also
according to ATHENA. Reduced X-inefficiency leads to labor
shedding by the sheltered sector; the exposed sector ab-
sorbs the released resources. This mechanism is not present
in MIMIC, due to the absence of X-inefficiency.
The MIMIC results accord well with the theoretical analy-
sis of Röger (1995). This paper uses a small general-equi-
librium model based on Pissarides to find that a lower
markup reduces nominal wages and boosts production,
employment, investments and real wages. The ATHENA
results are different mainly because of the labor shake-out
in the deregulated industries.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that care must be taken in assessing
the economy-wide effects of deregulation with the help of
some macroeconomic model. Two of
CPB’s models, ATHENA and MIMIC,
respond differently to a fall in prices
due to more intense competition fol-
lowing deregulation. Both models
account endogenously for a reduction
of the rents accruing to labor, because
the modelling of wages implies rent
sharing. Only ATHENA accounts for a
reduction of X-inefficiency as well
through a not strictly neoclassical
specification of the factor-demand
equations. With either model, the
usual practice of simultaneously shift-
ing several endogenous variables of
the macroeconomic model, in particular prices, wages and
productivity, would involve some double-counting.
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Notes
1The following paragraphs draw mainly on Joskow and Rose (1989) and Win-
ston (1993).
2Deregulation is itself a phenomenon in need of an explanation. As the eco-
nomic theory of regulation does such a good job in explaining regulation, it
would seem to be hard pressed for explaining deregulation. Nevertheless,
Peltzman (1989) argued that this theory can actually help to explain several
cases of deregulation.
3These industries are: Construction, trade, banking and insurance, and other
for-profit services. Not-for-profit services are not hit by a negative price
shock.
4In addition, labor supply increases slightly (by 0.1%). Labor supply is exog-
enous in ATHENA.
Table 1   Price shock of -1% in selected sheltered industries
(Long-term effects)
MIMIC ATHENA MIMIC ATHENA
percentage deviation from reference path
Product price Product volume
Sheltered sector –1.1 –1.1 Sheltered sector 1.0 0.2
Exposed sector –0.3 –0.3 Exposed sector 0.3 0.3
Enterprise sector –0.6 –0.7 Enterprise sector 0.5 0.2
Investments Employment
Sheltered sector - –0.1 Sheltered sector 0.9 –0.2
Exposed sector - 0.3 Exposed sector 0.2 0.2
Enterprise sector 0.5 0.1 Enterprise sector 0.6 –0.0
Labor market
Wage rate –0.3 –0.4 Unemployment ratea –0.4 0.0
a Absolute deviation
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Competition and welfare
Jan Boone*
ables. Section 4 analyses how a change in intensity of com-
petition affects the market outcome and thereby social wel-
fare. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Defining competition
Why do we need a new definition of competition? Some
readers may argue that market concentration (measured
by, for instance, the Herfindahl index or the concentration
ratio) is a good way to define competition. More competi-
tion then implies less market concentration. From a policy
point of view, market concentration suffices as an appro-
priate measure of competition if the focus is on stimulating
entry. If the government removes (regulatory or other)
entry barriers, more firms will enter the market, and com-
petition is enhanced. In this case, the rise in competition is
reflected in a fall in market concentration.
However, a number of policy variables influence com-
petition without directly affecting entry. For instance, liber-
alizing shop opening hours clearly increases the intensity
of competition between shops by removing (time) con-
straints on consumers’ search behavior. However, it is not
aimed at increasing the number of firms in the sector. On
the contrary, as argued below, liberalizing shopping hours
is likely to raise market concentration. Similarly, abolishing
the minimum price in the daily newspaper industry will in-
crease price competition between publishers and hence
may drive some less efficient firms out of the market,
thereby increasing market concentration.
In these two examples, policy does not affect competi-
tion by (directly) changing the number of players in the mar-
ket but by changing the way players interact. Then, a policy
change is said to enhance competition if it induces players
to act more aggressively,  lowering prices and/or increas-
ing their output levels. If competition is seen from this per-
spective (as it is in this paper), market concentration is not
a good measure of competition since market concentration
is determined endogenously by the cost and demand struc-
tures in the industry and the way firms interact.
In particular, a policy measure is said to increase the
intensity of competition in an industry, if  it meets the fol-
lowing conditions (C1)-(C4):1
(C1) reduces total industry profits,
(C2) reduces the profit level of the least efficient active
firm and increases that of the most efficient firm (the so-
called leader) if it is far enough ahead of its opponents,
(C3) increases total industry output and
(C4) reduces the output level of firms that feature much
higher costs than the leader.
This definition of competition may look unfamiliar. The
idea is that competition is defined in terms of its effects on
output and profit patterns. For instance, if all firms in the in-
dustry are homogeneous, the definition implies that stron-
ger competition raises total industry output and reduces
total industry profits.
The definition incorporates the realistic case in which
firms are heterogeneous. In that case, the definition im-
Abstract
This article proposes a new definition of competition, em-
phasizing that competition impacts the way firms  interact
in an industry. This definition is illustrated with four policy
measures, recently proposed by the Dutch government, that
affect competition. Finally, the article considers the welfare
effects of more intense competition.
Samenvatting
Dit artikel bespreekt een nieuwe definitie van markt-
werking, die benadrukt dat marktwerking de manier be-
invloedt waarop ondernemingen onderling concureren.
Ter illustratie van deze definitie, worden vier recente
beleidsvoorstellen besproken die meer marktwerking
beogen. Ten slotte worden de welvaarts effecten van
meer marktwerking geanalyseerd.
Introduction
Markets are generally believed to be efficient institutions in
organizing production and exchange in an economy. One
justification for this is based on the notion of competition.
Indeed, it is often claimed that ‘more competition’ makes
markets more efficient. The problem, however, is that it is
unclear what is meant by ‘more competition.’
On the one hand, there is the abstract notion of (perfect)
competition, which implies that firms act as price takers.
Although this idea has been precisely defined theoretically,
it is of little use in practice. In reality, firms do not act as price
takers, while it is unclear how competition in this sense can
be enhanced. On the other hand, there is a wide variety of
policy variables that affect competition;  at first glance,
however, it is unclear what they have in common.
This paper makes a first attempt to define competition
in such a way that one can meaningfully talk about ‘more
competition.’ Subsequently, the impact of four policy in-
struments on competition are discussed. It is argued that
these variables can be used to raise competition in the
sense defined in this paper. For instance, increasing the
number of taxi permits sold in a city intensifies competition
in the taxi market. Alternatively, liberalizing shopping hours
in the retail sector increases competition between shops.
These examples illustrate that the definition of competition
in this paper is a good starting point for analyzing the effects
of policy decisions on competition.
Finally, I analyze under which conditions more compe-
tition indeed makes markets more efficient in the sense that
it raises welfare.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section
introduces the specific concept of competition that will be
used. Section 3 illustrates this definition with policy vari-
*tel.  31-70- 3383318; e-mail:jbn@cpb.nl.
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poses restrictions on how more intense competition affects
the production allocation of industry-wide output over ef-
ficient and inefficient firms and on how it affects the distri-
bution of profits over such firms.
Illustrating more competition
To illustrate the definition provided in the previous section,
this section considers the following four policy experi-
ments, which have received much attention in the Dutch
policy debate: abolish the minimum price in the daily news-
paper market, liberalize shop opening hours, increase the
number of taxi permits in a city, and allow workers and
firms to select their own pension fund or insurance
company.
Minimum price for newspapers
As described by Rekko (1996), the Dutch daily newspaper
market is characterized by a cartel dictating (among other
things) a minimum price for yearly subscriptions. Compe-
tition in this market can be increased by abolishing this
minimum price. What would be the effects of such a rise in
competition? First, assuming that the minimum price is not
above the price that maximizes  joint profits, one would ex-
pect total industry profits to fall. In other words, abolishing
the minimum price satisfies condition (C1). Second, abol-
ishing the minimum price will reduce the profits of the least
efficient or least popular newspapers. In fact, protecting
these weak newspapers is precisely the justification given
by the cartel for its minimum price. Further, the most popu-
lar newspaper, de Telegraaf, may profit by using very low
prices to attract readers. Such a profit gain can materialize
only if the Telegraaf is far more popular and efficient than
the other newspapers are. Indeed if all newspapers would
be equally efficient and popular, condition (C1) would im-
ply that each firm’s profits would be reduced by a rise in
competition. Furthermore, abolishing the minimum price
will result in more newspapers being sold overall. However,
if one of the weaker papers, such as het Parool, is not able
to reduce its price in line with the other papers, it may well
lose sales after the minimum price has disappeared.
Shopping hours
Allowing shops to be open in the evenings and on Sundays,
yields two effects. First, consumers have more time to buy
products and hence will spend more money. The size of this
effect is controversial. Although some proponents of this
measure claimed that this effect would be quite large, no
clear evidence exists that this is indeed the case. I focus on
the second effect related to competition. Longer shopping
hours allow consumers to search longer for the product
they desire. For expositional purposes, I’ll concentrate on
the case in which consumers search for the cheapest prod-
uct. The liberalization of shopping hours implies that firms
have to compete more aggressively on price. Since con-
sumers can spend more time to find the cheapest product,
they will visit more shops, and it thus becomes more likely
that they will find a cheaper shop. Hence each shop owner
has a larger incentive to reduce prices. Consequently, in-
dustry profits will be reduced. Furthermore, very efficient
shops will find that more consumers will visit them and buy
more from them because their efficiency allows them to set
low prices. This will increase their profits, if they are far
more efficient than their competitors. Not surprisingly,
therefore, one of the most efficient supermarket chains,
Albert Heyn, favored the liberalization of shopping hours.
Conversely, most small shops opposed this measure.
Indeed, it is likely to reduce their profits as they lose
customers to the more efficient and cheaper supermarket
chains. As noted above, the measure has boosted total
industry output but it is not clear by how much. The small
shops have seen their output levels reduced and most
of them do not even use the new possibilities of selling in
the evenings or on Sundays. For a more detailed analysis
of the economic effects of liberalizing shopping hours, see
Bernardt (1997).
Taxi permits
One measure contemplated to intensify competition in the
taxi sector, is for the government to sell more taxi permits.
This is not necessarily the same as raising the number of
firms in the taxi sector, since an existing taxi firm may buy
permits to expand its fleet. More taxis driving around im-
ply more competition and hence lower prices and industry
profits. In the taxi sector, most firms are more or less
equally efficient. There are no massive economies of scale
or scope, and taxis are rather homogeneous both in what
they offer and in what they cost. Hence, the distribution and
allocation effects between firms will be limited. Finally,
more taxis and lower prices will raise output, measured as
total taxi kilometers travelled per week.
Pension contributions
As described by Eichholtz and Koedijk (1996), firms and
employees in most Dutch industries cannot freely select
their pension fund or insurance company at which they
deposit their pension contributions. One way to enhance
competition in the pension branch would be to allow each
firm or even each employee to select their preferred pen-
sion fund or insurance company. What would be the effects
of such a policy change? First, pension funds and insurance
companies would compete more on the returns on pension
deposits. If one insurance company would be far more ef-
ficient than the other firms, it would attract more custom-
ers, thereby increasing its output and profits.2 Conversely,
firms and employees that were formerly linked to an inef-
ficient pension fund would leave this fund for a more attrac-
tive offer from other funds or insurance companies. For
such inefficient pension funds, the policy change would
reduce output. Finally, to the extent that the rise in compe-
tition raises returns on pension funds, employers and
employees might decide to increase their pension contri-
butions, thereby increasing industry output.
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Competition and welfare
Consider a market with a number of firms, where each firm
produces its own (possibly heterogenous) product and its
production process features a per period fixed cost. Why
would the actual outcome differ from the social optimum?
I focus on five externalities associated with a rise in com-
petition, which may affect social welfare.
First, if the production process features strong econo-
mies of scale, there may be excess entry. With strong
economies of scale, a social planner prefers a small num-
ber of firms, each of which produces at low unit costs. In the
actual outcome, too many firms may have entered, each
producing at excessively high unit costs. I will call this the
economies of scale effect. Second, if firms produce differ-
entiated goods, and each firm has its own specific product,
there may be too little entry. This will happen if consumers
exhibit a strong taste for variety and firms cannot appropri-
ate the entire consumer surplus, because perfect price dis-
crimination is not possible. In this case, entry by a firm is
socially desirable but unprofitable. This is coined the
appropriability effect. Third, if the firms in the observed
outcome have monopoly power, it is likely that they pro-
duce too little output from a social point of view. This is
called the monopoly power effect. These first three effects
are well known from papers by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
The final two effects deal explicitly with the case in which
the firms in the market are heterogeneous in their efficiency
levels. In particular, if firms are not all equally efficient, there
are two additional reasons why the actual outcome may de-
viate from the social optimum. First, for a given level of total
industry output, the social planner would like to allocate
production to the most efficient firms in the market. In the
actual outcome, therefore, inefficient firms may produce
too much from a social point of view. This is called the al-
location effect. Finally, the distribution effect says that to-
tal industry profits should be distributed in such a way that
the most efficient firms enter the market. This last effect can
be found also in Vickers (1996).
To analyze the effects of competition on these externali-
ties, I return to the four policy experiments introduced in the
section above. Abolishing the minimum price in the daily
newspaper market will reduce total industry profits (see
condition (C1)). This will reduce the number of firms that
can recover their fixed costs. Hence, abolishing the mini-
mum price may force some newspapers to exit the market.
In so far as economies of scale are important in the daily
newspaper market, this will enhance welfare. Indeed, a
smaller number of firms producing at lower unit costs is
cost efficient from a social point of view. However, perhaps
more likely, if consumers appreciate the variety in newspa-
pers, the rise in competition may push some newspapers
out of the market that are no longer profitable but still so-
cially desirable. In other words, a rise in competition exac-
erbates the appropriability effect. This is, in fact, the only
welfare effect of the five above that argues against a rise in
competition. As a rise in competition increases total indus-
try output by (C3), it mitigates the lack of output due to the
monopoly power effect. Finally, because of (C2) and (C4),
a rise in competition reallocates production away from the
least towards the most efficient firms in the market and
redistributes profits in the same way. Hence, it becomes
more likely that the most efficient firms stay in the market
and will produce a large share of the output. This boosts
welfare through the allocation and distribution effects.
Similar results hold with respect to the shopping
hours,  taxi permits and pension contributions examples.
A rise in competition can reduce welfare only through the
appropriability effect. In so far as  the consumers perceive
shops, taxis and pension funds as homogeneous and only
value the best service at the lowest price, the appropriability
effect is absent. In that case, a rise in competition unam-
biguously raises welfare.
Conclusion
This article has analyzed the relationship between the in-
tensity of competition and welfare. In the policy debate it
is often unclear what people mean by competition. There-
fore, this article has proposed a precise definition, where
intensity of competition is defined in terms of its effects on
industry output and profit patterns. Four examples of actual
policy measures suggest that a rise in the intensity of com-
petition can reduce welfare only if consumers feature a
strong taste for variety. Other effects of intensified compe-
tition, such as promoting economies of scale by reducing
the number of firms in the industry, increasing total output,
and allocating production and distributing profits to the
most efficient firms, all work in the direction of enhancing
welfare.
References
Bernardt, Y., 1997, Competition policy in retail trade: Economic effects of lib-
eralizing shop opening hours in the Netherlands, CPB Report, this issue.
Boone, J., 1997, Competitive pressure, selection and investments in develop-
ment and fundamental research, mimeo Nuffield College Oxford.
Dixit, A. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1977, Monopolistic competition and optimum prod-
uct diversity, American Economic Review, 67: 297-308.
Eichholtz, P.M.A. and C.G. Koedijk, 1996, Pensioenen voor de toekomst: naar
meer keuzevrijheid en transparantie, Onderzoeksreeks directie
Marktwerking, Ministerie van Economische Zaken.
Mankiw, N.G. and M. Whinston, 1986, Free entry and social inefficiency, Rand
Journal of Economics, 17: 48-58.
Rekko, A.H.M.J., 1996, Marktwerking in de Nederlandse Dagbladsector: De
gevolgen voor de consument, Onderzoeksreeks directie Marktwerking,
Ministerie van Economische Zaken.
Vickers, J., 1995, Entry and competitive selection, unpublished.
Notes
1 The effect of competition on firms’ incentives to improve their products and
production technology is missing here. The interested reader is referred to
Boone (1997).
2 Note that one cannot speak of profits for pension funds, since with pension
funds, unlike insurance companies, one cannot distinguish customers and
shareholders.
97/4
BPC_ R   E   P   O   R  T
45
 CURRENT RESEARCH
How efficient is Dutch
electricity generation?
Maurice Dykstra*
the four so-called KLEM-categories (i.e. capital, labor, en-
ergy and materials). Capital costs are the sum of deprecia-
tion and opportunity costs. The capital stock is constructed
through the perpetual inventory method, i.e. through the
accumulation of past investments, assuming a constant
depreciation rate over time. The opportunity cost of capi-
tal is calculated by multiplying the constructed capital stock
with the long-term interest rate. Labor is measured by the
number of employees and energy in physical units (Joules).
Costs of materials consist of purchases of electricity and
materials, services by third parties, and other costs. Output
is measured by electricity and heat sales in physical units
(Joules).
A non-frontier productivity index
In order to obtain a first impression of total factor produc-
tivity growth, it is calculated using the Tornqvist index for
the years 1989-1996. Inputs (outputs) have been aggre-
gated by means of this index. This aggregation implies the
assumptions of constant returns to scale and neutral tech-
nological change (Caves, Christensen, Diewert, 1982). On
average, total factor productivity of the power generation
sector rose by nearly 1% per year (see Table 1). Productiv-
ity increased by shedding labor and employing more en-
ergy efficient production plants, which is mirrored in higher
capital and lower energy inputs.
The technique used cannot distinguish between techni-
cal change and efficiency change. The next section takes the
productivity analysis a level deeper by dissecting produc-
tivity growth into efficiency change and technical change.
A frontier productivity index
The Malmqvist index is the ratio between technical effi-
ciency measures for a production unit; technical efficiency
is calculated at two different points in time relative to two
different frontiers. The index can be decomposed so that
the change in total factor productivity may be separated
into a shift of the frontier (technical change) and a shift rela-
tive to the frontier (change in efficiency).
Figure 1 illustrates the construction of the Malmqvist in-
dex for a constant-return-to-scale production function. U is
a production unit observed in two years, t and t+1. Between
these points in time, the frontier has shifted from ft to ft+1.
Abstract
The main motive behind deregulation is to boost pro-
ductivity by increasing competition. An analysis of the
Dutch electricity generation sector reveals that consider-
able inefficiencies can exist at the company level despite
relatively steady productivity growth stemming from
technical change.
Samenvatting
Het belangrijkste motief achter deregulering is het
verhogen van de productiviteit door het versterken van
marktwerking. Een analyse van de Nederlandse
elektriciteitsproductiebedrijven laat zien dat op bedrijfs-
niveau aanzienlijke inefficiNnties kunnen bestaan
ondanks relatief gestage produktiviteitstoenamen door
technologische veranderingen.
Introduction
Traditional approaches to productivity measurement gen-
erally assume that observed output is best practice or fron-
tier output. These approaches therefore cannot distinguish
between technical change and changes in efficiency. In a
world in which inefficiency exists, productivity growth no
longer necessarily coincides with technical change, but is
the net effect of changes in efficiency and shifts in the pro-
duction frontier, the latter being technical change. This dis-
tinction is important from a policy perspective; a slowdown
in productivity growth due to increased inefficiency implies
the need for different policies than a slowdown due to lack
of technical change does. Slow growth due to inefficiency
may originate, among others, in institutional barriers,
managerial slack and absence of competition. Lack of tech-
nical change, in contrast, may be caused by too little R&D
and institutional barriers to innovation and diffusion. This
paper focuses on the Dutch electricity generation sector and
is intended as a pilot study for an international comparison
of efficiency and productivity in this sector.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents a stan-
dard (non-frontier) approach to productivity measurement.
Section 4, the core of the paper, discusses the Malmqvist in-
dex, which can be used to measure technical efficiency, and
gives some results using this index. Finally, section 5 draws
some conclusions and looks ahead to further research.
Data
The data are drawn from the annual reports of the four large
scale electricity production companies in the Netherlands
for the years 1989-1996. Costs have been broken down into
Table 1  Productivity of Netherlands
electricity producers, 1989-1996
% per year
Capital input 0.5 %
Labor input -0.3 %
Energy input -0.8 %
Materials input 0.4 %
Total inputs -0.2 %
Output 0.7 %
Total Factor Productivity 0.9 %
* tel: 31 70 3383445; e-mail: mjd@cpb.nl.
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In year t, the technical efficiency of unit U measured against
ft is OB/OUt. In year t+1 the technical efficiency becomes
OC/OUt+1.
The Malmqvist productivity index, M, can be decom-
posed into changes in technical efficiency and an index of
technical change, as follows:
M =  MC  MF .× (1)
The first component is an index measuring changes in rela-
tive technical efficiency, and shows whether a unit is mov-
ing closer to or further away from best practice. The second
component is an index of technical change, and shows
whether the best practice relative to which a unit is com-
pared is improving, stagnant or deteriorating. The catching-
up productivity index for unit U between t and t+1 is:
t+1
t t+1
t
MC  =  
OC / OU
OB / OU (2)
and the shift of the frontier is defined as the geometrical
mean of the distance between the frontiers for both obser-
vations,
t +1
t
1 / 2
t
t
t +1
t +1
MF  =  
OB / OU
OA/ OU
  
OD / OU
OC / OU
 .×



 (3)
The alternative methods for determining the production
frontiers are parametric (econometric) and nonparametric
(mathematical programming). We employ the latter
method of deterministic nonparametric frontiers or data
envelopment. The efficiency of a production unit is mea-
sured relative to the efficiency of all the other production
units, subject to the restriction that all units are on or below
the frontier. The efficient production units are thus an en-
velope around the entire data set. We employ this method
because it can more easily handle multiple inputs and out-
puts than the traditional production function approach.
Moreover, it does not impose a specific functional form on
technology, thus minimizing specification error. It also can
cope with relatively small samples. The approach is, how-
ever, sensitive to measurement error and typically does not
allow for statistical inference.
Since the seminal paper by Charnes, Cooper and
Rhodes (1978), numerous Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) models and applications have appeared in the litera-
ture. Excellent surveys of this literature on the measure-
ment of productive efficiency can be found in Seiford and
Thrall (1990) and Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (1993). Any
method for measuring productivity growth requires some
assumption that allows productivity improvements to be
identified from returns to scale. Parametric methods usu-
ally address this problem by requiring that the productiv-
ity movements are smooth functions of time. Since the
nonparametric DEA method imposes no such smoothness,
another assumption is required. We assume constant re-
turns to scale. This assumption seems appropriate in view
of the evidence that the size of the companies are all well
above the minimum efficient scale and that the difference
in size between the smallest and largest  companies is rela-
tively small (1:1.5). It is also consistent with the  initial ag-
gregation using a Tornqvist index.
Although constant returns to scale is imposed in each pe-
riod, each period is allowed to have a completely different
constant returns-to-scale technology. Frontiers can even
intersect and technical regress is possible. Furthermore tech-
nical change is in no way necessarily neutral over time.
Table 2 shows the scores on the Malmqvist index and
its components during the period ‘89-’96. The shift of the
technical frontier as measured by MF is relatively small (0.9
% per year), due to technical efficiency being strongly linked
to capital and the factor capital having a growth rate of  0.5
% per year. The shifts in the catching-up index (MC) at the
company level show a more diverse picture. Company 4,
starting from a low level of efficiency in 1989, has managed
to reach the frontier in 1996. Company 3, in contrast, shows
virtually no change. The shift of the technical frontier has
been completely offset by an adverse movement relative
to the frontier.
Figure 2 shows the development of productivity relative
to the 1996 frontier. On average there is a steady increase
in productivity. However, at the company level consider-
able inefficiencies can exist.  The technical frontier in a few
cases exceeds the 1996 frontier, indicating that technical re-
gress is possible.
Table 2 Annual changes of the Malmqvist
productivity index of Netherlands electricity
producers, 1989-1996
catching-up frontier index total
index (MC) (MF) index (M)
% per year
Company 1 0.0% 0.7% 0.7%
Company 2 0.0% 1.0% 1.0%
Company 3 -0.8% 0.8% 0.0%
Company 4 1.4% 0.9% 2.3%
Average of the four
power companies 0.2% 0.9% 1.0%
x1
x2
U t+1
D
0
C
A
B
f t
f t
f t+1
f t+1
Ut
Figure 1
Construction of the Malmqvist index
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Conclusions and research implications
The paper focuses on the Dutch electricity generation sector
and is intended as a pilot study for an international compari-
son of efficiency and productivity in this sector.  The two
total factor productivity measures (i.e. the Tornqvist and
Malmqvist indices) yield similar results. The Malmqvist
index has as advantage that it can differentiate between
technical change and changes in efficiency. Moreover, it
can be used even if prices of inputs and outputs are un-
known. This is an important advantage when an interna-
tional comparison of power generators is made.
The validity of the method rests on the assumption that
the list of inputs and outputs is complete. In principle, the
apparently more efficient units may have employed more
unobservable inputs, such as management skills. For
power generation, due to the technical nature of the produc-
tion process, this point seems of minor importance because
the labor content for that matter is low. Management skills
relating to efficiency will therefore primarily be reflected in
the amount of inputs as identified here.
A weakness of the nonparametric approach is its lack of
behavioral content. The information that some units are
more efficient than others is not very helpful unless we find
out why. We can not answer this with the present data. The
environment for the companies is virtually identical: there
have been no breaks in the regulatory regime during this
period; the companies strongly resemble each other in,
among other things, degree of vertical integration and
scope of business. In an international comparison, these
different aspects can serve as distinguishing features for the
degree of efficiency.
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Figure 2  Productivity of Netherlands electric-
ity producers, 1989-1996 (1996 frontier=100)
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 WORKSHOPS
  ACTIVITIES
Assessing infrastructure
projects
July 3 and 4, 1997
Ernst van Koesveld and Pim van Santen*
One of the policy goals of the present Dutch Cabinet is to
improve the economic (infra)structure of the Netherlands.
During the last 25 years, public investment has fallen from
nearly 5% of GDP to less than 3% of GDP in 1994. Although
the level of public investment in terms of GDP has been
rather stable since then, it has risen substantially as a pro-
portion of total public expenditures. Whereas total public
expenditures are expected to remain constant in real terms
during the present Cabinet period 1994-1998, investments
will increase by more than 17½% during that period. This
approach is likely to be continued in the coming years.
Together with its yearly budget last September, the
government presented a list of feasible investment projects
with regard to physical infrastructure, the natural environ-
ment, knowledge and technology for the period until 2010.
The individual projects add up to at least Dfl. 60 bln, of
which Dfl. 18.5 bln has already been assigned. This seems
to be a minimum. It excludes, by the way, most of the
megaprojects such as an extension of Schiphol Airport and
a land reclamation project for a second ‘Maasvlakte’ near
Rotterdam, which the government still has to decide on. If
all these projects are agreed upon, the share of public in-
vestment in GDP will increase with 1%-point during the first
decade of the next century. This is quite an ambitious tar-
get because public means are still scarce. Sound economic
grounding for new projects is therefore essential.
Conference
Against this background, the Ministry of Transport, Public
Works and Water Management initiated a workshop on the
economics of public infrastructure. The workshop was or-
ganized in close cooperation with the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and four research institutes: CPB Netherlands Bu-
reau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Netherlands Eco-
nomic Institute (NEI), NYFER Forum for Economic
Research, and OCFEB Research Centre for Economic Policy.
Researchers from various institutes, academia and policy
makers exchanged ideas about different methods for evalu-
ating the economic effects of public investments on the
level of the macroeconomy, infrastructural programs, and
individual projects.
Professor Weisbrod outlined five general approaches for
appraising the economic effects of infrastructure. Each of
these approaches features its strengths and weaknesses.
The most appropriate approach depends on the specific
objectives, the scale of the geographic area, and the rel-
evant time horizon.
First of all, the traditional cost-benefit analysis compares
savings in direct costs and time with the amount invested.
The second approach is social cost-benefit analysis. It
employs the same neoclassical methodology, but goes
beyond the traditional approach by including external ef-
fects on the natural environment and social welfare.
A third method is to estimate production and cost func-
tions to calculate macroeconomic productivity gains or
losses over time. Aschauer is one of the main pioneers of
this approach. His finding of a strong, positive correlation
between nonmilitary public capital stock and private sec-
tor productivity in the United States is often cited as evi-
dence of the importance of public investments for
economic growth.
A more elaborate approach is followed in macroeco-
nomic simulations models, which incorporate multiplier
effects and regional interactions. They explore the macro-
economic return of (specific) investments in terms of
growth and employment. CPB’s studies are often associ-
ated with this approach. However, in CPB studies on the
Betuweline, the High Speed Line, Schiphol Airport and
especially the second Maasvlakte show the macroeco-
nomic calculations are only part of a much broader analy-
sis that employs scenarios and incorporates information
from other approaches. Accordingly, the technical limita-
tions of CPB’s models are easily too strongly emphasized
in the discussion.
Finally, infrastructure investments can be viewed from
a more strategic point of view, making use of scenario and
risk analysis. Weisbrod stressed that risk scenarios are of-
ten asymmetric: by not investing, the losses may be higher
than the gains. An analogy with the theory of portfolio in-
vestments may also emerge: short-term, low-risk projects
are to be combined with long-term investment - meaning
a higher risk, but often also a higher payoff.
Weisbrod’s central message was that no single ap-
proach is available that answers all questions. Also study-
ing history and investment programs in other countries
may provide important additional insights.
Ambition
The current state of affairs is that each institute selects its
own approach, makes its own assumptions and delivers its
own results. From a general point of view, this is undesir-
able for a number of reasons. First of all, it is inefficient.
Studies overlap each other in one area, whereas another
area is hardly explored. With regard to the latter, not much
integrated research is being conducted on, for example, the
consequences of the way projects are financed - by raising
taxes, lowering expenditures, increasing lending or by pri-
vate means. The same holds true for the effects on con-
sumer satisfaction. Different studies also employ different
*The authors are affiliated with the Research Centre for Economic Policy
(OCFEB) and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management,
respectively. The views expressed in this contribution are strictly those of the
authors.
97/4
BPC_ R   E   P   O   R  T
49
basic assumptions so that comparing the outcomes of the
different studies is often difficult. If different studies are
regarded too much as substitutes, ‘argument shopping’
and ‘institute hopping’ may be provoked. This could be
attractive for the research institutes in the short run, but it
will harm their reputation in the long run. Moreover, the
current state of affairs may confuse the public and policy
makers, thereby harming the quality of the decision proce-
dure. In this connection, professor Knack cited empirical
evidence showing that broad trust in institutions is essen-
tial for investment and economic development.
One of the interesting issues for discussion was the re-
lationship between the different approaches. Are they,
though often regarded as substitutes, complementary to a
large extent? Do they refer to all levels or to distinct levels
of aggregation, e.g. at the level of individual projects, gov-
ernment programs or the macroeconomy? Do they also
refer to different levels of decision making, that is to say
allocation of public means in general, allocation of sector
budgets or allocation within budgets? Could one method
be used as input for the other or should they be combined
in a broad cost-benefit analysis to present an integrated
approach? And finally, who is to balance different studies
so that politicians can make concrete decisions? Of course,
the latter is easier said than done. Indeed, clear-cut answers
presume clear-cut questions. In practice, the political and
public discussion is often about specific outcomes, and far
too less about a broad strategic view.
In this respect, the design of investment programs re-
ceived special attention at the conference. Van den Bossche
(NEI) argued that projects should be clustered according to
specific targets (e.g. the accessibility of the main port
Rotterdam) instead of the traditional modal approach (road,
rail, inland waterways). Within such a package, a process
of setting priorities should separate the ‘niceties’ from the
‘necessities.’ Politically, this ‘package deal’ may be attrac-
tive, as costs and benefits for particular groups can be
traded against each other. Van den Berg (CPB) pointed out
that building and construction is not the only answer to
capacity problems. Other measures, such as tax policy,
road pricing and regulation, can contribute substantially
toward meeting accessibility and environmental targets, as
shown in CPB’s recent long-term scenario study ‘The
economy and its physical surroundings: policy challenges
and instruments, 1995-2020.’
Conclusion
Where do we go from here? Given the positive reactions
during the conference and the large number of new
projects, a follow-up is desirable. This would be possible
along two lines. The first is open discussion, which im-
proves the quality of the debate and promotes cooperation
between the economic institutes, thereby exploiting com-
parative advantages. The second is to stimulate further
research. The conference revealed that a number of loose
ends remains regarding the appraisal of infrastructure.
Tying up the ends will enhance the reputation of both the
government and the research institutes involved. Most
importantly, tax payers deserve a careful analysis of pub-
lic investment projects before large sums of their money
will be spent on such projects during the next decade.
Workshop ‘Economic Effects of
Infrastructural Projects’
Introduction: Seen van der Plas (Ministry of Transport,
Public Works and Water Management)
Session 1, Effects on a Macro Level: Ad Geelhoed (Min-
istry of General Affairs), Glen Weisbrod (Economic
Development Research Group), Jarig van Sinderen
(OCFEB), Stephen Knack (University of Maryland), Eduard
Bomhoff (NYFER).
Session 2, Effects on Program Level: Marten van den
Bossche (NEI), Rein Bemer (Ministry of Economic Affairs),
Peter van den Berg (CPB), Raymond Gradus (OCFEB).
Session 3, Effects on Project Level: Dick Bruinsma
(Ministry of Economic Affairs), Carel Eijgenraam (CPB), Leo
van der Geest (NYFER), Sjaak Boeckhout (NEI), Jan
Oosterhaven (University of Groningen).
Conclusion: Marion Gout (Ministry of Transport, Public
Works and Water Management).
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of curiosity, to absorb available information with an open
mind. The selection of information, as recognized in the
study itself, is not entirely based on a preconceived plan,
but is partly accidental. This might explain the separate
chapters on pensions, health care and corporate gover-
nance, while e.g. telecommunication, transport, civil ser-
vice, financial institutions and housing markets are not
explored in detail. Unclear selection criteria give the study
Scholars in Dusseldorf
Luc Soete (Maastricht Economic Research Institute for
Innovation and Technology) and Hariolf Grupp
(Fraunhofer Institut Systemtechnik und Innovations-
forschung) discussed science and technology policy.
Soete stressed that new information technology creates
new markets and enhances competition. The appropria-
tion and commodification of knowledge becomes feasible
and barriers to enter markets are reduced. Grupp, how-
ever, stated that new technological options call for
society-wide discussions about quality of life and that gov-
ernment should play its role as intermediary between
social groups. Günter Knieps (Freiburg University) and
Eric van Damme (Tilburg University) discussed competi-
tion policy and deregulation. Both argued that welfare
gains are to be expected from further deregulation and
that both Germany and the Netherlands can learn more
from countries like the United Kingdom than from each
other. After David Soskice (Wissenschaftszentrum  f hr
Socialforschung Berlin) drew attention to the importance
of monetary and fiscal policies in addition to wage mod-
eration and labor market institutions, these institutions
were discussed by Karl-Heinz Paqué (Magdeburg Univer-
sity) and Joop Hartog (University of Amsterdam). They
embraced the Dutch system of collective bargaining, lead-
ing to macroeconomic responsibility of both unions and
employers organizations. At the same time, they saw the
German apprenticeship system as a good example of how
to avoid or tackle youth unemployment, although Hartog
showed more enthusiasm about this system than Paqué.
Norbert Walter (Deutsche Bank AG) and Arnold Boot (Uni-
versity of Amsterdam) were the last speakers on the first
day of the conference with their contributions on corpo-
rate governance and financing. Although there were some
differences in emphasis, both speakers agreed that global-
ization would force Dutch and German firms to take
shareholder value more seriously, while neither economy
would go all the way to sole shareholder control.
Challenging Neighbours
Rethinking German and Dutch Economic Institutions
September 10 and 11, 1997
Hans Timmer*
“Turn the Länder into Holländer.” With that pithy policy
advise, labor market economist Joop Hartog concluded his
presentation at the Challenging Neighbours conference in
Dusseldorf on 10 and 11 November. The conference was
organized on the occasion of the publication of a CPB study
of the same name.1 Hartog’s conclusion that German fed-
eral states could learn from the example of Dutch labor
market reforms, touched upon three key aspects of the
conference and the underlying study. First of all, the aim of
both the conference and the study was a critical rethinking
of German and Dutch economic institutions, including la-
bor market institutions.  Secondly, the organizers of the
conference and authors of the study explicitly aimed to
bridge the gap between academic discussions and actual
policy making. The third aspect was about the proper frame
of reference for the Dutch economy. Is it Germany as a
whole, a single German federal state or another country
somewhere in the world?
How successful were the conference and the study in
dealing with these three aspects? How much food for re-
thinking the institutions was actually provided? How solid
was the bridge between scholars and policy makers? How
relevant were the international comparisons provided?
Food for rethinking
The book Challenging Neighbours provides a rich table
with food for thinking about institutions. In 600 closely
written pages, many areas of the institutional environment
are discussed, from social security and labor market
institutions, through corporate governance and technology
policy, to options for more competition in energy markets
and health care. For many inside CPB, including most
authors of the study, the study was the first serious confron-
tation with institutional economics. In that sense it
was more thinking than rethinking. It was more a first visit
to the institutions than institutions revisited. Both the
study and the conference proved that this first visit was not
a superficial acquaintance. The book contains many
details about existing institutions. Moreover, a comprehen-
sive analytical framework was developed and used in
the book for the assessment of these details. In addition
to the study providing this overwhelming amount of
information, the conference invited many experts to
comment on the study and to add their own views (see
box,“Scholars in Dusseldorf”). The study easily withstood
their scrutiny. Without exception, the scholars praised the
study as a good overview of the issues in institutional
economics, and it was difficult for them to present new
views and new arguments.
Still, the study contains marked characteristics of a first
visit. As in one’s first visit to a city, the basic attitude is one *tel. 31-70-3383306; e-mail:hrt@cpb.nl.
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a somewhat fragmentary character. This could be one of
the reasons why many speakers at the conference men-
tioned that they found the study not easy to read. Even in
the very impressive chapter that provides the theoretical
framework, selection was not the main objective. Indeed,
the combination of many theoretical concepts in one
overall framework implies that the framework is not easily
accessible.
A solid bridge?
The authors of the study explicitly aimed to bridge the gap
between academic research and policy making. Every
chapter in the book concludes with policy options. These
policy conclusions are well balanced and prudent, in accor-
dance with the general idea behind the analytical frame-
work that it is virtually impossible to define optimal
institutions. Every set of institutions has its own pros and
cons and different institutions can lead to a similar perfor-
mance.  Therefore, existing institutions are discussed in
terms of trade-offs. Taking into account that it is unwise to
change institutions frequently, the study recognizes that
reforms are needed only if certain thresholds are crossed,
if the burden of existing institutions exceeds the benefits,
e.g. in the case of changing environments. Nevertheless,
the authors were able to draw some concrete lessons for
both the Netherlands and Germany. To give some ex-
amples of the lessons for the Netherlands:
— improve the administration and monitoring of social
benefits;
— make pension schemes more flexible and tailored to
individual needs;
— make on-the-job-training diverse enough for workers so
that they are willing to co-finance this training;
— Abandon cooption in the supervisory board of enter-
prises and increase the influence of shareholders;
— Let finance of higher education depend on the outcome
of peer reviews;
— ensure independence of competition authorities and
avoid intermingling of competition policy with industrial
policy;
— make electricity grids independent of electricity
producers.
The conference also aimed to link academics and poli-
ticians. First of all, the chairman Ruud Lubbers, former
Dutch Prime Minister and currently professor at Tilburg Uni-
versity, actively tried to link both worlds. He did not hesi-
tate to add his own views and cite his own experiences
frequently. Furthermore, the entire second day of the con-
ference was dedicated to policy discussions, with contribu-
tions of the Dutch ministers of Finance and Economic
Affairs, the German minister of Economic Affairs and the
German under-secretary of Finance (see box, “Politicians
in Dusseldorf”). Hence, there were ingredients enough for
a successful crossing of the bridge from theory to practice.
But how solid was the bridge? At the conference, it still did
not seem to be completely reliable. The weakest chain was
the empirical evidence, the relation between micro institu-
tions and macro performance. Academics like Eric van
Damme stressed that micro institutions should be judged
on theoretical grounds rather than macro evidence, since
macroeconomic developments depend on many other fac-
tors. Nevertheless, politicians tend to use recent macroeco-
nomic performance to elucidate the success of institutional
reforms or the need for further reforms. Especially against
the background of subtle trade-offs, the lack of empirical
evidence leaves too much freedom for academics to insist
on their theoretical arguments and for politicians to claim
successes. Despite the weakness of this chain, academics
and politicians agreed that, in line with current theoretical
arguments and the spirit of the age, more competition
would be welcome, even though solidarity and coordina-
tion would remain important as well.
International comparisons
Two arguments were given for the comparison between
the Netherlands and Germany. First of all, both countries
are rather similar. Consequently, comparisons of institu-
tions are not obscured by completely different environ-
ments or cultural backgrounds. Secondly, since many
institutions are interlinked, one should describe the institu-
tional environment as a whole. By focussing on only two
countries, such a holistic approach is much more feasible
than trying to analyze many countries at the same time.
However, even in the study itself the authors felt the need
to deviate from this approach. In almost all chapters, both
Politicians in Dusseldorf
Ruud Lubbers, chairing the conference, emphasized that the
success of the Dutch polder model is based on trust; the
confidence that both employers organizations and trade
unions will continue to act cooperatively in future years
underlies the rapid increase in employment. Hans Wijers,
minister of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands, damped
the enthusiasm about the Dutch polder model. For one, the
participation rate is still low in the Netherlands. Moreover,
to become one of the top economies of northwestern
Europe, the Netherlands should implement more market-
oriented reforms and introduce more competition in several
key areas. In what could have been an election speech, his
German colleague Günter Rexrodt advocated Anglo Saxon
dynamism combined with social protection. But he under-
scored that social partners should go beyond protecting
their vested interests. For that reason, he praised the
moderate policy of Dutch unions. Gerrit Zalm, minister
of Finance in the Netherlands and former director of
CPB, saw a role for the government in improving transpar-
ency and accountability of corporate governance and in
reinforcing the role of the shareholder. Jürgen Stark,
undersecretary of Finance in Germany, pointed to the
necessary further convergence within Europe, also with
respect to tax systems and social standards.
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Regulating Dutch
tele-competition
12 November 1997
Paul Arnoldus*
Despite rapid technological developments and the intro-
duction of competition, the Dutch telecom sector has re-
tained some characteristics of its public utility past. The
former monopolist KPN still owns the basic network; it re-
mains the dominant player in all telecom markets and it
needs cross-subsidization to finance non-profitable activi-
ties. The government needs a regulation policy that secures
the expected large economic benefits a dynamic and effi-
cient telecom sector can provide and that at the same time
guarantees access to a minimum level of telecom services
for all Dutch consumers. The latest workshop on competi-
tion policy (jointly organized by the Dutch Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and CPB) was devoted to these important
policy issues.
Access
Jos Huigen (the Independent Post and Telecom Authority
OPTA) addressed the most urgent problem of competition
in the telecom sector, namely the access to KPN’s network
by its competitors. Another full-fledged telecom network
will not emerge in the foreseeable future. Although the
Dutch cable-TV network has great potential because of its
high coverage and large bandwidth, the cable operators
hesitate to use their financial means to develop it further.
Since splitting up KPN’s telecom activities is beyond
OPTA’s scope of action, strict regulation of KPN’s network
management is called for.
The general criteria for regulation are simple enough in
theory: network access should be transparent and non-dis-
criminatory, and access charges should be cost-based. In
practice, though, effective regulation requires thorough and
up-to-date knowledge of all technical intricacies. In particu-
lar, the regulator should determine the bottlenecks in the
net. Huigen identified these to be the “Terminating Access”
(TA) facilities, loosely defined as “incoming calls”-facilities:
for instance, whenever a new entrant wants access to the
final customer, its net has to be linked with KPN’s net. All
other connections are “Originating Access” (OA): they
widen the scope of the consumer, but are not essential for
connecting to the final consumer. A complication is that this
distinction can be made at different levels of network con-
nections. It is therefore hardly surprising that different coun-
tries have opted for different price regulations. Most have
in common that the price for TA should equal that of OA.
Hans Maks (Maastricht University) noted that the cost
orientation is the weakest point in the outlined regulation
strategy, for the regulated firm has a strategic informational
advantage about its own cost. Harold Creusen (CPB) added
that this information asymmetry has dynamic aspects as
* tel. 31-70-3383463; e-mail: pnea@cpb.nl.
countries were compared to other, best-practice countries.
Lessons from such a comparison with third countries were
included in the unfinished agenda for reform. Also during
the conference, many participants questioned the approach
that was chosen. Especially in view of globalization tenden-
cies, alternative frameworks for comparison were advo-
cated. First of all, because of the collapse of centrally
planned economies and increased international competi-
tion, economies and institutions converge rapidly. There-
fore, many other countries are becoming interesting
examples for the Netherlands. Secondly, globalization, and
especially European integration, diminish the relevance of
national states. More and more, policies become regional,
regional in the sense of a group of national states or re-
gional in the sense of an area within a national state. Fol-
lowing this line of thought, policy in Germany could be
decentralized further and, indeed, the Länder could be
turned into Holländer or Holland could be turned into one
of the Länder. In this connection, one could argue that a
next study should focus on the Netherlands and the neigh-
boring German state North Rhine-Westphalia. Such a com-
parison would be extremely relevant from a policy point of
view, because locational competition is fierce in neighbor-
ing regions and trade flows are large. At the same time, a
more global perspective, looking at rather different econo-
mies competing in an integrated world market, could be
most interesting from an academic point of view.
The next visit to the city of institutions will undoubtedly
be more selective, focussing on a few items of empirical evi-
dence or a few areas for clarification. One of the areas that
deserves more attention is the character of technological
developments. The study, and especially the contributions
during the conference, stressed that new technologies
enable a smaller scale of production, easier entry and more
competition. What used to be natural monopolies, com-
monly incorporated in the government sector, can now be
split into several competing units. Almost ignored, how-
ever, was the growth in mergers in, for example, financial
sectors and the aircraft industry. In those sectors, econo-
mies of scale seem to induce monopolistic tendencies.
These two conflicting tendencies (towards more competi-
tion and towards monopoly) would be a good subject for
a revisit to the institutions. A single focus would help the
reader to maintain a clear sense of direction, which is some-
times difficult in the broad overview provided in the current
study. This is one reason for looking forward to additional
short visits to the institutions. However, as is often the case
when visiting cities, the first visit will remain the most ex-
citing one.
Notes
1 CPB (1997), Challenging Neighbours, Rethinking German and Dutch Eco-
nomic Institutions,  Springer-Verlag. For a summary, see Lans Bovenberg,
George Gelauff and AndrJ  de Jong, “Challenging Neighbours, Rethinking
German and Dutch economic institutions, CPB Report 1997/3, pp. 43-48.
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well: because of its technological know-how, the incumbent
KPN has an edge in the negotiations about technical speci-
fications and licenses.
The discussant Rob Rosendaal (Dutch Competition Au-
thority NMa) surprised many participants with his antago-
nistic stance towards the sector-specific regulator OPTA. In
his view, the general Competition Authority NMa should
take the lead in (de)-regulating telecom, on the basis of the
general European and Dutch competition laws and the
Open Network Provision. OPTA’s main task should be the
setting of standards and the granting of licenses, all this in
accordance with NMa’s rulings. More generally, he favored
ex-post arbitration above extensive ex-ante regulation, be-
cause the latter is based on the fallacy that the regulator
knows better than the market. In the floor discussion, how-
ever, most held the view that ex-post arbitration in a com-
plex market such as telecom boils down to “locking the
stable door after the horse is stolen.” One participant sar-
castically remarked that the new Dutch Competition Law
might enhance competition between regulators, which
constitutes a doom scenario for the regulated sector.
Universal Service Obligation
Several contributors pointed out that cross-subsidization is
pervasive in the telecom market, because the subscription
fee is too low to cover the expenses of the connection. In
this way, international calls subsidize national calls and
frequent users subsidize low users. This tariff system is
inefficient, because it leads to an inefficient use of the na-
tional network and sloppy cost management. However, a
“rebalancing of tariffs” at the expense of the users’ charges
for local and regional calls might yield undesirable social
effects, when low income users are virtually excluded from
telecom services. A Universal Service Obligation (USO) is
an often proposed solution to this problem.
Jos Jansen (CentER, Tilburg University) analyzed the
general case of USO, and applied it to the particular case
of the telecom market. He defines USO as “the obligation
to supply against a sound price a minimum level of services
of well-defined quality to all consumers who demand so on
reasonable terms.” This definition deliberately abstracts
from a more precise characterization of the services in-
volved, because that is assumed to be a political choice.
First, Jansen discerned three rationales for USO. The
first reason is efficiency. USO internalizes network externali-
ties, as the connection of even a low user encourages oth-
ers to connect as well or to stay connected. However, with
telecom’s high coverage and low price elasticity, this rea-
son does not seem that relevant. The second rationale is (as
noted above) equity. However, the discussant Jeroen in ‘t
Veld (Ministry of Finance) noticed that very often this social
goal is, if at all, badly defined. Besides, USO is the optimal
solution only in some, but not all “second-best” worlds (i.e.
cases where imperfect information and distortions else-
where prevail). In a “first-best” world, income subsidies are
the optimal solution. Finally, the incumbent might press for
USO itself in its political lobby against liberalization.
Subsequently, Jansen analyzed the latter case in more
detail, for the most common case of USO is that of one
imposed on a monopolist and financed through cross-sub-
sidization. It is usually argued that in this situation, free entry
is inefficient and inconsistent with USO, because entrants,
even more inefficient ones, would target only the profitable
segments of the market, leaving the incumbent with the
obligation to serve the remaining unprofitable ones. How-
ever, Jansen stressed that this “cream skimming” occurs
only if the incumbent sticks to its pre-entry price scheme (or
is forced to do so).
“Rebalancing the tariffs” is therefore the proper remedy,
but it must be closely monitored in order to prevent “preda-
tory pricing” by the former monopolist. As argued by Van
Damme (CentER, Tilburg University), the incumbent could
temporarily supply its services below cost price and so push
the actual entrant off the market and simultaneously scare
off potential entrants. This aggressive strategy is feasible if
the incumbent has accumulated monopoly profits or expects
to recoup the losses later on the re-monopolized market.
Moreover, the incumbent has probably covered its initial
investment, while the entrant has not. A well-informed regu-
lator is required to assess the threat or even the occurrence
of this dynamic phenomenon.
There are, however, more interesting ways of imposing
and financing USO than the more traditional one. The “pay or
play”-version of USO leaves entrants with the choice to pro-
vide USO (“play”) or to contribute to a so-called USO fund
(“pay”); the incumbent is obliged to provide the USO services
in order to “create a level playing field.” This version of USO
enhances competition and curbs the incentive to overstate the
costs of USO; more than one USO supplier, though, could lead
to duplication of costs. Jansen himself therefore favored auc-
tioning the USO. The lowest bidder should be awarded the
USO franchise and it should be paid out of a common USO
fund. In spite of the apparent efficiency, this method has pit-
falls as well: the incumbent has an informational advantage
and collusion between bidders is possible.
The possibility of a USO-auction is incorporated in the
new Dutch Telecom Law, in case the regulator deems ac-
Workshop Regulating Dutch
Tele-competition
Chairman: Marcel Canoy (CPB)
Some problems concerning competition in the tele-
communication sector
Jos Huigen (the Independent Post and Telecom
Authority OPTA)
Discussant: Rob Rosendaal (the Dutch Competition
Authority NMa)
Universal Service Obligation
Jos Jansen (CentER, Tilburg University)
Discussant: Jeroen in ‘t Veld (Ministry of Finance)
The economic effects of competition in communica-
tion and information services
Yvonne Bernardt (CPB)
Discussant: Robert Haffner (Ministry of Economic Affairs)
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Seminars are held on Tuesday afternoons between
1:00p.m. to 2:00p.m. Those outside CPB wishing to partici-
pate should call the receptionist (tel. CPB 070-3383380).
Papers presented at seminars can be sent on request.
13 January  1998
Willem van Groenendaal (CentER, Tilburg University)
On the assessment of economic risk: factorial
design versus Monte Carlo methods
discussant: Carel Eijgenraam (CPB)
The economic feasibility of large investments in infrastruc-
ture involves many aspects and thus cannot be modeled as
a single optimization problem; instead, the multiple aspects
(demand, supply, prices, investment costs) are modeled
separately. Because of the wide range of factors that play
a role in the analysis, it is important to know which factors
exert a large effect on the analysis and which can safely be
discarded. This presentation discusses the roles of experi-
mental design and meta-modeling in this analysis.
27 January  1998
Carel Eijgenraam and Sjef Ederveen (CPB)
Economic consequences of
restrictive use of Schiphol
discussant: Kees Heineken
(Ministry of the Natural Environment)
Which restrictions should be imposed on the airport of
Schiphol? This public choice question requires a clear in-
sight into the alternative consequences of policy measures.
What are the economic effects of restrictions? Which policy
measures achieve the government objective of staying
below an upper limit of 44 mln passengers? Is an upper limit
of 44 mln passengers useful to achieve the standard for
noise pollution? How much traffic can be processed at
Schiphol in the different cases?
10 February  1998
Leon Bettendorf (CPB), and
Frank Verboven (UFSIA, University of Antwerpen)
Competition in the Dutch coffee market
discussant: Marcel Canoy (CPB)
World coffee bean prices have shown large fluctuations
during past years, whereas consumer prices for roasted
coffee have varied considerably less. This paper seeks to
explain the weak relationship between coffee bean and
consumer prices for roasted coffee. We estimate an aggre-
gate model of oligopolistic interaction. The relatively large
share of costs other than bean costs appears to account for
most of the weak relationship between bean and roasted
coffee prices. The remaining part originates in markup
absorption, but is less important since the market is
relatively competitive. See also the article entitled, “How
competitive is the Dutch coffee market?” in this issue of
CPB Report.
tual service to be below the USO-standard. If the bids are
unsatisfactory, the USO will be imposed on the incumbent
and financed by a levy on all suppliers. This procedure
seems feasible: experiences in France and Britain indicate
that even generous USOs impose only low costs relative to
total turnover; USO might even be desirable for the public
image of the provider and for locking in potential clients.
The benefits of competition in C&I services
Yvonne Bernardt presented a CPB study assessing the eco-
nomic effects of competition in the Communication and
Information Services (C&I), of which Telecom is an essen-
tial part (see also the article entitled ‘Competition in Com-
munication and Information Services’ by Marcel Canoy in
this issue of CPB Report). The method of analysis is a sce-
nario approach, as the changes under study are hard to
incorporate in current macroeconomic models.
The study uses two scenarios for the economic back-
ground: a favorable and an unfavorable one. The impact of
government policy on competition in C&I is framed also in
two alternative scenarios, one for effective policy, and one
for an unsuccessful competition policy.
The combination of favorable economic developments
and successful competition policy is called “technoforia;”
the combination of the two worst-case scenarios leads to
“infostatics.” This contrast is meant to elucidate the impact
of C&I on the economy as a whole. The other two combi-
nations, dubbed “mixed worlds,” are used to assess the
separate influence of policy compared to exogenous devel-
opments.
From the scenario analysis and particular case studies,
Bernardt made three general inferences, the outlines of
which were endorsed by discussant Robert Haffner (Min-
istry of Economic Affairs). First, successful competition in
C&I leads to substantial improvements of the price-quality
mix, and that the larger the improvement, the less the scope
remains for government policy. Second, a more efficient
and innovative C&I industry lowers transactions cost all
over the economy. The largest long-term savings originate
in re-arranging methods of production (e.g. PIN-cards in-
stead of cash payments). Finally, government policy seems
to be able to influence the market direction during the tran-
sition period. The resulting market size of C&I in the long
term, however, depends for the most part on exogenous
economic trends. The overall conclusion was that the costs
of regulating C&I are rather small compared to the poten-
tial benefits, but risks are substantial.
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7 April 1998
Erik Canton (CPB)
The Dutch Business Cycle; Let’s Get Real!
Discussant: Peter Broer (CPB and OCƒEB)
Since the seminal work by Kydland, Prescott and Hansen,
Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory has become one of the
standard approaches in modern macroeconomics. This
seminar reviews some of the literature and introduces a
basic neoclassical model with real business cycles. Even a
simple model is capable of mimicking some salient features
of the Dutch business cycle. Such a simple model may not
be readily appropriate for serious policy analysis. Canton
discusses some interesting extensions to make the model
more suitable for policy-oriented research. The basic RBC
model may have to be adjusted in order for it to represent
the Dutch economy with respect to the labor market, the
role of the government, and the importance of exports.
21 April 1998
Eric Bartelsman (CPB and Free University of
Amsterdam)
Productivity and specificity in factor inputs
discussant: Nick Draper (CPB)
This paper evaluates the macroeconomic importance of
specificity in factor markets by considering the effects of
wage moderation in the Netherlands on productivity
growth since 1982. The analysis is based on a vintage
model of capital with embodied technology. In a traditional
vintage model, a decline in wages relative to the cost of
capital will delay scrapping and postpone new investment,
thus repressing productivity growth. However, in recent
models that account for the specific production relationship
between capital and labor and the problem associated with
appropriability of rents, institutionalized wage moderation
will boast new investment and improve productivity. A
preliminary analysis using micro-level data of industrial
firms does not reject the role of specificity.
23 February  1998
Arnold Kusters (CPB)
The short-term macroeconomic
forecasting process
discussant: FrJ Huizinga (CPB)
The procedures of the forecasting process by the Cyclical
Analysis Division are presented on the basis of the time
schedule of the Central Economic Plan. This presentation
elaborates on the role of the quarterly macroeconomic
model FKSEC in short-term forecasting, the inclusion of
recent realizations, the leading indicator system, the link
with sectoral and foreign data and non-model information.
One of the major behavioral equations of the model, ex-
ports of non-energy goods (both volume and price), serves
as an illustration.
10 March 1998
Coen Teulings (Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment and University of Amsterdam)
Earnings inequality: the influence of changing
opportunities and choices
discussant: Pieter Gautier (CPB)
While the employment effects of minimum wages changes
are usually reported to be small, direct estimates suggest
a much larger degree of substitubility. This paper argues
that this paradox is largely due to a bias due to the aggre-
gation of skill types into broad categories. An assignment
model is applied where workers have a comparative advan-
tage in complex jobs. The implied pattern of substitubility
reveals the sources of the bias. Estimation results for the
United States show elasticities of complementarity to be
underestimated by up to a factor of five. Simulation results
suggests that the reduction of minimum wages during the
eighties has significantly contributed to the rise in wage
inequality.
25 March 1998
Valentijn van Nieuwenhuijzen
(University of Amsterdam and CPB)
Collapsing exchange rates
discussant: Hans Lunsing (CPB)
Several models of collapsing fixed exchange rate regimes
have been developed. The first generation of (monetary)
collapse models were based on economic fundamentals;
second-generation models later formalized the possibility
of self-fulfilling speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates.
This research develops a first-generation monetary dis-
crete-time model with uncertainty to estimate next-period
collapse probabilities of fixed exchange rate regimes. The
model is applied to several exchange rate crises and pre-
dicts fairly well speculative attacks on pegged exchange
rates that occurred in Mexico and the European Monetary
System (EMS). The model’s results allow formulation of policy
guidelines for countries who want to participate in EMU.
Presentation of new MIMIC model for
Dutch policymakers
Wednesday March 4, from 14.00 - 17.00 hours
The MIMIC team will present the new MIMIC model, which
contains a number of innovations compared to its predeces-
sor, such as an informal economy, endogenous human capital
formation and a distinction between short-term and long-term
unemployment. The new model simulates the effects of vari-
ous policy proposals that receive much attention in current
policy debates, such as:
* The Earned Income Tax Credit
* Policies targeted at the long-term unemployed
* Across-the-board versus targeted tax reductions
* Tax cuts for employers versus employees
Location is to be announced.  If you would like to attend the
meeting, please contact Ria van der Hoorn, tel. 070 - 338 3380
or Ruud de Mooij (070-3383364; e-mail:radm@cpb.nl)
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*Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen (tel. 31-50-3633674; email:
h.h.van.ark@eco.rug.nl )
  FORUM
Challenging partners
Bart van Ark*
In 1995, the Dutch economic weekly, ESB, published an ar-
ticle by van Ewijk and Koedijk which argued that CPB should
move from its traditional role of running econometric
models to assess the effectiveness of policy proposals to-
wards a greater participation as a “think-tank“ in major
economic policy debates in the Netherlands (C. van Ewijk
and C.G. Koedijk, “Van rekenmeester naar denktank,” ESB,
31-5-1995, pp. 509-513). With the publication of Challeng-
ing Neighbours: Rethinking German and Dutch Institutions
(CPB, 1997), CPB has convincingly demonstrated its ability
to do this. Challenging Neighbours is the most extensive
documentation of the comparative economic performance
of Germany and the Netherlands, viewed from an institu-
tional perspective, since World War II. It provides a rich
source of information on a wide range of topics, including
social security, pensions, corporate governance, science
and technology policy, competition policies, public utilities
and health care. Most chapters are structured in a similar
way, starting with a theoretical or analytical framework, an
analysis and comparison of developments in both coun-
tries and concluding with a section on policy options (see
CPB Report 97/3 for a discussion by the authors).
This study stands out in comparison to some other re-
cent reports on the comparative economic performance of
the Netherlands, in particular McKinsey’s study, Boosting
Dutch Economic Performance, and the latest competitive-
ness test (Toets op het concurrentievermogen 1997) of the
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. The latter two studies
provide empirical information on how the Netherlands
performs relative to other countries on a whole range of
variables. However, these studies lack an analytical frame-
work that combines all the pictures into a consistent story.
Benchmarking is a useful device for firms, but at the mac-
roeconomic level it fails when it does not take into account
the offsetting effects of improving on any policy variable.
Hence, the McKinsey study and the competitiveness of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs are of limited use to policy
makers. Challenging Neighbours, in contrast, has a clear
analytical structure. It starts from identifying market failures
that raise coordination issues and require coordination
mechanisms to resolve them. The main aim of the study is
to visualize the trade-offs one faces in applying the coordi-
nation mechanisms.
What can one do with this book of more than 500 densely
printed pages? As an academic, I do no hesitate to answer
that question. The book is a major contribution to applied
institutional economics, and it helps to better understand the
relationship between policy and economic performance. It
has also a nice accompanying effect, i.e. that it is ideal ma-
terial for a graduate course on institutional economics, be-
cause it is a good case of an in-depth study of two countries.
But what about the policy maker, who is looking for clear-
cut policy questions and answers? Facing the trade-offs
complicates policy making, but it provides a better perspec-
tive on how successful certain policy instruments can be to
achieve certain policy aims and how the ideal mix looks like.
Regrets?
Are there no regrets at all about this study? One big ques-
tion that has arisen several times since publication is: why
compare Germany and the Netherlands? Without denying
the differences, from a global point of view the countries are
institutionally quite close. CPB defends its choice by empha-
sizing the importance of the more subtle differences of the
coordination mechanisms. Whereas the German system
supplements markets with control, the Dutch system
supplements competition with cooperative exchange. Still,
many of the trade-offs would have been much clearer if the
study had compared countries which were further apart on
the various coordination scales. In this respect the
McKinsey studies which benchmark each country with the
US performance in particular, more clearly show the trade-
offs between, for example, economic and social objectives.
Another problem is that, despite the similar structure,
the chapters in the book are still somewhat unbalanced.
Some chapters are very descriptive which cannot alto-
gether be avoided with institutional economics, but it some-
times obscures the “trade-offs” emphasized so strongly in
the beginning of the study. Other chapters do not succeed
to link the analysis of the institutions back to economic
performance. Admittedly this is not easy to do, but occa-
sionally one gets this feeling: “all right, many differences,
but so what …?” A logical next step in CPB’s research would
be to integrate the institutional framework with measures
of economic performance.
With this book CPB has challenged its partners in academ-
ics and policy making — exactly what a think tank should do!
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to changes in the economic environment. In reaction to the
general trends of international integration and globaliza-
tion, for example, CPB shifted its emphasis toward micro
and institutional research. The Committee realizes that
CPB’s research in this field has been lagging behind re-
search at universities and ministries, but believes that this
was almost unavoidable in view of the fact that CPB, be-
cause of its position in the Dutch social-economic system,
simply cannot afford to act as a pioneer.
In the second place, CPB has invested in opening up to
the outside world. Initiatives like peer reviews, the launch-
ing of CPB Report, and network building are both a sign of
this intention and a help to stay up to date. These efforts
might be developed more systematically, however, by pro-
motion of greater external mobility of staff, by a further
increase of the number of employees who work part-time
for other institutes, by the organization of summer schools
for outsiders and newcomers, and by encouraging employ-
ees to publish research articles in academic journals.
Maintaining its reputation sets high demands upon the
organization of the Bureau. The organization should both
be flexible and be able to guarantee that research quality
standards are met within agreed deadlines. In this sphere,
improvements could be achieved. In particular, the Com-
mittee stresses the desirability of:
— a more systematic approach to human resource manage-
ment. Off-the-job-schooling and employee training exist, but
are insufficiently used because of inadequate incentives. The
appointment of a special human resources manager could
be useful. In addition, a systematic and explicit assessment
of employees’ performance is necessary;
— a further improvement of research management. The
initiatives taken by management in this sphere are steps in
the right direction provided that they are systematically
used. Other suggestions that might be useful are a more
systematic use of project managers for projects that involve
several departments within the Bureau and for projects that
are undertaken together with other institutes, and to invest
in a clear formulation of the expected outputs at the start
of new projects;
— increasing the number of staff on temporary contracts.
This would promote external staff mobility and help main-
tain quality.
Main observations and recommendations by theme
The world economy
The Committee
— recommends that CPB undertake a comparison of the
accuracy of its short-term forecasts with those made by in-
ternational organizations such as the EU Commission, the
OECD and the IMF;
- welcomes the development of WorldScan, which it con-
siders a unique world model with few competitors in its
field. It is flexible enough to address a wide range of long-
*Chairman of the committee that reviewed the quality of CPB’s work. Prof.dr.
Anton Barten is professor emeritus at the University of Leuven.
Scanning CPB:
A view from the outside
Anton Barten*
The mission of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis is
...to undertake economic forecasts and analyses that are up-
to-date, scientifically sound and relevant for policymaking —
for the government, parliament, and other interested parties,
including political parties and industry.
CPB last year invited a committee of six independent ex-
perts1 to review the current position and activities of the
Bureau in the light of this mission statement. The commit-
tee was asked to consider both the research activities of
CPB as well as its forecasting and policy analysis activities,
and then to assess not only the scientific quality of CPB’s
work but also its relevance for policy making. A self-assess-
ment report2 written by CPB provided a starting point for the
committee’s work. This report presents CPB’s work in a the-
matic fashion.
The Review Committee visited CPB from 21 until 25 April
1997. During this week, the Committee met with Bureau
staff and with its clients (i.e. representatives of the civil
service, independent observers, participants in socioeco-
nomic consultations, representatives of institutes) that co-
operate with CPB and politicians.
CPB decided to subject itself to a review in order to help
maintain the quality of its work, which  is crucial for protect-
ing the Bureau’s credibility and independence. CPB delib-
erately chose to expose itself to a committee of outsiders
in the expectation that this committee would come up with
helpful suggestions to support CPB’s pursuit of quality.
During the talks with the Bureau staff and its clients, we
learned that CPB has a unique position in the Dutch politi-
cal and social-economic system. Our report3 formulates a
number of recommendations that we think might be helpful
in maintaining this special position and the vitality of the
Bureau. It is the hope of the Committee that this report will
serve its purpose and assists CPB in its pursuit of quality.
General observations and recommendations
As both a scientific institute within the government and an
institute for applied scientific research, CPB  Netherlands
Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis is a unique institution.
The second reason why CPB is unique is that it has been
able to build up a reputation for solidity and independence.
It plays an important role in policy preparation and consen-
sus-building in the Netherlands. This is shown, for instance,
by its role in the evaluation of the major political parties’
election programs.
Fulfilling the tasks that CPB is required to fulfil by law and
that it has set for itself at a certain moment is one thing,
maintaining vitality is another thing. This is not a simple
matter for a civil service institute. CPB has been successful
also in this respect. In particular, it has been able to respond
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term issues by generating scenarios of future develop-
ments in the world economy. The Committee welcomes
CPB’s intention to develop a maquette of WorldScan. This
would highlight the model’s most important mechanisms
and make it more transparent to outsiders and clients. It
would also make it easier to introduce innovations into the
model. CPB should promote greater use of World Scan,
both for Dutch and international clients. This should pro-
vide additional resources needed to enhance the model
further;
— is not convinced that the investment in WEB, a macro-
economic model covering the world economy, is likely to
yield sufficient value for money. There are already several
similar models available on the market and, although WEB
differs from most other macro econometric models in that
it aims to integrate business cycle analysis in a structural
model of the world economy and that it includes a rather
extensive trade block, the Committee is not convinced of
the additional value offered by WEB. For that reason, the
Committee suggests that the Bureau keep the volume of
investment going into WEB at a low level.
Macro- and meso-economic analysis
of the domestic economy
The Committee
— is impressed by the way up-to-date econometric meth-
ods are used for short-term model building and short-term
economic analysis;
— observes that the careful construction of short-term
forecasts, using additional information from outside
sources, helps to achieve a broad consensus about the
forecasts;
— advocates that CPB reconsider its investments in short-
term sectoral forecasts;
— advises CPB to continue building the annual model for
short and medium-term policy analysis (the so called OFK-
model). The annual forecasts made by the model should
be interpolated using quarterly indicators to obtain quar-
terly forecasts. If this turns out to be a satisfactory proce-
dure, there will be no need to build a separate quarterly
model for quarterly forecasting purposes;
— believes that CPB should encourage applications of
modern methods of macroeconomic theory in order to
analyze cyclical and structural developments.
Industrial and institutional economics
The Committee
— recognizes that through personnel additions and shifts
of emphasis among long-term staff, CPB is moving aggres-
sively into the domain of microeconomic and institutional
economics. The Committee views this as a desirable re-
sponse to changes in the Dutch economic environment.
Much of the progress made thus far has necessarily been
of a capability-building character, without sharply focused
contributions to specific public policy debates. The re-
search on agricultural markets is one of the exceptions,
having already made explicit in-depth contributions using
state-of-the-art methodologies;
— recommends that further studies of deregulation, com-
petition policy and economic institutions should emphasize
in-depth analyses of specific industries and policy ques-
tions;
— International comparisons of industrial policy ap-
proaches are valuable, but require deep insight into local
institutions that can be achieved intramurally only at high
cost. For that reason, the Committee recommends that CPB
should build up its ability to work cooperatively with experts
in other nations.
Analysis of the welfare state and the labor market
The Committee
— considers the MIMIC model to be an impressive achieve-
ment. The empirical basis of some parts of this applied
general equilibrium model is to be applauded.
— recommends that more emphasis should be given to the
sensitivity of MIMIC to alternative parameter values, espe-
cially where there is some uncertainty as to the reliability
of the parameter estimates. There should also be an assess-
ment of the ability of the model to track historic episodes
and  policy reforms before proceeding to make large invest-
ments in new extensions to the model;
— believes that the development of the health model and
the analysis of education and training are important con-
tributions that should prove relevant for policy making;
— believes that more attention should be given to the role
of private pensions and of savings behavior.
Energy, environment, space and transport
The Committee
— observes that CPB has played an important role in en-
ergy, environment and transport studies by supplying
macro-sectoral inputs to many long-term studies. In this
way it has contributed consistency to the analysis of pub-
lic policy;
— believes that CPB should invest in the development of
a cost-benefit analysis methodology that is macro-eco-
nomically consistent. This methodology should be able to
address pricing and investment issues. This investment is
necessary to enable the Bureau to maintain its function as
an independent assessor of important economic policy
actions.
Notes
 1 In addition to the chairman, prof.dr. Anton Barten, other members of the com-
mittee were: dr. Richard Blundell (IFS, London), prof.dr. Frank den Butter (Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam), dr. John Martin (OECD, Paris), prof.dr. Frederic
Scherer (Harvard University, Cambridge Massachusetts), prof.dr. Stef Proost
(University of Leuven). Drs. Edwin Oskam of the Social Economic Council as-
sisted the committee as independent secretary.
2 ‘Scanning CPB: A view from the inside’, available on request at CPB.
3 ‘Scanning CPB: A view from the outside’, available on request at CPB.
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 RESEARCH MEMORANDA
No 138
An analytical framework of industrial
organization for policy analysis
Harold Creusen
(tel: 31-70-3383393; e-mail: hpwac@cpb.nl)
This paper discusses an analytical framework of industrial
organization and a guide for policy analysis. It is mainly
addressed to policy makers entrusted with competition
policy, industrial policy and regulatory reform in particular
markets. The analytical framework contains a taxonomy of
several IO theories that consider relations between com-
petitors, suppliers and customers on a market. It highlights
firm behavior that results from or induce market imperfec-
tions. The guide for policy analysis then points to the po-
tential role for policy to remove these market distortions
and improve dynamic welfare. See also the article, “Detect-
ing relevant policy issues on competition and regulation“
in this issue of CPB Report.
 RECENT PUBLICATIONS
 WORKING  PAPERS
No. 97
Economic aspects of reorganizing
the pig-breeding sector
(co-authored with the Agricultural Economics
Research Institute; only in Dutch)
This paper analyzes recent proposals by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Conservation to restruc-
ture the pig producing sector. The restructuring plan con-
sists of a reduction of the number of pigs by 25% and the
introduction of tradeable pig producing permits.
The consequences of the proposals are evaluated by
means of a scenario study. The scenario outcomes show,
among other things, that employment in the pig chain will
decrease (due to the restructuring measures) by some
13,000 labor years. It shows also that a successful restruc-
turing of the sector is possible only if the pig processing
industry succeeds in upgrading its output.
As a general conclusion, the study states that the restruc-
turing measures imply a substantial break with the past.
However, in view of the environmental damages caused by
the sector and the problems brought on by the outbreak of
swine fever, the sector has to be restructured in any case.
Macro Economic Outlook 1998
(only in Dutch)
ISBN 90 399 1371 4.
Price: ƒ41,50
In September CPB publishes the Macro Economic Outlook
(MEV), which serves as a guide for the cabinet in the prepa-
rations of the budget for the next year by providing the lat-
est economic and budgetary forecasts for that year.
Updated with final decisions on government policy, the
MEV presents a forecast of the  Dutch economy for next
year. It is published in September simultaneously with the
government budget, which is based on these forecasts.
Special features in the MEV 1998 are an investigation of the
possible link between slower productivity growth and the
increased employment share of low-paying work, and an
analysis of the erosion of the tax base.
 PUBLICATIONS ABOUT
 FORECASTING ACTIVITIES
Limits to Schiphol Airport?
(only in Dutch)
ISBN 90 399 1445 1
Price ƒ37,50
Which limits do we set to Schiphol Airport? Answering this
political question requires insight into the consequences of
 SPECIAL PUBLICATION
Economic outlook for the next cabinet period
(only in Dutch)
ISBN 90 399 1443 5
Price ƒ57,50
This study presents two medium-term scenarios for the
period 1999-2002. The scenario approach has been adopted
because of the many uncertainties surrounding medium-
term forecasts. The cautious scenario is advocated as the basis
for fiscal policy in the next cabinet period, while the favor-
able scenario can be useful in preparing policies regarding
the environment, the labor market and infrastructure.
Special features in this publication are an assessment of
the economic development during the current cabinet pe-
riod, i.e. the years 1995-1998, and an evaluation of the pros
and cons of policy measures aimed at improving the labor
market prospects of people with lower education levels.
An English summary of the latest medium-term outlook
is published in this issue of CPB Report.
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The Macro Economic Outlook
(only in Dutch: Macro Economische Verkenning) is
published by and can be ordered at
Sdu Publishers
Postbox 20014
2500 EA The Hague
The Netherlands
Telephone: 31-70-3789880
Telefax: 31-70-3789783
Research Memoranda and Working Papers published
after December 1992 can be ordered at
Hageman Verpakkers
Postbox 281
2700 AG Zoetermeer
The Netherlands
Telephone: 31-79-3611188
Telefax: 31-79-3613927
Price: /20
Earlier publications in these series, if available, can be
ordered at the CPB library. Diskettes and Reprints can be
ordered at
CPB Library
Postbox 80510
2508 GM The Hague
The Netherlands
Telephone: 31-70-3383425
Telefax: 31-70-3383350
available options. What are the costs of limiting the num-
ber of passengers arriving at Schiphol, for the consumer,
for the airline industry and for the society at large? Which
alternative policy measures can be taken to stay within the
noise-criteria and what does this mean for the capacity of
the airport?
Together with other specialized research institutes, CPB
has worked on answering these questions. The study aims
to provide information for the public debate about the fu-
ture of aviation in the Netherlands.
97/4
BPC_ R   E   P   O   R  T
61
Basic statistics of the Netherlands (1996)
GENERAL
Area (1000 sq. km) 41.5
Population (million) 15.5
Employment (million persons)  6.0
Currency (1996) 1 $ = 1.69 guilders
Currency (November 1996) 1 $ = 1.95 guilders
PUBLIC SECTOR
General government financial balance (% GDP) –2.3
Taxes and social security contributions (% GDP) 44.0
Gross debt general government (% GDP) 76.6
PRODUCTION FOREIGN TRADE
Exports   Imports
GDP (billion guilders) 667.6 Goods (billion guilders) 294.2 267.7
GDP per head (thousand guilders) 43.0 (% of total)
Gross fixed investment (% GDP)  19.7 Food 23.9  17.3
Current balance (% GDP)   6.3 Energy 8.2       8.9
Chemicals 17.4  12.0
Metals 35.7  42.9
Other 14.8  19.0
Services (billion guilders) 64.1 47.9
  ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Production by branch (% of total GDP)          Exports of goods by destination (% of total)
other services 23.5
industry 15.2
trade & repair 
services 13.6
transport 6.8
health & 
human 
services 6.6
construction 5.0
agriculture 3.0
government 
9.5
real 
estate 
10.3
energy 
6.6
Germany 28.7
United 
Kingdom
9.6
France 11.1
other EU 
countries 17.5
Belgium/ 
Luxemburg 
13.2
rest 
of the
world 
19.8
6
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Appendix A Main economic indicators of the Netherlands, 1985–2002
 1996          1985          1986         1987        1988        1989        1990        1991        1992        1993        1994        1995 1996 1997 1998      1999–2002a
cautious favorable
billion
guilders           annual percentage changes
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (VOLUME)
Private consumption 398.5 2.8 2.6 2.7 0.8 3.5 4.2 3.1 2.5 1.0 2.2 1.8 3.0 3¼ 2¾ 1 ¾ 2 ¾
Government consumption 93.7 2.4 3.6 2.6 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.5 0.6 0.6 1.2 3 2¾ 1 1
Gross fixed investment 131.4 6.8 6.9 0.9 4.5 4.9 1.6 0.2 0.6 –2.8 2.2 5.0 6.1 7 4¼ 1 ¼ 3 ½
Private residential 33.5 –0.7 4.3 1.6 11.3 0.7 –2.5 –5.4 6.4 –0.3 6.2 0.9 0.1 6 2½ –1 1
Private nonresidential 81.7 13.1 10.7 0.4 1.6 7.5 2.3 3.2 –2.2 –4.5 0.0 7.6 9.3 7¾ 5¼ 2 ¼ 5
Public 16.2 –3.5 –5.3 1.7 5.7 1.7 7.2 –3.5 4.2 0.7 4.4 1.8 3.4 4¼ 3½ – ¼ – ¼
Final domestic demand 623.6 3.5 3.6 2.3 1.7 3.5 3.2 2.2 2.0 0.3 1.9 2.3 3.4 4 3 1 ½ 2 ¾
Change in stockbuilding 1.4 0.1 0.2 –0.9 0.1 1.1 0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –1.3 1.0 –0.2 0.2 –¼ 0 0 0
Total domestic demand 624.9 3.6 3.8 1.4 1.8 4.6 3.4 1.9 1.6 –1.1 3.0 2.0 3.6 3¾ 3¼ 1 ½ 2 ¾
Exports of goods and services 358.3 5.1 1.8 4.0 9.0 6.6 5.3 4.7 2.9 1.5 6.7 7.1 4.5 6 7¾ 3 ¾ 6 ¼
Goods (fob) 294.2 5.6 2.1 4.5 9.2 6.3 5.2 4.8 2.6 1.0 7.3 7.9 4.6 6 8¼ 4 6 ¾
Energy 23.8 4.9 –0.4 1.2 –4.8 4.2 –2.3 3.5 1.2 –1.1 –0.1 2.4 6.9 –2 ¾ 1 ¼ 1 ¼
Non–energy 270.3 5.7 2.9 5.1 11.0 6.5 5.9 4.9 2.8 1.2 8.0 8.3 4.4 6¾ 8¾ 4 7
Services 64.1 2.7 0.2 1.8 7.9 8.3 6.3 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.5 4.4 6 6 3 ¼ 5
Imports of goods and services 315.6 6.3 3.5 4.2 7.6 6.7 4.2 4.1 2.1 –2.1 6.7 7.2 5.3 7½ 6¾ 3 ½ 6
Goods (cif) 267.7 7.1 3.6 4.6 8.0 6.9 4.7 4.3 1.4 –2.7 8.1 7.6 5.8 7¾ 7¼ 3 ½ 6 ¼
Services 47.9 1.4 2.9 1.5 5.4 5.9 1.0 3.3 6.2 1.5 –0.1 5.2 2.6 5½ 5¼ 2 ¾ 5
GDP 667.6 3.0 2.8 1.4 2.6 4.7 4.1 2.3 2.0 0.8 3.2 2.3 3.3 3¼ 3¾ 2 3 ¼
Production enterprises 603.9 3.1 2.8 1.4 2.8 5.1 4.5 2.5 2.1 0.7 3.5 2.6 3.6 3¼ 4¼ 2 3 ¼
Labor productivity market sector 0.9 1.2 –0.2 1.9 2.8 2.0 0.8 0.4 –0.1 4.4 1.1 0.5 2¼ 1¾ 1 ¼ 2 ¼
LABOR MARKET         thousands
Population 15531 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 ½ ½ ½ ½
Population between 15 and 64 years 10604 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 ¼ ½ ½ ½
Labor force 6471 0.7 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1¼ 1¼ 1 1 ¼
Employment (persons) * 5977 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.4 2.1 2.3 1.7 1.8 –0.1 0.1 1.6 2.0 2¼ 2¼ 1 1 ½
Unemployment rate (%) * 494 8.7 8.4 8.4 8.4 7.7 7.0 6.6 6.6 7.7 8.7 8.3 7.6 6¾ 5¾ 5 ¾ 4 ¾
Participation rate (%) * 55.6 56.0 56.5 56.8 57.3 57.8 58.2 58.9 59.2 59.6 60.2 60.7 61¼ 61¾ 63 63 ¾
Dependency ratio (%) * 83.2 82.8 82.6 82.1 82.5 82.1 81.6 81.3 83.2 83.2 82.4 80.3 78¼ 75¾ 76 ¼ 73 ¼
WAGES
Contractual wages market sector 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.4 2.9 3.5 4.3 3.1 1.8 1.4 1.7 2¼ 3 2 ¼ 3 ½
Compensation per employee market sector 1.9 2.9 1.6 1.1 0.8 3.0 4.4 4.1 2.9 2.4 1.6 1.9 3 3 2 ¾ 4 ¼
Unit labor costs * 1.3 3.2 2.5 –2.3 –2.8 1.5 3.7 4.7 1.7 –6.7 –2.0 0.7 –½ –½ 0 0
Household disposable income (real) 2.1 5.7 2.6 2.0 4.6 5.7 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.1 1.8 2.5 2¾ 2¼ 1 ¾ 3
* see explanation after appendices.
a Levels: end–year. Break in series between 1998 and 1999–2002. Medium–term projections 1999–2002 are based on the 1997–1998 forecasts of last September (see CPB Report 1997/3). The 1997–1998 figures presented in this appendix have been updated since then.
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Appendix A Main economic indicators of the Netherlands, 1985–2002 (continued)
         1985          1986         1987        1988        1989        1990        1991        1992        1993        1994        1995 1996 1997 1998      1999–2002a
cautious favorable
         annual percentage changes
PRICES
Consumer price index 2.3 0.0 –1.0 0.5 1.1 2.5 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.7 2.0 2.1 2¼ 2¼ 1 ¾ 2
Private consumption deflator 2.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.2 2.2 3.2 3.1 2.1 2.8 1.5 1.3 2 2¼ 1 ¾ 2
Export price goods, excluding energy –0.1 –9.3 –1.6 2.0 4.0 –2.6 –0.6 –1.6 –2.6 0.8 1.6 –0.5 3¾ 2 1 ¼ 1¼
Import price 0.6 –18.0 –3.1 –0.6 5.2 –1.7 –0.3 –1.9 –2.8 –0.2 0.7 0.5 3½ 1¾ 1 1¼
GDP deflator 1.8 0.1 –0.7 1.2 1.2 2.3 2.7 2.3 1.9 2.3 1.6 1.3 2½ 2¼ 1 ½ 2
FOREIGN TRADE         levels, billion guilders
Exports of goods (fob) 218.6 185.1 182.4 200.0 223.5 232.3 241.9 241.3 237.1 255.6 279.6 294.2 324.75 357.00 437.25 488.50
Imports of goods(cif) 206.4 175.3 177.8 190.8 214.5 220.7 229.3 228.1 215.5 232.4 251.8 267.7 298.50 325.25 387.75 433.25
Trade balance 12.2 9.8 4.6 9.2 9.0 11.5 12.6 13.2 21.5 23.2 27.8 26.5 26.25 31.75 49.50 55.25
Invisibles. net 4.8 1.4 3.9 4.8 12.2 5.1 1.8 –0.3 3.8 9.3 11.7 15.7 22.25 23.75 23.25 24.50
Current balance 17.0 11.2 8.5 14.0 21.2 16.7 14.4 12.9 25.3 32.6 39.6 42.2 48.50 55.00 72.75 79.75
Current balance (% GDP) 4.0 2.6 1.9 3.1 4.4 3.2 2.6 2.3 4.3 5.3 6.2 6.3 6.75 7.25 8.50 8.50
Terms of trade 0.7 3.5 –5.6 2.7 –1.0 1.7 –1.1 –3.0 0.8 1.5 1.1 –0.4 2.25 –0.25 –1.50 0.75
COMPETITIVE POSITION            annual percentage changes
Price competitiveness * 2.0 –2.3 –4.6 3.4 2.2 –2.0 1.6 –1.6 0.2 1.1 –3.5 1.9 2¾ –½ 0 0
Relative unit labour costs * 1.9 –6.6 –4.4 3.4 6.0 –1.0 3.0 –3.9 –1.7 4.6 –1.7 1.1 6 1¼ 1 ¼
Export performance * 1.2 –2.1 –2.4 4.3 –1.1 2.1 1.8 –1.2 1.0 –1.0 –0.2 –0.3 0 1¼ 0 ¼
FINANCIAL          levels
Household saving rate (%) * 10.6 12.5 12.0 13.2 13.9 14.9 13.9 12.4 12.8 12.2 12.7 12.4 12 11¾ 13 ½ 12 ¾
Contractual (%) 11.7 11.0 10.6 10.9 10.6 10.4 11.2 11.0 11.1 10.5 11.1 11.2 11¼ 11½ 12 ½ 12
Non–contractual (%) –1.1 1.5 1.4 2.4 3.3 4.5 2.7 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.2 ¾ ¼ 1 ¾
Labor share in enterprise income (%) * 88.6 86.3 87.1 84.6 81.5 81.2 82.9 84.8 86.4 82.7 82.7 83.1 81¾ 80¾ 80 ½ 80 ¼
Net rate of return on capital (%) * 5.9 9.2 8.3 9.5 10.9 9.7 9.1 6.9 5.2 8.9 9.6 9.6 10¾ 11¾ 10 ½ 11
Solvency (%) * 40.8 42.7 43.5 43.4 43.6 43.6 42.9 44.0 45.4 45.0 45.7 46.4 47½ 47¼ 47 47
Short–term interest rate (%) * 6.3 5.6 5.3 4.8 7.3 8.7 9.3 9.4 6.9 5.2 4.4 3.0 3¼ 3¾ 4 4
Long–term interest rate (%) * 7.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 7.2 8.9 8.7 8.1 6.4 6.9 6.9 6.2 5¾ 5¾ 6 5 ½
PUBLIC SECTOR          % GDP
General government financial balance b* –3.6 –5.1 –5.9 –4.6 –4.8 –4.7 –2.9 –3.9 –3.2 –4.2 –4.0 –2.3 –1¾ –1½ –1 ½ ¼
Central government balance* –6.2 –5.6 –6.8 –5.7 –5.1 –4.6 –3.7 –3.8 –3.2 –1.9 –2.3 –1.4 –1¾ –2¼ –1 ¾ 0
Gross debt general governmentb 71.5 73.5 76.1 79.4 79.4 79.2 79.0 80.0 81.2 77.9 79.1 77.2 72¼ 69¾ 68 ½ 60 ¾
Taxes and social security contributions 45.6 46.1 48.5 48.7 45.6 45.7 47.5 46.5 46.8 44.7 43.6 44.0 43¾ 42¾ 42 41¾
Taxes      .      .      .      .      . 25.8 27.2 26.4 27.3 26.3 25.6 26.5 26¼ 26 25 ¾ 25¾
Social security contributions      .      .      .      .      . 19.9 20.3 20.0 19.6 18.4 17.9 17.4 17½ 16¾ 16 ¼ 16
* see explanation after appendices.
a Levels: end–year. Break in series between 1998 and 1999–2002. Medium–term projections 1999–2002 are based on the 1997–1998 forecasts of last September (see CPB Report 1997/3). The 1997–1998 figures presented in this appendix have been updated since then.
 b From 1988 onwards expressed as a percentage of harmonized GDP,
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1996 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999–2002
millions        annual percentage changes cautious favorable
guilders
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 19750 5.2 7.0 10.1 3.2 4.1 1.7 6.0 1.4 1.1 1¾ ¼ 2 3¼
2. Food, beverage and tobacco industry 18500 0.5 4.7 2.9 4.7 2.0 0.8 6.0 2.8 1.4 1½ 2 ¾ 1½ 3¾
3. Other industries * 24870 5.9 4.0 2.8 –1.1 –2.8 –1.0 3.3 0.1 1.5 4¼ 4 1¾ 3
4. Chemical and rubber industry 19190 7.3 4.8 2.8 –2.2 0.3 0.2 9.9 5.8 –0.3 7½ 7 ¼ 3½ 6
5. Metal industry 36280 1.7 5.3 3.3 0.9 –1.0 –4.3 5.7 4.0 2.3 4¾ 5 ¾ 2 4
6. Petroleum industry 3920 3.5 –8.7 16.7 –0.5 2.1 –4.5 11.8 4.3 4.6 4¼ 1 ¼ 1½ 3¼
7. Mining and quarrying 17700 –11.4 4.4 –0.1 9.0 1.4 1.8 –1.0 0.7 10.5 –7½ ¾ –2 –½
8. Public utilities 11190 2.7 0.2 3.0 3.4 1.0 0.4 1.9 3.2 2.9 –1½ 4 ½ 2 3½
9. Construction industry 33350 9.7 1.5 1.5 –1.0 –3.1 –2.4 1.1 –1.2 0.9 4½ 2 ½ ¾ 2
10.Operation of real estate 66590 –0.1 5.4 3.9 2.5 3.4 4.0 2.8 2.2 2.5 2¾ 2 ½ 1¾ 2½
11.Wholesale and retail trade and repair 80270 3.3 4.4 5.1 4.3 1.4 –2.0 1.9 4.1 3.2 4½ 4 2 4¼
12.Transport, storage and communication 48420 3.2 5.5 6.1 7.0 4.5 1.5 4.4 3.7 5.5 6¼ 6 4 5½
13.Banking, finance and insurance 32900 1.5 3.9 –1.3 –2.2 0.6 –0.1 1.4 –1.1 6.1 6½ 1 ½ ¾ 2¾
14.Other commercial services 95590 5.8 8.0 7.4 4.1 3.5 2.8 3.7 5.4 4.5 5 4 ¾ 2¾ 4½
15.Medical services 44930 0.4 1.3 2.1 2.5 2.5 1.4 1.5 0.4 1.0 1½ 1 ½ 1¼ 1¼
17.Correction imputed bank services –25720 2.8 –1.1 1.3 2.8 –0.3 1.7 –2.0 2.1 4.0 7 –1 ¼ 2¼ 3¾
2–6.Manufacturing industry 102760 3.6 4.4 3.3 0.4 –0.5 –1.8 6.1 3.2 1.5 4½ 5 2¼ 4
2–8.Total industry (excl.construction) 131650 1.3 4.1 2.9 1.8 –0.1 –1.1 4.8 2.9 2.7 2½ 4 ¼ 1¾ 3½
10–15.Services 368700 2.7 5.0 4.6 3.5 2.7 1.3 2.7 3.1 3.7 4¼ 3 ½ 2¼ 3¾
1–17.Enterprises * 528690 2.7 5.0 4.4 2.8 1.8 0.4 3.5 2.5 3.0 3¾ 3 ¾ 2 3½
Market sector * 399470 4.1 5.3 4.9 2.6 1.5 –0.4 4.1 2.9 3.1 4½ 4 ¼ 2¼ 4
Including exposed sector * 182120 3.7 4.7 4.9 2.5 1.3 –0.4 5.4 3.1 2.6 4¼ 4 ¾ 2½ 4¼
Including sheltered sector * 183040 4.1 6.8 5.5 3.3 2.5 0.1 3.3 4.0 4.3 4¾ 4 ¼ 2¼ 4
* see explanations after appendices
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Appendix C2 Total employment by branches of industry, 1988–2002
1996 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999–2002
thousand        annual percentage changes Cautious Favorable
labor years
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 247 0.0 –0.4 0.0 –0.4 0.8 –0.5 –2.2 –2.0 –1.0 –1½ –1 ¼ –1¼ –½
2. Food, beverage and tobacco industry 150 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 –0.4 –3.6 –0.7 –1.7 0 ½ –¾ ¼
3. Other industries * 242 4.1 3.2 1.5 0.0 –0.4 –1.3 –3.6 –0.7 –2.3 ½ 1 ¼ –½ 0
4. Chemical and rubber industry 102 2.6 1.7 2.5 0.0 –0.8 –2.3 –7.2 –5.3 –3.1 ¼ 2 ½ ¾ 1¾
5. Metal industry 341 –1.8 0.5 2.4 –0.8 –1.3 –5.7 –4.7 –0.6 0.3 ¾ 2 ¾ –¼ ¼
6. Petroleum industry 9 –9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –4.0 –1.0 2.1 –4.1 –2 0 0 0
7. Mining and quarrying 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –1.0 –3.0 –7.3 0.0 0 ¾ 0 0
8. Public utilities 40 0.0 0.0 –2.2 –2.2 0.0 –2.0 –1.4 –1.9 –3.1 –1½ – ¾ 0 0
9. Construction industry 413 3.2 1.0 0.8 0.0 –0.3 0.6 –1.0 1.2 2.7 1½ ½ –¾ 0
10.Operation of real estate 43 2.9 2.8 0.0 2.8 2.7 3.9 4.0 2.2 2.4 ½ ½ 0 ½
11.Wholesale and retail trade and repair 997 3.1 3.1 3.9 3.7 2.1 0.3 –0.0 1.7 2.4 3¼ 3 ¼ 1¾ 2¼
12.Transport, storage and communication 367 0.6 1.2 2.3 3.1 2.5 –1.6 –2.1 0.3 2.2 2 2 ¼ 1 1½
13.Banking, finance and insurance 190 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 –0.5 0.9 –1.0 0.2 1.3 ¾ –1 –¾ ¼
14.Other commercial services 1147 4.6 5.7 5.6 3.2 2.5 2.2 5.0 7.2 6.7 4¾ 4 ½ 2 3¼
15.Medical services 527 0.4 0.9 2.3 1.4 3.1 1.2 0.3 1.8 1.0 1½ 1 ½ 1¼ 1¼
2–6.Manufacturing industry 843 0.5 1.3 1.8 –0.3 –0.7 –3.1 –4.5 –1.2 –1.3 ¼ 1 ¾ –¼ ¼
2–8.Total industry (excl.construction) 892 0.5 1.2 1.6 –0.4 –0.7 –3.1 –4.3 –1.3 –1.3 ¼ 1 ¾ –¼ ¼
10–15.Services 3271 2.6 3.1 3.8 2.9 2.3 0.9 1.3 3.3 3.6 3¼ 3 1½ 2¼
1–15.Enterprises 4823 2.0 2.3 2.8 1.7 1.3 –0.1 –0.2 1.9 2.3 2¼ 2 ¼ 1 1½
Market sector * 4244 2.2 2.5 2.9 1.8 1.1 –0.3 –0.3 1.9 2.5 2¼ 2 ½ 1 1¾
Including exposed sector * 1497 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.4 0.2 –2.3 –3.5 –1.0 –0.4 ½ 1 ¼ 0 ½
Including sheltered sector * 2333 3.5 4.1 4.5 3.2 2.1 1.2 2.1 4.1 4.4 3¾ 3 ½ 1¾ 2½
* see explanations after appendices
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The figures in appendix A correspond with the National Accounts 1995 of Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Appendix A
Central government balance Central government surplus (+) or deficit (-), cash basis.
Dependency ratio Number of recipients of a benefit (unemployment, disability, old-age etc) as
a percentage of the working population in full time equivalents.
Employment ³ 12 hours/week
Export performance Percentage change of Dutch non-energy export volume minus percentage
change of  relevant world trade volume.
General government financial balance General government fiscal surplus (+) or deficit (–), EMU definition
Household saving rate Household savings as a percentage of disposable household income.
Labor share in enterprise income Enterprises excluding mining and quarrying, operation of real estate, medi-
cal and non-commercial services.
Long-term interest rate 10-year government bonds.
Net rate of return on capital Net profits as a percentage of equity.
Participation rate Labor force as a percentage of the corresponding population aged between
15 and 64  years.
Price competitiveness Percentage change of relevant world trade price minus percentage change
of Dutch export price (goods excluding energy).
Short-term interest rate 3-months Aibor.
Solvency Equity as a percentage of debt (liabilities) plus equity.
Unemployment rate Unemployed labor force as a percentage of the total labor force.
Unit labor costs Compensation of employees per unit of real value added in manufacturing.
Appendix B
Relevant world trade price Weighted average of price changes in guilders of non-energy imports of
customers countries, with Dutch export shares as weights.
Relevant world trade volume Weighted average of volume changes of non-energy imports of customers
countries, with Dutch export shares as weights.
Unit labor costs competitors Compensation of employees per unit of real value added in manufacturing of
OECD countries; the applied competitor weights indicate the relative impor-
tance of competing exporters of industrial products.
Statistical treatment of Germany In this appendix, data in tables on levels before 1991 are for western Germany
only. Data showing annual percentage changes refer to the whole of Germany
from 1992 onwards.
Appendix C
Enterprises Including value added tax.
Exposed sector Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing; manufacturing; public utilities; transport,
storage and communication.
Market sector Enterprises excluding mining and quarrying; operation of real estate;
medical  services.
Other industries Textile, wearing and leather industry; wood, furniture and building materials
industry; paper, paper products, printing and publishing industry.
Sheltered sector Wholesale and retail trade and repair; banking, finance and insurance; other
commercial services; correction imputed bank services.
